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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Stash away the duct tape. Don’t use it now: stash it away and that pre-measured 
plastic sheeting for future—and I emphasize future use.  You probably won’t need it, 
but in case you do, you’ll have it available1” 
  --Tom Ridge  
 
Human societies have always confronted hazards and risk.  Throughout history people have 
had to cope with devastating natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods.  
Societies have mobilized considerable resources and sacrificed numerous lives to wage wars across 
the globe.  In some cases, groups have sought to advance their own interests by subverting established 
political structures and processes, employing violent tactics and committing deadly acts of terrorism.  
And human beings sometimes fall prey to their own inventions, developing dangerous technologies 
aimed at making life easier that end up causing horrific technological disasters.
                                                       
1 (Kolberg 2004:114) 
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As Ulrich Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) point out, modern society is defined largely by 
risk.  Natural, technological, and human-induced hazards pervade our lives.  Disasters occur 
frequently, cause staggering amounts of financial damage, and exact severe death tolls on the 
societies they impact.  Moreover, efforts to improve safety and mitigate future disasters sometimes 
make matters worse.  As Mileti (1999) and Perrow (1984) demonstrate, we often build unsafe 
structures, approve land development in hazard-prone areas, and produce technologies with inherent 
flaws and strong propensities for failure.  Hurricane Katrina and the recent oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico are but two recent examples (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, and Erikson 2009; Freudenburg 
and Gramling 2011). 
Despite our long history and recent experiences with catastrophes, industrial and post-
industrial societies still have not developed adequate means for assessing risk, mitigating threats, and 
ensuring safety.  That is in large part because people often do not agree on what is risky and what is 
not, and even when they do, there are typically differing views on what should be done to reduce the 
risk.  In other words, risk and safety are socially constructed phenomena.  Rather than being purely 
objective and quantifiable, risk is something that various individuals, groups, and organizations 
contest.  Through a process of claims-making and framing, societies struggle to arrive at socially 
constructed definitions of acceptable risk (Clarke 1989).  Based upon that process, safety measures 
consistent with the prevailing definitions of risk are formulated.  Thus, risk and safety tend to be 
defined and constructed by those with the greatest access to and control over the claims-making 
arena, which are typically powerful governmental and corporate actors.     
Symbolic Safety 
To illustrate the social construction of risk and safety, consider the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  On that day, terrorists hijacked several commercial airliners and crashed them 
into the World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., killing 
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approximately 3,000 people.  This kind of attack had been a prominent threat in other societies for 
many years, and it had even occurred previously in the United States in 1993 when the World Trade 
Center was bombed and in the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.  
Nevertheless, before the attacks of September 11, lawmakers, public officials, emergency managers, 
and ordinary citizens had not been overly concerned or preoccupied with the threat of terrorism. 
All of that changed, of course, following the attacks.  The specter of terrorism was used to 
launch global wars, craft and pass policies and laws allowing for more aggressive pursuit and 
treatment of terror suspects, implement new invasive screening procedures in public places such as 
airports, and establish a new federal bureaucracy called the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
More relevant to this research, the newly created DHS developed the Homeland Security Alert 
System (HSAS) to inform the public about the possibility of future terrorist attacks.   
HSAS was a risk communication tool that presented the threat of terrorism on a color-coded 
chart.  Green indicated low risk, blue was guarded, yellow was elevated, orange was high, and red 
was severe.  The threat level was publicized every day on government websites, in airports, and on 
cable news channels.  As pervasive as it was, the HSAS had major shortcomings.  For example, once 
it was developed, the threat level never fell below the yellow (i.e., elevated) level.  Additionally, 
many political commentators speculated that the system could be used to influence political elections, 
fearing that the level would be raised not due to an actual increase in risk but instead to help garner 
votes.  Most importantly, the alert system lacked all of the characteristics of an effective warning 
system (Aguirre 2004).  An effective warning communicates detailed information about the threat, 
describes specific geographic areas or segments of the population exposed to the threat, and provides 
clear and consistent instructions on what protective actions should be taken.  The HSAS did none of 
those things.  It provided only a vague description of the threat, generalized the threat to the entire 
nation, and failed to tell people what they should do to be safe.  As a result of these shortcomings, 
DHS began to phase out the HSAS in early 2011 and replaced it with a new warning tool.   
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As this example clearly shows, risk and safety are social constructs, even in the context of a 
highly visible threat such as terrorism.  To further illustrate the consequences of these social 
constructions, consider the words of former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of 
Homeland Security, which are quoted at the beginning of this chapter.  Following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, he suggested that U.S. citizens follow the newly constructed HSAS, and he 
urged them to purchase plastic and duct tape to protect themselves against chemical or biological 
attack (Vries 2003; Lichtblau and Drew 2004).  In retrospect, these suggestions seem dishonest or 
even comical, but at the time, these suggestions were taken seriously enough that Americans rushed 
to their local hardware stores and cleared the shelves of duct tape and plastic sheeting (Vries 2003; 
Ridge and Bloom 2009).  This is a clear example of “symbolic safety.”  Symbolic safety is socially 
constructed, based on official definitions of risk, and promoted by those in power to appease the 
public and create the impression that things are under control.   
Contemporary society has largely become denoted by its ubiquitous risk (Giddens 1990; 
Beck 1992; Shriver, Cable, Norris, and Hastings 2000), and to a large degree, this process will not go 
away in the foreseeable future.  I contend that many organizations do this knowingly, but at the same 
time, they produce contingency planning to compensate for this fact (Clarke 1999).  Like Clarke, I 
assert this planning is largely fantasy.  These organizations offer symbolic safety, and considering the 
sheer amount of risk we all share and the degree of technological development of the last century, this 
process will become increasingly important to those critically studying society.   
Symbolic safety offers the illusion of security, allowing those producing risk to continue 
putting the public in danger.  It does this through the manipulation of reason.  These organizations 
encourage the public to disengage their imagination concerning the possibilities for accidents and 
disasters (Clarke 2006).  They downplay the possibilities for an accident, while overestimating their 
potential to respond and deal with an emergency.  Simultaneously, these organizations carefully craft 
and insert their own definitions of reality—informing the public what is reasonable, legitimate, and 
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realistic.  This construction becomes reified through the production and distribution of emergency 
plans and objects. When effective, symbolic safety calms the public and silences critics.  It frames 
oppositional thoughts as unmerited, illegitimate, and ultimately problematic.  Symbolic safety 
legitimates those in power, thereby reinforcing social arrangements and extending the status quo.    
These tactics should be studied, as technological disasters will happen, and eventually some 
of these fantasies will fail; many—usually the most marginalized—people will suffer, and some will 
die.  Research addressing symbolic safety promotes the kind of critical thinking and analysis that may 
better prepare societies to reduce potential problems in the future. 
Research Objectives and Rationale 
This research examines the social construction of risk and safety around the chemical 
weapons stockpile and incinerator in Anniston, Alabama.  It seeks to answer the following research 
questions: First, what aspects of organizationally produced symbolic safety are salient to the public?  
Second, how does the public perceive and consume organizationally produced symbolic safety?  
Through the collection of personal interviews, historical documents, and personal accounts, this study 
addresses these fundamental questions concerning how incineration became a reality for the people of 
Anniston, Alabama. 
This kind of research is important for at least two primary reasons.  First, this research not 
only documents how organizations communicate risk information, but importantly, it also addresses 
how the public makes sense of the various tactics these organizations implement.  Understanding this 
communicative process elucidates both the manufacture of public acquiescence and how incineration 
proponents maintain and even increase their legitimacy with the very public they place in risk.  
Second, this research produces fresh theoretical insight into this intriguing social event.  This new 
theoretical insight illustrates how contemporary organizations communicate risk and mold reality 
through the production and distribution of symbolic safety.   
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Findings from this study also have important practical implications in terms of better 
understanding risk communication.  Emergency planners typically focus on the construction and 
implementation of mitigation efforts for a disaster or some kind of an accident.  The production and 
distribution of risk information and materials are important aspects of planning for an emergency.  
However, audiences are not passive bystanders in the negotiation of social reality.  The production 
and distribution of these plans accounts for part of this process.  People will ultimately evaluate the 
worth and usefulness of the information and materials given to them.  They will make important 
decisions based on how they make sense of emergency planning, and people make these decisions 
through a process that is highly social.  Sociologists, in particular, are well equipped to study this 
dynamic process, and further, we need to study this process.  Understanding how people interpret 
emergency planning will positively contribute to future efforts to mitigate and prepare for disasters.  
Preview of the Remaining Chapters  
Chapter II explores the history leading up to the construction of the Anniston incinerator.  
These socio-historical conditions serve as the foundation for these events in Anniston, and they still 
factor into the perceptions of people living in the area.  Anniston is historically noted for the bombing 
of the Freedom Riders Bus, but this notoriety extends into a legacy of environmental racism resulting 
from the polluting activities of Monsanto/Solutia.  Although not the focus of this study, this 
contextualizes the community’s complex relationship to chemicals.  Additionally, Anniston has deep 
historical and economic ties to the military.  This chapter will connect Anniston to the military 
industrial complex, and it will demonstrate Calhoun County’s economic dependency on the Anniston 
Army Depot.  This will include a description of Anniston’s significant chemical weapon stockpile and 
the international treaty that mandating its destruction.  Together, these historical, economic, and 
social factors will help ground the conclusions of this study, and they will provide a more 
encompassing description of these events in Anniston, Alabama.  
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Chapter III reviews relevant literature on risk and disasters.  It begins by discussing 
traditional scholarship on disasters that emphasizes how social structures respond to system 
disruptions.  It then contrasts that approach with a more critical, social constructionist point of view 
emphasizing interaction, negotiation, and the symbolic nature of social reality.  This contemporary 
view incorporates fantasy documents, and it extends this logic into the creation and distribution of 
fantasy objects.  This literature will support the conclusions of the study.   
 Chapter IV discusses the research methods for this project.  This study exclusively comes out 
of the qualitative tradition.  Qualitative methods are well suited for this research, as they permit the 
researcher to inductively and deductively gather research data.  It also allows the research participants 
to contribute their voice to these events in Anniston.  This chapter will also introduce the reflexive 
ethnographic element of this research, and it will cover the substantive parts of this kind of qualitative 
work: the sampling process, the qualitative interview method, and the data analysis process.    
 Chapter V begins the data analysis portion of this project.  Grounded in the words of the 
research participants, it will describe the production and distribution of symbolic safety.  This will 
include the risk information and materials coming from the organizations supporting the stockpile and 
chemical incinerator.  This chapter will begin by addressing the lack of transparency at the Anniston 
Army Depot, and it will continue into describing the overhanging diagnostic frame for incineration.  
This framing includes the common held fears of explosions and leaks and the knowledge or 
awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.  This chapter will also describe the risk 
information and materials distributed to the public. 
 Chapters VI and VII address how the public consumes and perceives these efforts.  Chapter 
six will primarily focus on the believers, the people who find comfort through consuming the risk 
information and objects.  This chapter will reveal the rationale for supporting the incinerator, and it 
will include important factors—such as knowing employees, trust in the materials, denial, et cetera—
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that contribute to this line of thinking.  Chapter seven will primarily focus on the skeptics, the people 
who do not find comfort through consuming the risk information and projects.  This chapter will 
show why these people distrust and disapprove of incineration, and it will include important factors—
such as viewing an evacuation as impossible, distrust of the materials, et cetera—that contribute to 
this skepticism. 
 Chapter VIII explores the factors influencing perception of the stockpile and incinerator.  
Some of these influencing factors include the general economic decline of the area and the 
widespread patriotism of the community.  These factors interplay in complex ways with opinions on 
symbolic safety.  Furthermore, many critics succumb to feelings of apathy, fatalism, ignorance, and 
indifference.  Some respondents resolve their fears with the untested belief that they can personally 
escape a disaster scenario.  This chapter demonstrates how important socio-historical conditions can 
influence social reality.   
 Chapter IX summarizes and discusses the major findings of this project.  It also discusses the 
limitations and significant implications of the research, including the applied applications for 
emergency planners.  This chapter will conclude by discussing the possibilities for future research.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
HISTORY 
 
 
The historical record of Anniston begins with a large void.  That void reflects the lack of 
attention given to the indigenous population that the European invaders largely eradicated.  Going 
back to the war of 1812 and the subsequent Indian Removal Act of the 1830s, whites 
systematically removed and killed the native Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw people 
living in the area comprising and surrounding what would become Anniston, Alabama (Garrison 
1999).  The historical narrative of Anniston begins without reference to the significant 
populations living in the area.  Unfortunately, this omission2 largely continues to this day. 
The existing historical record of early Anniston begins with the community of 
Woodstock—a name emerging from the start of the Woodstock Iron Company in northeast 
Alabama.  Woodstock would eventually be renamed Anniston after a local resident’s wife, Miss  
Annie.  From its very inception, Anniston was a carefully planned, and subsequently controlled, 
modern city.  The white industrialists establishing Anniston were immensely idealistic and 
wealthy.  Every avenue in the city followed a careful design, all reflecting the xenophobic 
                                                       
2 Strong debates and controversy surround this issue. One case in particular surrounds an event in 
nearby Oxford, Alabama, where a Native burial mound was used to fill in a parking lot of a 
Sam’s Club store.  Tensions remain between the need to value and respect the past and the push 
for economic development.    
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paranoia and controlling nature of the city’s founders: James Noble and Daniel Tyler (Sprayberry 
2003).   
Following a clear west-east demarcation along Noble Street, the city owners divided the 
city into two distinct parts: a spatial division that still remains pertinent to current-day social 
arrangements.  From the beginning, the west side of Anniston contained the working class 
communities, including the numerous factories and iron foundries spewing pollution.  Contrasting 
this, the wealthy owners and professional class lived on the exclusive east side of town, where 
they could literally look down on the inhabitants of west Anniston from their Victorian mansions 
spanning the Appalachian foothills.  This kind of segregation is not that uncommon in the South, 
but what makes Anniston so interesting is that the founders carefully outlined every geographic 
detail: even what kind of trees would be planted on which avenue (Sprayberry 2003).   
This strict planning combined with the exclusion of outsiders until 1883, made for a 
purposeful organization of the city; this organization embodied the values of the Old South—a 
highly formal apartheid based in race and class.  The founders were not much different from the 
planters and slaveholders of the past.  They ran the city with stern philosophy based in “charity 
and paternalism” (Sprayberry 2003:14); dissidents were never permitted, as the Anniston elites 
feared anyone shaking the status quo.  The remnants and consequences resulting from this kind of 
paternalism and distaste for nonconformity still remain to present day.   
Eventually the elites opened Anniston to the outside world.  In 1883, fearing pressure 
from rival companies based in Georgia, the Woodstock owners opened the town to outsiders.  
The city population doubled within a few months, but the elites continued to strictly control the 
citizens.  Industrialist James Noble continued to dominate local politics, and it was not 
uncommon for him to personally go through houses in the town to investigate and police the 
people living in Anniston (Sprayberry 2003).   
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Perhaps the founders’ strongest legacy would be the initial geographic segregation 
outlined in the city’s founding, as Anniston would follow this path for the rest of its development.  
Anniston’s segregation cannot be interpreted as an accident.  The segregation began as primarily 
an issue of economics, but looking back, race cannot be removed from this geographic 
organization; in fact, over time “race…became the ultimate dividing line in the city” (Sprayberry 
2003:36).   
Anniston always maintained a significant African American population.  The economic 
opportunities that factory work offered over sharecropping brought in a lot of African American 
workers from the surrounding communities.  Although conditions in Anniston were not ideal for 
minorities, there were real economic opportunities in the community.  West Anniston was not 
strictly segregated in terms of race at first, but over the decades, poor and rich whites would unite 
time and time again against their African American neighbors.  Racial segregation began as 
mostly economic in practice, but as time went on, race became an increasingly salient marker of 
division and exclusion in the community.  It was only in the late 1800s that the whites erected 
physical barriers to separate the racial communities.  The pattern of race combined with fear and 
politics would insulate elite power to contemporary times.  Following the 1901 Constitution in 
Alabama, white elites expanded on the initial groundwork of the city founders.  They approached 
the black community with a combination of paternalism and pity, as they distanced themselves 
from physical violence through blaming poor whites for much of the racial violence bestowed on 
the black community.  At the same time the elites constructed and subsequently monopolized a 
system of social control through combining symbolic and economic violence.  They engendered 
cooperation with the poor whites through a continuously communicated narrative of shared white 
supremacy.  But this sense of entitlement was also economic and reciprocal, as they maintained 
that the best jobs would be exclusive to the white population.  Black men could not become 
professionals; as of 1900, less than two percent of the African American working population was 
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categorized as professionals.  This economic observation does not include women because their 
labor opportunities were even more limited—almost negligible by contemporary standards.  Even 
with those profound limitations, a considerable middle class established itself in the west side of 
town, but because of the racial and economic pressures from the white community, maintaining 
their middle class standard of living remained a tenuous proposition (Sprayberry 2003).     
All the poor whites had to do in return was occasionally enforce the developing apartheid 
with violence, but this was mostly not necessary, as long the “African Americans recognized their 
“place” in the community, projected an air of civility, and refrained from economic 
competition…they were allowed to carve out a niche for themselves in the city” (Sprayberry 
2003: 57).  Overt violence was not generally tolerated because the elite whites recognized that 
these activities could threaten business.  Instead, an uneasy balance of denial and avoidance was 
established.  Describing the power of space and exclusion in the forties and fifties, historian 
Wayne Flynt wrote: 
We lived in East Anniston and that was important.  Living in East Anniston 
determined where you attended church, which group you ran with at Anniston 
High School, and gave you general standing in the community.  True, there were 
Areas where the two Annistons met—on high school athletic teams, at Baptist 
Associational youth rallies, and especially dating—but all such occasions 
provided parents with opportunities for lectures on marrying people of similar 
backgrounds or how ‘old so-and-so’ was really very nice but somehow not our 
kind of person. (Sprayberry 2003:36) 
The legacy of this spatial organization of race and class remains.  Even as white elites did 
not openly encourage or invite racial violence in their city, violence did occur.  Ostensibly, their 
distaste for physical violence was more that these public events could bring attention to the 
problems and inequalities of Anniston, thereby threatening the status quo of racial inequality.  
Many of the elite remained nervous of federal intervention, and because of the inroads of the 
Civil Rights Movement all through the Deep South and the horrendous 1961 burning of the 
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Freedom Rider bus in Anniston, the white community slowly began to work with the black 
community to halt the escalating physical violence in Anniston (Noble 2003). 
Polluted Past 
While the people of Anniston were able to somewhat calm the more overt forms of 
physical violence (Noble 2003), the legacy of racial inequality transcends normative definitions 
of harm.  Current and future generations living in Anniston must bear the burden of the toxic 
practices of those with power in Anniston.  Considering the historical legacy of racism in 
Anniston, it should come as no surprise that these practices were never equally distributed among 
the population of the city.  Time and time again the poor and racial minorities of west Anniston 
had to suffer from environmental risks and contamination.  Considering the profound work of 
Robert Bullard (1990) on race and environment, one could make a strong argument that the 
African American community living in west Anniston has continuously suffered from years of 
environmental racism.  Although this project will not directly address this issue, these events 
should be recognized for their social and historical importance.    
According to Bullard (1990), there exists a direct, significant relationship between race 
and environmental conditions.  He concludes that black communities are often targets for 
polluting industry; in this case, Anniston is no different.  This unequal treatment directly reflects 
the lack of political and economic power in black communities; as Bullard succinctly puts it, they 
fall in the “path of least resistance” (Bullard 1990:xiv), although black communities increasingly 
organize and fight against this injustice.                
Several factors influence the uneven paving of this “path”.  First, the lack of resistance 
from black communities reflects the unequal economic conditions facing African Americans in 
the U.S. South.  However, as Omi and Winant (1994) point out, class does not fully explain racial 
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construction or racial inequality.  In the post-reconstruction “New South3” (Bullard 1990:29), the 
basic need for employment engendered a lack of regulation, environmental protections, or 
meaningful resistance to the whims of polluting industry.  Anniston and the surrounding areas are 
strongly pro-business; after all, Alabama is a “right to work state4”, and historically speaking, 
labor conditions have always been tenuous at best.  Bullard’s analysis of survey data cites less 
opposition to polluting industry in economically depressed areas.  In a sense, the “New South” 
remains anti-regulatory and consistently pro-business, as southern communities felt that “jobs 
were real; environmental risks were unknown” (Bullard 1990:32).  Second, economic forces 
greatly impact the politics of race and ethnicity (Massey and Capoferro 2008; Winders 2008), and 
political structures contribute to the disproportionate environmental burden on black 
communities.  These environmentally devastated communities collectively lack representation in 
government, business, and importantly to understanding the environmental pollution in Anniston, 
environmental protection.  This disparity negatively influences black communities, and as a 
result, time and time again, they disproportionately suffer environmental degradation.  Third, 
political structures directly impact the spatial component of race and environmental inequality.  
Federal, state, and municipal policies towards infrastructure, government services, zoning, 
regulation, and enforcement organize and unevenly distribute environmental risks; these 
geographies comprise a federally created “urban apartheid” (Bullard 1990:7) across the south.  
Anniston exists as an almost perfect textbook case of this kind of urban planning.   
Considering Bullard’s (1990) work, we can connect the racial geography of Anniston 
with the unequal distribution of pollution and risk, as the geographies of risk parallel existing 
social inequalities.  Again, this project does not focus on these factors in great detail, but they do 
                                                       
3 An illusion that things have significantly changed from the “Old South”, but some argue this 
simply is not a reality. 
4 Meaning that workers may be fired for just about anything.  It is very difficult for labor to 
organize in these “right to work” states. 
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contextualize present day events, and they accordingly affect how people understand the chemical 
stockpile and incinerator in Anniston.   
Monsanto/Solutia 
Starting in the 1930s an “industrial coolant” (Grunwald 2002:A01) known as 
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) was manufactured in two locations in the United States.  One of 
these chemical factories was located in Anniston, Alabama, and this production was truly 
unfortunate for the citizens surrounding the Monsanto5 factory producing the PCBs.  In fact, the 
PCB exposure in Anniston is some of the highest in the nation, and this exposure caused the 
Environmental Protection Agency to designate Anniston as a Superfund Site (Rubin, Nodvin, 
Geller, Teague, Holtzclaw, and Felner 2007).  For years Monsanto poured “toxic waste into west 
Anniston creek and dumped millions of pounds of PCBs into oozing open-pit landfills” 
(Grunwald 2002:A01), all the while knowing the possible toxicity of their product.  As late as the 
1960s, the Anniston Monsanto plant released “50,000 pounds of PCBs into Snow Creek every 
year, while burying more than 1 million pounds of PCB-laced waste in its antiquated landfills” 
(Grunwald 2002:A05); this occurred without observing “even basic industry practices…no catch 
basins, settling ponds or carbon filters to clean its wastewater.  It washed spills straight into its 
sewers” (Grunwald 2002:A05).  A journalist writing for the Washington Times observed:  
State officials and plaintiffs’ attorneys were finding astronomical PCB levels in 
the area: as high as 940 times the federal level of concern in yard soils, 200 times 
that level in dust inside people’s homes, 2,000 times that level in Monsanto’s 
drainage ditches.  The PCB levels in the air were also too high.  And in blood 
tests, nearly one-third of the residents of the working-class Sweet Valley and 
Cobbtown neighborhoods near the plant were to found to have elevated PCB 
levels.  The communities were declared public health hazards.  Near Snow 
Creek, the state warned…the increased risk of cancer is estimated to be high. 
(Grunwald 2002: A08) 
                                                       
5 Litigation now involves a new company called Solutia Inc.  Solutia comes from Monsanto, and 
at least legally speaking and in terms of liability, the two can be considered connected. 
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By no coincidence, the production of the highly toxic PCBs took place across town from 
the country club and expensive homes dotting the hills of east Anniston.  This geographic detail is 
not a fluke or something resulting from mere happenstance.  The west side of Anniston has 
always been the poor side of town, and closely connected to this historical poverty, the west side 
was primarily the “black side” of town.  Observing the connection between health, location, and 
race, Rubin et al. (2007:388) observe: 
The patterns of PCB exposure in Anniston affected African Americans residents 
disproportionately more than white residents.  The former PCB chemical facility 
and its waste sites were located in West Anniston, the predominately African 
American and poorer part of the city.  
Unfortunately the environmental degradation and risks in Anniston are not limited to the 
pollution of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), as the city also warehoused tons of highly toxic 
chemical munitions.    
Anniston Army Depot  
The U.S. Department of Defense founded the Anniston Army Depot in 1940.  Originally 
named the Army Ordinance Depot, the Depot has continuously adapted to the needs of the U.S. 
military.  The Depot began performing maintenance and repair of combat vehicles in the 1950s, a 
goal it still maintains to present day.  It began storing chemical weapons in the early 60s (U.S. 
Army 2011).   
The Depot provides a significant impact on the local economy.  According to the U.S. 
Army (2011), the Anniston Army Depot contributes about one and a half billion dollars to the 
local economy every year, and it supports—directly and indirectly—an estimated 25,000 jobs in 
the Calhoun County area.  They maintain a yearly budget of almost 90 million dollars, and this 
does not include the substantial amount of money put into constructing the incinerator.  The 
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economic impact of the Depot cannot be understated.  This contribution became amplified after 
the closing of Anniston’s Fort McClellan.    
Stockpile 
Chemical and biological weapons have a long history of use, but in the First World War, 
chemical weapons were used in significant numbers to injure more than a million people and kill 
90,000 (Campell and Ross 1995).  Because of the dangers and indiscriminant effects of chemical 
weapons, the international community created the Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare, but 
even so, “between 1969 and 1986 there were at least 40 allegations of the use of chemical and 
biological weapons” (Campbell and Ross 1995:116).  That said, in part to the implications of 
their noted indiscriminate effects, chemical weapons were rarely used past the First World War in 
the 20th Century, and as a result, large stockpiles amassed across the world, essentially in the 
name of deterrence (Futrell 2003).     
In 1969, the United States halted chemical weapon agent production, accreting a 
stockpile of around 36,000 tons of chemical agent.  With “Public Law 99-145, in the Department 
of Defense Authorization Act of 1986” (Campbell and Ross 1995:116) the U.S. Congress 
legislated the destruction of the aging, non-binary chemical weapons, but even so, the United 
States continued production of the more advanced, binary version of chemical weapons; 
meanwhile, the Soviets amassed around 200,000 to 300,000 tons of chemical weapons  
(Campbell and Ross 1995). 
Since 1961, Anniston contained a significant portion of the nation’s chemical weapon 
stockpile. At one point, about 9 percent of all the chemical weapons in the country were 
contained in the 15,000 acres outside west Anniston; this amounted to about 2,254 tons of 
chemical agents (Bragg and Wilson 2002; Quigley 2005).  This massive stockpile of chemical 
weapons included about five million pounds of Sarin, VX nerve agent, and mustard agent (Bragg 
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1995; Quigley 2005).  Blister agents (like mustard gas) cause degradation of moist bodily tissues; 
these would include the eyes, throat, and the respiratory tract.  Nerve agents attack the nervous 
system of the body.  When exposed, muscles contract uncontrollably, soon followed by violent 
diarrhea, mucus saturation, vomiting, and death (Sundberg 2007).  These chemical weapons are 
simply lethal and particularly persistent.  They vary in form and function, but even when exposed 
to the elements—and this is by design—some of these weapons may stay viable and lethal for up 
to 16 weeks (Sundberg 2007).  Most of the U.S. stockpile consists of nerve and blister agents, and 
these are particularly persistent; things like weather, vegetation, elevation, and time modify their 
lethality and containment (Sundberg 2007), and given an accident in a populated area, 
decontamination would be very difficult.  These weapons were stored near a city consisting of 
over 24,000 people and surrounded by 100,000 more people living in the greater Calhoun County 
area—a relatively large population by most reasonable measures (Murphy 2003). 
Treaty 
To alleviate the international threat of chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention was held in 1993.  Under the agreements signed in the convention, the United States 
and the cosigning 130 nations all agreed “that each party would control its stockpile of existing 
weapons and never use or prepare to use such weapons for military purposes…[and to] take 
measures to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons home and abroad, as well as any facilities 
used to manufacture such weapons” (Quigley 2005:2), and according to the convention, this all 
was to happen before the year 2007 (Quigley 2005).   
To meet this demanding deadline, the United States Army began the long process of 
disposing its sizeable chemical weapon stockpile in 1983 (Futrell 2003). To accomplish this goal, 
the Army decided that incinerating the chemical stockpiles would be the best tactic to eliminate 
these weapons and fulfill the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Incineration 
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appealed to the Army because it would not require risky transportation of the chemical weapons, 
and they felt that the financial costs of incineration could remain reasonable.  The Army 
originally chose to build chemical incinerators at nine locales in the United States: Umatilla Army 
Depot in Oregon, Tooele Army Depot in Utah, Pueblo Depot Activity in Colorado, Newport 
Army Ammunition Plant in Indiana, Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, Blue Grass Army Depot in 
Kentucky, Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Mary land, Johnston Island in the Pacific, and the 
Anniston Army Depot in Alabama (Campbell and Ross 1995). 
Incinerator 
Due to the U.S. obligations in the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, the U.S. 
Army decided to construct an incinerator to dispose of the sizeable chemical weapon stockpile 
amassed in west Anniston.  The military had previously disposed of chemical weapons through 
other, less sophisticated means; these include (Chemical Materials Agency 2011:1) “ocean 
dumping, open-pit burning, and land burials”.     
The process of disposing chemical munitions is complicated because the weapons take 
several forms: mines, shells, bombs, rockets, et cetera (Futrell 2003).  In particular, the disposing 
of chemical rockets is very complicated because the rockets themselves are intricate in 
composition (Campbell and Ross 1995; Futrell 2003); rockets have multiple, highly volatile 
segments including agent, propellants, fuses, and charges.  Incinerating these complicated 
weapons becomes especially risky because incineration requires that “explosives and propellants 
be separated from the chemical agent prior to destruction” (Futrell 2003:458).  These additional 
steps increase the chances for error and bring the distinct possibility of a “catastrophic accident” 
(Futrell 2003:458).  According to the Chemical Materials Agency (2011), the Anniston Chemical 
Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) utilizes a seven-step process to account for these dangers.  
These steps include massive, reinforced concrete walls, cascading ventilation, carbon filtering, 
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robotic controls, and excessive incinerating temperatures of both the weapons materiel and the 
incinerated exhaust.       
Chapter Summary 
As seen from this brief overview, race and class inequality are woven into the fabric of 
Anniston, and the community has a long history with environmental contamination, technological 
risk, and military presence.  All of these factors are interrelated in complex ways that have shaped 
the town’s past, present, and future.  For the purposes of this research, the primary concern is to 
better understand how weapons incineration became a reality in Anniston.  Specifically, this 
research seeks to understand how governmental and military organizations defined issues of risk 
and safety in terms of incineration, how they communicated that information to the public, and 
how the public made sense of the information.  The next chapter reviews relevant literature that 
may help answer these questions.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Sociologists and other social scientists began to systematically study disasters in the years 
after World War II.  Since that time, competing perspectives have emerged in terms of how 
disasters should be defined and what should be the primary focus of research.  In this chapter, two 
broad perspectives will be discussed: the traditional view and the social constructionist approach.  
The traditional view tends to regard disasters as external events that impose themselves upon a 
social system, while social constructionists typically view disasters as socially defined 
phenomena.  With its emphasis on symbolic safety, this study obviously draws more heavily 
upon the social constructionist perspective, but it is important to also consider the traditional view 
to better understand how sociological thinking about disasters has changed and evolved over the 
past several decades.  
Traditional Disasters 
The traditional paradigm of disaster research primarily focuses on the impact of disasters 
on communities and how organizations respond to such events.  This paradigmatic focus emerges 
from both the applied and theoretical origins of traditional disaster research (Tierney 2007; Webb 
2007).  Theoretically, the traditional view drew upon structural functionalism which saw society 
as a complex system akin to a living organism.  From a research perspective, the goal was to see 
how the system would respond to extreme environmental jolts or disruptions.  From an
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 applied perspective, the objective was to produce research findings that would improve the way 
organizations and communities prepare for and respond to future events.   
Contrary to popular thinking, early disaster studies found that rather than breaking down 
into panic, chaos, and social disorganization, societies are often resilient in the face of large-scale 
natural disasters (Fritz 1961; Kreps 1984).  Indeed, they identified numerous misconceptions or 
myths of human response to disaster (Quarantelli 1960; Fritz 1961; Johnson 1987).  At the 
forefront of disaster mythology were the established but problematic narratives of disaster panic, 
dependency, and the need to control unruly civilian populations (Quarantelli 1960).  Early 
researchers sought to debunk these myths and replaced them with an alternative view of the post-
disaster environment, one that emphasized functional adaptation, shared consensus, and 
cooperation.  The pro-social response to disasters was so pronounced that it led early researchers 
to use the term “therapeutic community” to describe what happens in the aftermath of a disaster 
(Fritz 1961; Quarantelli and Dynes 1977; Webb 2007).   
 However, the traditional view has some significant shortcomings.  For example, with its 
strong functionalist bias, questions of power and conflict remain largely marginalized.  With the 
funding for early disaster research coming from military sources, researchers focused largely on 
practical questions of interest to the funders (Quarantelli 1960; Fritz 1961; Webb 2007).  In 
particular, they sought to document typical civilian behavior, identify response challenges, and 
make recommendations for improving future responses.  They were far less concerned, then, with 
issues of power and social inequality (Tierney 2007).   
Yet, societal inequalities impact every aspect of disaster phenomena.  This basic point is 
the crux of the “vulnerabilities” paradigm.  It assumes that social inequality is a prominent feature 
of all societies, though societies differ in terms of their primary basis of stratification (e.g., race, 
class, gender, or age).  It also assumes that pre-existing social inequalities will shape people’s 
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exposure to natural and technological hazards in the first place, and they will impact people’s 
experiences in the post-disaster time period.  Simply put, on the basis of prevailing social 
inequalities, disasters create winners and losers (Bullard 1990; Fothergill 1996; Phillips 1996; 
Dash, Peacock, and Morrow 1997; Klienenberg 2002; Stallings 2002; Fothergill and Peek 2004).   
Additionally, subsequent researchers, particularly those from environmental sociology, 
have suggested that the traditional view overemphasizes the therapeutic effects of disasters.  
Technological disasters, they argue, tend instead to create what they call “corrosive communities”  
(Couch and Kroll-Smith 1985; Cuthbertson and Nigg 1987; Freudenburg 1997; Gill and Picou 
1998; Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004).  These corrosive technological events differ from natural 
events in that they often cause conflict among members of the community; they do not typically 
follow the same sequential stages as a natural disaster (e.g., preparedness, response, recovery, and 
mitigation); and people often disagree on what has happened, what should be done about it, and 
who is to blame  (Couch and Kroll-Smith 1985; Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004).  
The Social Constructionist Approach 
 The ambiguity and lack of consensus among community members in the wake of 
technological crises highlights an important point about disasters that is particularly relevant to 
this study—namely, that disasters are socially constructed phenomena.  Although they certainly 
have objective features (e.g., physical destruction, loss of life, and financial costs), disasters also 
have a subjective side.  Individual and organizational actors differ in terms of how they perceive 
risk; what is considered to be a disaster by some is viewed as unproblematic by others; and safety 
or mitigation measures advocated by some are staunchly opposed by others.   
 In 1966, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote The Social Construction of Reality.  
Within this profoundly influential work, they argue that reality is not simply objective, that is, 
people negotiate social reality through interaction.  But key to this interaction, people mistake or 
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simply assume that experienced reality is rather objective and concrete.  Reality is “simply there, 
as self-evident and compelling facticity” (Berger and Luckmann 1966:23), and this seemingly 
objective reality comes about through a sociological process of language, externalization, 
objectification, and institutional reification.  
Robert Stallings (1990) skillfully places the study of risk within the social constructionist 
tradition.  This paradigmatic approach requires that the researcher understand the significant role 
of social organization in the production, filtration, and distribution of risks.  This basic 
understanding of the sociology of risk addresses two fundamental questions: first, who is 
involved in the risk, and two, what processes produce risk (Stallings 1990).   
The media are heavily implicated in the production and consumption of risk.  Media 
sources do not so much influence or dictate what people say, but what they do is essentially set 
the topic for discussion; in a sense, “the reality of risk for most of us exists mainly in images 
created by others” (Stallings 1990:81); that is, the media “frame” how people think about a topic 
(Stallings 1990).   
Even so, some frames work and others simply fail.  Key to this is “the maintaining of the 
singularity of an incident” or the role of “disownership” (Stallings 1990:88).  Certain stories 
resonate within a public, and in the social construction of risk, isolated events do not fare well.  
Successful narratives fit a pattern; they make sense against the established narrative background.  
As interpretation usually follows an event, having an established pattern helps the public 
“reinterpret” (Stallings 1990:89) the event against competing narratives that may not stay 
consistent with the event’s history.  According to Stallings (1990), winning accounts 
communicate similarity of events.  Further, these claims often focus on a single issue—something 
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simple and clearly linked to a chain of responsibility.  This often falls on individuals6, as other—
perhaps more complex—causes do not seem to resonate within the American public.    
Addressing the social construction of risk, we can see how context greatly influences the 
interpretation of danger (Stallings 1995).  In a sense, the very reality of an event is subject to the 
organizations involved in the creation of an event and its very interpretation.      
Fantasy Documents 
Discussing organizational planning and failure, Lee Clarke addresses the role of fantasy 
in complex and often risky organizations.  As Clarke (1999) writes, in the world of complex 
organizations, planning remains omnipresent.  In order to function and succeed at what ever they 
do, organizations will attempt to plan for every conceivable possibility.  One could even say that 
planning is normal, but here Clarke makes an interesting distinction: not all planning is the same.    
Not all planning is the same because we live in a world with limited information.  
According to Clarke (1999), organizational officials often do not know the limits of their own 
abilities, power, knowledge, and foresight.  This unfortunate reality becomes problematic when 
considering the possibility for organizational failure and disaster (Clarke and Perrow 1996).  
Addressing the possibility of organizational failure, organizations will plan for contingencies, but 
returning to my earlier statement, not all plans are the same.  For instance, sometimes plans do 
not adequately address the dangers inherent in complex systems.  “In particular, some plans have 
so little instrumental utility in them that they warrant the label fantasy documents” (Clarke 
1999:3).  These fantasy documents have some interesting qualities.   
First, as the name clearly indicates, they are fantastic in nature and design.  Fantasy 
documents make people believe in the fantastic through offering the illusion of both safety and 
                                                       
6 With public organizations, we will see this often with the “least powerful irresponsible 
individuals” Stallings (1990:91). 
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competency.  Shockingly, even to the people creating these fantasies, they “are neither wholly 
believed nor disbelieved” (Clarke and Perrow 1996:1041).  They are not wholly believed nor 
disbelieved because they accept “the most benign assumptions about the environment” (Clarke 
and Perrow 1996:1053), and lack any check on reality, thereby normalizing danger and offering 
an illusion of control.  These fantasy documents erroneously confirm to their intended audience—
and importantly the public—that organizational officials can ensure that “everything will work 
right the first time, that every contingency is known and prepared for” (Clarke and Perrow 
1996:1041).  In essence, they engage the imagination.  When constructed well, they:  
Describe the scenery, necessarily neglecting much as they construct the 
organizational stage upon which the fantasy will presumably work itself out.  
Fantasy documents detail the timing of assault, of reaction, and of recovery: 
when the disaster will strike, and how, and when—never if—the all clear will 
sound. (Clarke and Perrow 1996:1053)  
 
These imaginative scenarios are essentially dreams created from the promised credibility 
of the organizations producing them (Clarke and Perrow 1996).   
Second, they imbue organizations with power.  Fantasy documents connect and reinforce 
power through credibility.  Some fantasy documents work as “forms of rhetoric, tools designed to 
convince audiences that they ought to believe what an organizations says” (Clarke 1999:3).  This 
is done, in part, to rationalize and justify the growing risk embedded in contemporary 
organizational systems and society.  These “fantasy documents normalize danger by allowing 
organizations and experts to claim that the problems are under control” (Clarke and Perrow 
1996:1055).  Often, these plans will work to silence critics and shore up power.  Citing Murray 
Edelman, Clarke (1999:141) writes “policies and plans may fail, or make no difference at all, but 
the words are palliative because they offer the public soothing solutions to difficult problems”.  
This “encourages a quiescent stand in the face of problems and grievances that might otherwise 
invite resistance” (Clarke 1999:145).   
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Fantasy Documents and Incineration in Anniston 
Clarke’s notion of organizational planning and the production of fantasy documents is 
clearly applicable to the Anniston case.  We can see this demonstrated through in the ineffective 
but admirable opposition to incineration in Anniston.  Despite the best efforts from highly 
organized and outspoken opposition groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
the Kentucky Environmental Foundation, the Chemical Weapons Working Group, the Alabama 
Chapter of the Sierra Club, the Coosa River Basin Initiative, Serving Alabama’s Future 
Environment, and The Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration, numerous editorials 
opposing incineration in the local paper the Anniston Star, and even forthright hesitancy 
expressed from Senator Richard Shelby, incineration became a reality in Anniston (Laska 2001; 
Chemical Weapons Working Group 2007).      
How did incineration become a reality?  As with other risky organizations, the U.S. Army 
and Department of Defense engaged the public’s imagination through the creation and enactment 
of fantasy documents.  A case in point is the contingency plans addressing a possible emergency 
at the chemical incinerator in Anniston, Alabama.  Not unlike plans from other risky 
organizations, the plans presented to handle a disaster in Anniston incinerator fail to address 
reality and fall into Clarke’s (1999:3) astute criteria of “fantasy documents”. 
As part of the federally mandated Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project 
(CSEPP), emergency plans were developed to address an emergency at the Anniston Army Depot 
(Laska 2001).  These plans provided “emergency planning materials, including evacuation maps, 
siren patterns and schedules, and detailed instructions regarding what to do in the event of a 
chemical emergency” (Laska 2001:4).  The importance of these plans becomes acute when one 
considers that by some estimates, at least 30,000 people live within the “zone of danger” (Laska 
2001:3).  Even so, probabilities of risk in this case are difficult to estimate.  As of 2001,  
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Many in the area have no idea in what zone they live, no idea what siren tone 
signals a chemical accident, or no home-sheltering kits in their homes or 
businesses.  Many persons also do not have any idea of what evacuation routes to 
use, if any. (Laska 2001:86) 
Following the spirit of other fantasy documents, Laska (2001:6) writes of the Anniston area plans, 
“if an emergency were to occur, it would likely be large, overwhelming the best-laid community-
based plans…the area surrounding the Anniston Army Depot is not prepared for a chemical 
emergency”.  Sadly, evacuation is not even a possibility for many living near the incinerator, as 
they will have to shelter in place—a risky and tentative proposition at best (Laska 2001).  In a 
2001 press release, an organization opposing incineration released the following quote from an 
activist challenging incineration in Anniston: 
I’m sure it’ll be just fine with ADEM (Alabama Department of Environmental 
Management) if in the case of an emergency release of nerve agent, we simply 
close our windows, turn off our central air, and hold our breath, for that is exactly 
what the Army told us to do. (CWWG 2007) 
The probable failure of these plans does not result from a lack of competency, preparation, or 
commitment from the government and military (Clarke and Perrow 1996).  Instead, 
organizational failure comes directly from “the logic required of our risky systems” (Clarke and 
Perrow 1996:1053).  In a real sense, if a catastrophic failure were to occur in Anniston, horrific 
results would be simply inevitable.  But this is not to say that organizations knowingly lie to the 
public and themselves.  According to Clarke, organizations believe their own plans.  Although 
these plans are “deceptive in their effects” (Clarke 1999:141), they are not deceptive in their 
creation.  He concludes “organizations don’t know enough to create effective plans, so how could 
they know enough to lie and cover up?” (Clarke 1999:141). 
Fantasy Objects 
As can be seen in the previous discussion, Clarke’s concept of fantasy documents helps 
us understand the Anniston case.  However, it does not fully capture the social construction of 
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risk and symbolic safety around the incinerator.  To gain a more in-depth understanding of how 
incineration became reality, this study will move beyond fantasy documents and also consider 
“fantasy objects.”  These are material products, including plans that are more visible and tangible 
than documents, that shape people’s perceptions of risk and provide a physical embodiment of 
symbolic safety.  To understand how organizations use objects to enact fantasy and endow 
fantasy documents with credibility, it will be useful to briefly discuss the issue of postmodern 
production. 
Considering postmodern production, we can see how organizations do not just produce 
fantasy documents.  In fact, they produce a whole gambit of fantasy objects to justify and 
legitimate those in power.  So what are fantasy objects? 
Fantasy objects are physical, tangible items that work to accomplish all the goals of 
fantasy documents.  Returning to Clarke and Perrow’s (1996:1041) observation that fantasy 
documents “are neither wholly believe nor disbelieved”, the same can be said about fantasy 
objects.  For example, in the event of an emergency chemical release in Anniston, and this is 
assuming the sensors would successfully detect a chemical leak, Bragg and Wilson (2002:2) 
write:  
The 35,000 people who live in within nine miles are expected to have only 8 to 
15 minutes to evacuate.  For those who cannot get away quickly the plan is 
simple.  They have been told to go inside, seal a room with duct tape and plastic 
sheeting and wait. 
Now, if it is even possible to make a room airtight with all the time and tape in the world, this 
tactic, under the pressures of impending doom, seems unlikely for most people—especially those 
with special needs or even mild difficulties with pressure.  Describing this plan, elderly Anniston 
resident Hattie Howze tells reporters that she has trouble “closing the drapes” (Bragg and Wilson 
2002:5), and about the incinerator, “I fear it…but you just have to trust the people who are 
supposed to know” (Bragg and Wilson 2002:5).   
 
 
30 
To save their lives, most people living in communities surrounding the incinerator—the 
“PAZ” as it is called (Calhoun Emergency Management Agency 2008), can obtain a shelter- in-
place kit consisting of a 10’ X 25’ roll of plastic sheeting, a roll of duct tape, a pair of scissors, 
and an instructional video (Murphy 2003).  People living very close to the incinerator—the so-
called “pink zone” (Calhoun EMA 2008), are eligible for protective hoods, portable air room 
cleaners, and shelter-in-place kits, and people living in between these areas of the pink zone and 
PAZ—the “IRZ” (Calhoun EMA 2008) as it is called, can get a portable air room cleaner and a 
shelter in place kit from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Calhoun EMA 2008).    
I contend these objects work only in the most ideal of conditions, and this is assuming 
that if used properly, these objects would perform as advertised.  Exactly as with fantasy 
documents, to believe in these objects, one must accept “the most benign assumptions about the 
environment” (Clarke and Perrow 1996:1053) because all these objects: the tape, air cleaners, 
sirens, scissors, hoods, and plastic sheeting lack any kind of meaningful reality check—we do not 
know how they will work until a catastrophe happens, and that may very well be disastrous for 
everyone in the immediate area.  So with just a little imagination and critical thought, it is easy to 
see how these objects, and the people consuming these objects for that matter, might fail under 
chaotic conditions.  The possibilities are painful to imagine.     
As with all postmodern production, these fantasy objects are not valued or consumed for 
their reality or utility; what matters in terms of consumption is the symbolism of the item.  These 
fantasy objects allow people to seek and acquire a simulacrum of the real, not the real itself 
(Baudrillard 1990).  In his (1981) classic Simulacra and Simulation, Jean Baudrillard outlines the 
mechanics of power in postmodern society.  Contrasting a modern, more concrete sense of 
reality, Baudrillard claims that in the postmodern era, the proliferation of hyperreality7 maintains 
                                                       
7 Hyperreality coming from Baudrillard’s three orders of simulation: the first order being a clear 
copy of reality; the second order being indistinguishable from reality; the third order being not 
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that power is no longer obtainable, but instead, power becomes a simulation—that is, those in 
power practice the effects of power on a mass scale, even though they can no longer create, 
restrict, or restrain it.  It is a floating signifier; it remains free.  Exercised power dissolves into the 
practice of maintaining the illusion of control; it becomes a “hallucination” (Baudrillard 
1981:23).  Describing this phenomenon, he writes, “power is in essence no longer present except 
to conceal that there is no more power” (Baudrillard 1981:26).  However, the illusion of power 
takes effort, energy, and maintenance.  The powerful must insert the possibility of the real and 
clearly referential whenever possible to maintain the illusion of power.  Therefore, it is in the 
interest of those in power to confirm our worst fears and keep the public in a continual state of 
fear; the powerful “plays at the real, plays at crisis, plays at remanufacturing artificial, social, 
economic, and political states” (Baudrillard 1981:22).  
 To this end, those in power prefer the clear language of crisis.  According to Baudrillard 
(1981), crisis becomes the vehicle to answer desire—a mechanism to reengage and confirm the 
illusive reality principle8.  “Take your desires for reality! Can [sic] be understood as the ultimate 
slogan of power since in a non-referential world, even the confusion of the reality principle and 
the principle of desire is less dangerous than contagious hyperreality” (Baudrillard 1981:22).  So 
through crisis, power reinstates the reality principle and confirms the real; hyperreality dissipates 
accordingly, and power temporarily remains sound in belief, practice, and perhaps ironically, 
reality.  In the case of Anniston, the crisis clearly comes from the deteriorating stockpile of 
weapons.  Amazingly, no one contests this narrative, and the opportunity for fantasy emerges 
from this seemingly solid foundation in reality.  For power to remain sound and legitimate 
                                                                                                                                                                  
bound in reality and producing its own reality.  Hyperreality works on this third order of 
simulation (Lane 2000). 
8 The Reality Principle is the possibility of real, tangible, undeniable phenomena in social reality.  
In a sense, the reality principle is what the postmodern period lost.  Comparable to both alienation 
and anomie from Marx, Durkheim, and Merton, postmodern society rarely connects to the 
tangible and undeniable.  Everything has become lost, deniable, and in a sense, unreal: this is 
what Baudrillard (1981:1) calls “the desert of the real itself”.   
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though, the fantasy must remain real, and here we can see the role of fantasy in creating, 
maintaining, and possibly destroying power.  
In postmodern times, the true danger to power is simulation.  The possibility of a 
concrete, obtainable reality remains power’s only defense against simulation.  As Baudrillard 
(1981:22) states of this, to those in power, “it is a question of life and death.  But it is too late”, 
and it is too late because production is no longer real.  “What every society looks for in 
continuing to produce, and to over-produce, is to restore the real that escapes it” (Baudrillard 
1981:23), but instead, society’s “material production is that of the hyperreal itself”.  It seems that 
all of postmodern production seeks to reinstate the reality principle, but consequently, it is 
deemed to ultimately fail.   
To illustrate this point, Baudrillard extends Marx’s analysis of capitalism and alienation 
by connecting the “cargo myth of Melanesian natives” (Lane 2000) with postmodern production 
and consumption.  Baudrillard views these cargo cults as analogous to our society and its 
ultimately fruitless anticipation for fulfillment through voracious consumption.  In this example 
of the cargo cults, the natives associated—not fully understanding why—cargo planes with the 
wealth and prosperity of the white imperialists.  So to achieve their own prosperity from the cargo 
planes, the native people constructed “a simulacrum of an aeroplane to attract these 
objects…likewise, the modern consumer…sets in place a whole array of sham objects, of 
characteristic signs of happiness, and then waits” (Lane 2000:70).  In the same way as the 
Melanesian natives, postmodern society associates—again, not fully understanding why—media 
messages of the real, and postmodern societies accordingly seek and acquire a simulacrum of 
what they want but will never have: the real.  We buy the convertible car seeking attractiveness; 
we buy the latest electronic gadgets to become assertive and confident in business; we buy the 
movie with the funny cartoon characters to relate to our children; all this gets us no closer to the 
real, but as we begin to realize this, we never challenge the association: only the object itself.  To 
 
 
33 
the disillusioned, the problem must be an inferior product, and then the cycle begins anew.  So in 
postmodern production, importantly, emphasis becomes placed on the symbolism of the product 
itself; it is no longer the physical utility of an object.   
Concerning those in power, according to Baudrillard (1981), power remains resiliently 
committed to itself and to the fulfillment of its own fantasy.  As mentioned earlier, power must 
combat hyperreality through the production and recreation of the real that escapes postmodern 
society.  This begs the question, how can power reinstate the real, and how does this relate to 
production?   
Power reinstates the real through producing reality—the clearest example of reality 
comes from the discourse of crisis, disaster, and risk.  When believable and successfully framed 
as credible, danger quickly provides the powerful an element of reality, and here is where 
simulation becomes so dangerous.  Simulation undermines the reality principle and erodes the 
entire foundation supporting the production of risk.  Authority does not seek to simulate, as the 
threat is real to them.  “To simulate is to feign to have what one doesn’t have” (Baudrillard 
1981:3).  Therefore, authority must disavowal simulation and amplify any—fabricated or not—
reality of risk.  “Simulation threatens the difference between the true and the false, the real and 
the imaginary” (Baudrillard 1981:3).  For power to exist, the fantasy must remain real, and it can 
remain real through “pretending, or dissimulating” (Baudrillard 1981:3) because this “leaves the 
principle of reality intact” (Baudrillard 1981:3).  We can now see how power must keep the 
fantasy going.  This manifests in the production of a fantasy, and from this viewpoint, we can 
begin to see power’s amusing and fascinating world of make-believe.  Safety becomes the object 
of desire, and as with the narrative of the cargo cults, people acquire these products and wait for 
the real to deliver.  But this never will happen.  
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Earning the trust of the public is exactly what these objects are supposed to do; 
meanwhile control and safety remain an unobtainable illusion.  As with the fantasy documents, 
these items essentially help sell the narrative of control; they set the stage for competency and 
legitimacy in organizations.  They erroneously confirm to their audience that organizational 
officials have answers—that they can engage in the discourse of crisis and realistically answer the 
desire for safety—that is, the desire for something real.  This silences critics; to question the 
fantasy is to also question the concrete fantasy objects, and that can be ridiculed.  Challenging 
these items is nearly impossible, and if someone were to question the entire chain of events, their 
energy would—as with other criticisms of postmodern production, attach to the fantasy object, 
not the risky system endangering people.  So when a disaster occurs, no one will punish the 
organizations that created the risk in the first place.  Instead, people will criticize the objects9.  
Further, these objects demonstrate to concerned citizens that organizations are serious about 
safety—that they have taken real steps to provide security for the citizenry; this understandably 
soothes anxiety and offers people a false security.  
Chapter Summary 
 As shown in this chapter, social scientific thinking about disasters has dramatically 
changed since the 1950s.  Early research was dominated by a functionalist bias that viewed 
society as a social system and disasters as external events that impose themselves on and cause 
changes to the system.  More recently, researchers have begun focusing on issues of power and 
social inequality, noting that disasters are not randomly or evenly distributed across society.  
Rather, some groups are more exposed to and impacted by natural and technological hazards.  Of 
most relevance to this study is the social constructionist perspective, which argues that hazards 
and disasters only exist when people define them as such.  As a result, researchers now aim to 
                                                       
9 Flooding resulting from hurricane Katrina was blamed on failed levies in New Orleans, for 
example.  Or one could look at the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico for another good 
illustration of this phenomenon. 
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describe the role of powerful organizations in shaping people’s perceptions of risk and safety. 
This research applies that approach to understanding the efforts of governmental and military 
organizations to convince the public that incineration was safe for Anniston.  Before discussing 
the findings, however, the next chapter describes the methodology that was employed to answer 
these important questions.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This project utilizes two primary research methods.  First, I conducted a series of 
qualitative interviews (n =25) in Anniston, Alabama.  These interviews offer personal accounts of 
those living and working near the chemical weapons incinerator, and they serve as my main 
source of data.  Second, I also incorporated an autoethnographic element to the research (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000).  To be specific, I utilized elements of a “reflexive ethnography” due to my 
familiarity with the local culture and my deep ties to the community.  As Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000:740) describe it:    
In reflexive ethnographies, the researcher’s personal experience becomes 
important primarily in how it illuminates the culture under study…the 
researcher’s experience is actually studied along with other participants, to 
confessional tales where the researcher’s experiences of doing the study become 
the focus of investigation. 
This autoethnographic element helped me contextualize, organize, and ultimately make 
sense of these different sources of data.  It permeated the entire project while adding important 
descriptive detail.  This methodological approach provided data largely unattainable to an 
outsider.  Now, some may find this approach objectionable as it could bias or influence findings, 
but having an inside understanding may also provide contextualization absent from other research 
methods.  Lived experience can provide unique data.  My strong roots in the area gave me an 
emic or insider’s perspective, which facilitated entrée into the setting, sensitized me to key issues 
and concerns, and helped me better understand the perspectives of the participants in the research 
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(Spradley1980; Lofland and Lofland 1995).  This kind of autoethnographic detail demands 
immersion in the field, while also embracing a certain amount of subjectivity; autoethnographic 
accounts require the researcher to become a connected, longstanding membership to the 
community of interest (Emerson 2001).  Maintaining that connection served in my research 
efforts to comfort research participants into talking frankly about their experiences.  Introducing 
myself as a “military brat” worked to open many doors in the interviewing process, and this 
comforting information also greatly contributed to participants recommending other people for 
participation in this project.  Cognizant of the closing of Fort McClellan, many people were 
hesitant to openly criticize the Army or happenings at the Anniston Army Depot.  
Communicating my insider status did well to address potential discomfort in the participants.   
Sampling 
Adult residents living in the greater Calhoun County area composed the subject 
population for this study.  I am interested in these people because they have a stake in the 
outcomes of chemical incineration.  Living so close to the Anniston incinerator, these 
stakeholders are essentially invested in the long-term outcome of events in the community.  In 
terms of research data, these stakeholders have a close social proximity to the geographic 
locale—thereby possessing unique knowledge of the events and happenings occurring near 
incineration.  This experiential data is invaluable to this study, and only this population can 
provide this kind of information.   
 Participants for this research came from a purposive, non-probability snowball sampling 
method (Babbie 2007).  Participants were selected for inclusion in the study because they had 
relevant knowledge of the incinerator and could provide in-depth information on how risk and 
safety information have been presented to the public.  Individual participants needed only to live 
in the Anniston area, and following the snowball sampling method, participating individuals 
suggested additional research participants.  Following this method, research informants provided 
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access and contacts to additional research participants. 
 The sample began with people I knew from living in the area for years.  The first wave of 
respondents was primarily comprised of former coworkers, friends, and acquaintances from my 
past.  After interviewing, these participants informally referred me to other people they thought I 
would find interesting.  These people were often coworkers and family members of the 
respondents, but this was not always the case.   
Often respondents would initially tell me that they knew very little about the topic, and 
they suggested that I talk to someone “in the know”.  This was usually someone working at the 
Depot.  I typically countered this by explaining that everyone has important information 
regarding the topic, and although it would be good to talk to people more technically 
knowledgeable, I was interested in everyday knowledge of the incinerator.  This hesitancy of 
people to talk with me could relate to the perception that the stockpile and incinerator were 
complex topics; that the incinerator was highly technical and should be left to those with 
expertise on the subject—like the military.  I resolved this issue by assuring the respondents that 
they knew something valuable, and many respondents assumed I knew a lot about the stockpile 
and incinerator anyway, so people began talking to me without too much trepidation.    
I met with participants in a place and time of their choosing, and this varied widely from 
homes to fast food restaurants.  It worked in my favor to interview people in areas with high 
visibility.  Although I will not mention these businesses out of concerns for confidentiality, 
people began talking about my presence at these locations, and this interest contributed to 
referrals for more interviews. 
The sample consisted of twenty-five people.  All the participants worked or lived 
relatively close to the incinerator and stockpile.  Typical of a military community, these people 
moved fairly often, and their connections to the military and Depot were quite complex.  This is a 
transient group of people, and many of them have family working for the military.   
The research participants varied considerably by a few factors.  My youngest respondents 
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were in their late teens, while the most senior participant was in her eighties.  The sample also 
varied greatly in amounts of education.  This varied from no high school education all the way to 
professional degrees.  The sample was almost perfectly split between women and men, and 
although difficult to cleanly quantify, a slight majority of the sample were more positive and 
supportive of the incinerator.   
Overall, the weaknesses of the sample reflect my own background in the area.  As 
compared to the general population, the respondents typically had more formal education, and the 
sample was mostly white.  This was in part due to the nature of non-probability sampling, but this 
limitation should not affect the quality of information coming out of the interviews.  I had 
arranged for more interviews to be conducted, but this became exceedingly difficult because of 
the logistics of traveling so far under a limited budget of money and time.  Regardless of 
logistical limitations, I achieved saturation in the data, and I am satisfied with this group of 
research participants.   
 In addition to this snowball sample, I also contacted and interviewed the spokesperson for 
the incinerator.  I contacted him through the United States Army Chemical Materials Agency.  I 
interviewed him in his official capacity as the person of contact for the incinerator complex, and 
he was very cooperative with helping me understand and communicate the official line of the 
incinerator.  He also provided me with additional information and resources to aid in my research; 
this included a calendar, brochures, and other information about incineration.  All participants 
were assigned a pseudonym, and one person actually produced their own pseudonym for this 
project. 
Interviews 
The main portion of the research project consists of a series of in-depth, qualitative 
interviews.  Because these interviews are grounded in the experiences and context of those living 
near (within the boundaries of Calhoun County area) the storage and incineration of chemical 
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weapons at Anniston, Alabama, I traveled there to locate and contact people living and working 
in the vicinity of the chemical incinerator.  In this effort, early participants came directly from my 
extensive personal contacts, as I lived in this community for over a decade and still maintain 
friendships and have family in the Anniston area.     
Because rapport is so important in qualitative research, participation for this study came 
initially through the use of “gatekeepers” (Creswell 1998:117).  A gatekeeper is “the initial 
contact for the researcher and leads the researcher to other informants” (Creswell 1998:117).  A 
gatekeeper has special localized knowledge, and he or she is imperative to finding, and 
importantly, establishing rapport with research participants.  A gatekeeper becomes the first step 
in constructing a “snowball or chain sample” (Creswell 1998:119).  This non-probability 
sampling method “identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know what 
cases are information rich” (Creswell 1998:119).  Since there is no intention to generalize to a 
larger population, this sampling process was appropriate for this study.  I contacted these 
gatekeepers through a personal phone call.  The recruitment narrative included a brief description 
of the research project followed with a request for participation.   
Active involvement remained relatively short— less than two hours—for each interview 
session.  Some interviews were short due to the constraints of the individuals I interviewed.  
Some were a little longer, but most went approximately one hour in length.  Each participant was 
only interviewed once.  A waiver for signed informed consent was requested and subsequently 
approved, as the signed form would be the only document linking the participant to the study.  
Solicitation for participation and the actual interview sessions occurred between the months of 
June 2010 and August 2011.  All interview data were gathered in this twelve-month window.  
I asked each participant to participate in a brief (2 hours or less) semi-structured (Babbie 
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2007) interview10 at a location and time of their choosing.  This semi-structured or 
semistandardized interview: 
Involves the implementation of a number of predetermined questions and special 
topics.  These questions are typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic 
and consistent order, but the interviewers are allowed freedom to digress; that is, 
the interviewers are permitted (in fact, expected) to probe far beyond the answers 
to their prepared standardized questions. (Berg 2004:81) 
The accommodating nature of a semistandardized interview schedule engenders a more natural 
social exchange where the research participants feel more comfortable, and the interviewer 
retains the methodological freedom to pursue any emerging narrative themes. This strategy 
enables indirect and nuanced questioning.  Utilizing a semistandardized interview, I felt that I 
could better access emerging narrative themes without interjecting or directing the data; again, a 
flexible methodology encourages a more active participation and a more egalitarian relationship 
between the research participant and myself.  This research relationship follows a more feminist 
approach—encouraging collaborative knowledge making and an attentive focus on voice (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000; Padgett 2004).  All the participants agreed to let me electronically record the 
audio from our interviews, and I subsequently took the recordings and transcribed the interviews 
verbatim; these transcripts are the bulk of my research data.  I also took handwritten notes during 
the interview process.  Taking notes during these interviews helped me maintain focus during our 
conversations, and it permitted me another layer of description for later analysis.  Once the 
interviews were completed, I organized the transcribed data using a grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Babbie 2007) approach. 
 
 
   
                                                       
10 See Interview Schedule in Appendix. 
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Data Analysis 
Naturalistic Inquiry and Issues of Reliability and Validity 
This project employs a social constructionist position.  Thus, rather than emphasizing 
reliability and validity, its primary consideration is establishing “trustworthiness” (Hesse-Biber 
and Leavy 2004:460).  This encompasses “credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability”, or as Norman Denzin puts it, “a good constructionist interpretation is based on 
purposive sampling, a grounded theory, inductive data analysis, and idiographic interpretations” 
(Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2004:460); this research follows these guidelines.   
Data Analysis for Interviews 
Once I completed interviewing the research participants, I transcribed the conversations 
for analysis.  To analyze the material, I used an inductive approach much like the grounded 
theory method.  The grounded theory method is, “an iterative process by which the analyst 
becomes more and more ‘grounded’ in the data and develops increasingly richer concepts and 
models of how the phenomenon being studied really works” (Denzin and Lincoln 2000:783).  
Although this project does build from the grounded theory method, theory and the disaster 
literature informed the process of coding and organizing themes.  This process does not strictly 
follow the grounded theory method.  I entered this project with some expectations of what I 
would find, and I acknowledge this bias.  However, I attempted to approach the data with an open 
mind, and because of this, several unique themes came rather unexpectedly from the data.  My 
theoretical leanings did sensitize me to themes in the data, but this did not inhibit the end 
analysis.    
My strategy contained a few key stages.  First, I gathered the printed transcripts and read 
over the material for quite some time.  Reading the interview transcripts, I noted what caught my 
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attention—paying attention to both my understanding of what is pertinent from the literature and 
more importantly, what the participants felt, emphasized, or communicated as most significant.  
Once those themes became apparent, I scoured the transcripts to collect what quotes applied to 
those key themes, and I then organized the excerpts to make the most logical sense and fit a 
cohesive, narrative presentation.  I finally went back through the transcripts to find cases that 
contradicted or challenged my organization.  I then worked to resolve these differences and 
produce a document that best represents the complexity of this subject matter.  Several themes 
developed deductively from the literature, but several themes emerged from the interviews 
previously unseen.  This flexibility speaks to the merit of a semistandardized interview and the 
grounded theory method.   
Chapter Summary 
 As described in this chapter, this research employed a qualitative methodology that 
involved interviews and autoethnography.  The primary objectives of the research were to 
describe how officials defined issues of risk and safety around the incinerator and to better 
understand how members of the public have responded to those efforts.  Drawing primarily upon 
the interviews and also from my own experiences, the next four chapters provide some answers to 
these questions.    
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SELLING SYMBOLIC SAFETY: OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF 
RISK AND SAFETY IN ANNISTON 
 
 
This chapter examines organizationally produced symbolic safety.  Symbolic safety is a 
social construction.  It is an attempt to comfort people through the communication of official 
definitions of risk.  People in power promote these definitions to appease and calm the public.  
Communicating symbolic safety is an effort to create and maintain the impression that things are 
under control—that the social order remains securely in place, and that oppositional thoughts are 
unmerited, illegitimate, and ultimately problematic.   
In this instance, the Anniston incinerator complex and associated organizations 
accomplished this through two tactics: on one hand, the Anniston Army Depot and incinerator 
offered the surrounding public little transparency.  This kind of selective secrecy was obviously 
justified for national security reasons, but obfuscation of internal information—including 
institutional identity, demarcation, and transparency—worked to confuse the ownership of risk; 
that is, participants in the study generally did not meaningfully distinguish between the Depot, 
incinerator, Westinghouse, Calhoun County, or the Department of Defense, and this lack of 
distinction worked in the favor of these organizations.   
In terms of public perceptions, no one entity maintained responsibility or ownership of 
risk.  These organizations externalized responsibility for safety onto the public and in the case of 
a hypothetical disaster, onto sheltering individuals in particular.  However, this does not
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necessarily mean that these organizations had malicious intentions—in fact, far from it.  The 
spokesperson for the incinerator revealed his frustration about this very thing, as much of his 
energy and time goes into severing the public’s close association between the incinerator and 
stockpile.  This association creates a certain amount of dissonance in the communication of his 
central message: the incinerator is perfectly safe, and it exists to eradicate the dangerous 
stockpile.     
On the other hand, these same organizations permeate the surrounding community with 
an abundance of risk information and materials.  This risk information takes many forms and 
approaches.  One could say the discourse is rather diffuse.  The public relations outreach 
inundates the public with numerous waves of mailings, pamphlets, calendars, and maps 
reinscribing the geographies of risk.  Earlier on, this effort included the dissemination of 
evacuation plans, the holding of public meetings, and the instillation of an expansive siren and 
radio warning system.  This outreach effort also includes many radio and television spots, and the 
local paper ultimately reinforces this same public relations effort. 
This chapter describes these efforts in the exact words of the research participants.  It 
describes the production and distribution of information and materials coming from the 
organizations supporting the stockpile and chemical incinerator.  It describes the uncontested 
diagnostic frame for incineration in Anniston: that the stockpile was dangerous to the community, 
and it had to be destroyed.  It outlines the fantasy documents used to sell incineration, and it 
describes the objects manufactured to give life to these documents.  Overall, this chapter 
illustrates how the Depot and related organizations introduced and distributed symbolic safety to 
the community.   
 
 
 
 
46 
THE BLACK BOX 
“I feel like the Depot might as well be another planet.” 
Most of the study participants had little direct experience with the Depot.  This was even 
more so concerning the stockpile and especially with the chemical incinerator.  Most of their 
experiences came indirectly through the secondhand experiences of family and friends, or they 
pieced it together in their imagination.  Because so many people work at the Depot, a lot of 
information was secondhand.  It was very common for people in the area to personally know 
someone working out there.  Anna explained:   
I think that for people not to know what was going on out there, I don’t see how 
they couldn’t have known because if your parents didn’t work at the Depot, there 
was somebody in your family that did.   
Asking Dorothy about the Depot, she related a common sentiment:  
I’m pretty sure it’s important.  I don’t know much about the Depot, really.  I’ve 
known people that work out there and stuff, but I don’t know much about it 
mostly.  
Curtis told a similar story about the Depot: 
Some of my friends’ parents in high school worked at the Depot, but when I was 
growing up, I guess my impression, what I thought when I was growing up was 
that they worked at a place that made weapons, and I imagined they made tanks 
and stuff.  Like you see on the world war two films when the women are working 
in the factories—that’s what I imagined.   
The Depot is a restricted space, and relatively few non-military people have physically been 
onsite.  Far fewer ever see the incinerator: even pictures are limited to the public.  Describing the 
larger complex, one participant told me: 
To me, I feel like the Depot might as well be another planet.  I’ve been on the 
Depot once, and I didn’t like a single second of it [laughing], you know?  I guess 
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I could find it if I went looking for it, but I couldn’t really tell you where it is, 
you know what I mean?   
He continued:  
The Depot feels like, it feels like the chemical plant in the movie Batman 
[laughing].  You know what I mean? [loud laughing]…I was working for 
[Company Name Removed], and we had some drops there, and we got there, 
we’re going and it’s grassy you know, and there’s a buffalo, and we turn a 
corner, and it’s like a cement city.  It was awful! [laughing]  And that’s it.  That’s 
all I saw.  There were train tracks and pipes, and stone buildings, and it was 
awful.   
To most people, the entire complex was essentially an unexplored mystery; it is a 
phenomenological abyss—a void.  Harriet explained, “What I can see is that it’s off the radar.  
Out of sight out of mind…we don’t hear about it; we don’t know about it; we don’t talk about it.”   
“Out of sight, out of mind, the incinerator is totally out of sight.” 
 Because of its location and the closed nature of the Depot, few people visit or even see 
the incinerator.  In fact, one could describe the incinerator as physically hidden from public eyes.  
Anna described the incinerator’s hidden nature:         
You don’t see it.  It’s not in a place in town that you drive by and see this, you 
know, huge structure.  If it were in an area of town like near Quintard or 
something like that…that you saw it, but even if you work at the Depot, close to 
it—It’s in an such an area you may not even see it…It’s not like there’s a huge 
smokestack that you can see or anything like that.   
Jared told me that the incinerator is, “Out of sight, out of mind, the incinerator is totally out of 
sight.”   
Wanting more information, I asked him, “Your friends, too?  Do you ever talk about it?” 
“No, not really.  No.  We never talk about it,” he answered. 
“A lot of people tell me they don’t think about it.  It’s not on their mind.”   
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Jared responded, “Yeah.  You never think about it.”  One participant got to tour the 
facility as part of her job.  She described: 
I took a tour of the facility, but that’s it.  I know a lot of it is closed-container, 
mechanized, they take out the explosive parts and the nasty parts in the burn 
thing, and that’s about it. 
The incinerator was rather mysterious in terms of the exact process.  Much like with details of the 
chemical weapons, very few people knew the particulars of incineration and what exactly went on 
at the Anniston incinerator.  I asked Simon if he knew how incineration worked: 
No.  Not really.  I mean, no more than what the word incineration implies.  
[chuckle] I know a lot of the chemical agents are… once they reach a certain 
temperature become inert.  That’s it.   
Perhaps Jared’s response to my question encapsulated the community’s span of knowledge.  I 
asked, “Do you know a lot about incineration or what happen out there?” 
Jared answered, “No.  It’s a mystery to me.”   
And this lack of information should make sense, given the military mission of the Depot 
complex.  Reflecting on the transition from Cold War secrecy to contemporary disclosure, an 
official at the incinerator remembered: 
The focus on safely storing the weapons became very, very important, but we 
talked about it very, very little.  At one time, as a public affairs officer, I was 
counseled you can neither confirm nor deny whether Anniston Army Depot has 
chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, weapons of mass 
destruction.  Then in January of 1996, the Defense Department released a news 
release, saying: not only do we have chemical weapons, wink, wink, but this is 
where that material is, and they spelled out exactly what was where. 
 Despite the importance of the Anniston Army Depot, many people in the 
community have no direct experience with the facility.  Although thousands of people 
work on the site, the larger public does not get firsthand knowledge of the Depot, and this 
is in stark contrast to the open nature of the old Fort McClellan in Anniston.  The Depot 
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persists as a complete mystery to most people, and considering the high risk potential of 
the stockpile and its close proximity to a relatively highly populated area, this fact 
remains fascinating.   
THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS: ACHIEVING SAFETY THROUGH 
RISK 
Relative to the mystery of what happens at the Depot and the incinerator was an 
abundance of information concerning the stockpile: specifically the deteriorating condition of 
weapons in Anniston and the subsequent danger they imposed on the community.  This potential 
danger was the master narrative supporting incineration, and I never heard anyone dispute this 
claim, not even incineration opponents.  In other words, although incineration was a high-risk 
endeavor with potentially catastrophic consequences in the event of a mishap, it was framed as a 
safety measure to the public.  Rather than allowing the weapons to degrade and risking an 
accidental release, public officials claimed, it is safer to destroy them. 
 “Shoot, am I going to start twitching and having all kinds of neurological 
damage and whatnot?” 
Most of the people I spoke with did not have technical knowledge about the chemical 
weapons stored at the Anniston Depot.  Most common knowledge of the stockpile was rather 
anecdotal, and much of it was pure speculation.  However, although this knowledge was 
problematic in detail, the overall picture was fairly consistent and clear.  People were acutely 
aware of the possible danger these weapons pose, and details aside, these weapons scared them.   
People feared these munitions, and they saw them as dangerous to the community.  Greg recalled 
his first realization of the nearby stockpile:    
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So we were getting ready to invade Iraq; the discussion of chemical weapons was 
pretty common.  Everybody was nervous about chemical weapons being used on 
our troops and all of a sudden come to find out that just down the street, there’s a 
huge stockpile of chemical weapons!  And that was very unnerving because what 
I knew, which wasn’t much, was that they were very unstable…highly 
uncontrollable, and that’s one of the reasons they don’t use them anymore.  So 
shoot, am I going to start twitching and having all kinds of neurological damage 
and whatnot?  So it was, yeah, it was very unnerving.  If I would have known 
before I bought a house, and the realtor didn’t even say anything about it, I would 
have definitely looked somewhere else for a home.  
Often knowledge of these weapons comes through rumor and hearsay.  People hear things from 
someone “in the know”.  Carla explained:      
Yeah, there has been, talking about chemicals and how they’ve been used in war, 
and what types there are, and how they would affect your body.  We talked about 
that in high school.  Me and a bunch of my friends did; one of the guys knew a 
lot about stuff like that, and it came up one day, and we started arguing about we 
could do this or do that to prevent it, but ultimately he was like, no you cannot 
[laugh].  But I remember that.   
Like so many people in the area, Simon’s family member works at the Depot.  I asked him if his 
relative ever talks about these weapons: 
He was in the military, so they spoke in acronyms.  I never had an idea of what 
he was talking about anyway.  Every time we moved, his job kind of changed 
anyway.  So I never really knew what he was doing: one day he’s working on 
armored, hermetically sealed transports, and another time, he’s working with 
robots, and another time, he tells me hey, if this gets on your skin, you’re dead!  
That’s great.  That’s nice.  What’s very surprising, I remember one day he had a 
file that listed a bunch of chemical and biological agents, and what I didn’t 
realized was that how many varieties there were.  I thought as far as chemical 
weapons go, there’s three or four; there’s dozens that do all sorts of stuff.  I had 
no idea.  That’s kind of scary.  They keep coming up with stuff that’s better I 
guess, relatively.   
Other respondents place the stockpile in the scope and potential for devastation.  In terms of an 
incident and subsequent potential deaths, I asked Wendy, “Do you think that’s a realistic danger?  
That a thousand people could die?”  She answered: 
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I think so, yeah, because they talked about how it depended how the wind was 
blowing, it depended on which way it would go, and how quickly it would get 
there, and how far it would spread.  So I definitely think it’s realistic that 
thousands of people could die.  Especially if you’re in your car, you’re not going 
to have your gas mask.  You had to be at home, and if it happens during the day, 
how many people would be at home?   
Others cite the very nature of these weapons of mass destruction.  I asked Simon about the 
prospects of surviving a major chemical release:   
I have a hard time believing that [laughing].  You got to think: those weapons are 
designed to go around corners; that’s why they were made.  You know what I 
mean?  Otherwise, you make a big enough bomb to kill everybody.  You can put 
yourself in a bunker and you’re safe from a bomb, but you’re not going to be safe 
from chemical weapons.  You’re not going to be safe in your house.  Look at the 
dustbowl.  People lived in these prairie houses, and they sealed up every crack 
they could find in that house, and it didn’t matter.  The place was still filled with 
dust and they had mud in their lungs.  It’s the same thing, and chemical agents 
are even finer.   
EXPLOSIONS 
“like a time bomb, just sitting there”  
I asked the spokesperson for the incinerator about the stockpile and its dangers, and he 
explained that, “we [the military] didn’t have was [sic] a good plan if something happened in 
storage.”  And that “something” he referred to was an explosive disaster.  This danger of 
explosion was in part to the age and straightforward design of the firing mechanisms in these 
aging weapons:     
The rockets that we had: they had a motor that was lit off with electricity, and 
there was a very real threat that stray lightening could set off a rocket.  One 
rocket fire could affect an other; two could affect four, and four could affect 
eight, and it becomes a nightmare. 
However, the Army mitigated this danger of explosion through the proximity and design of the 
“igloos” that housed these weapons.  Again, the official stated: 
 
 
52 
The igloos were designed with very wide sidewalls, tapered roofs, if there was an 
explosion, the force of the explosion would go up, therefore even though the 
igloos were spaced apart, there would be even less of a tendency to have a 
domino effect.  This one blows up; this one blows up, and so forth.  The way they 
are designed, the force goes up and then implodes back down.  It becomes a 
localized issue, a very dangerous issue… 
He and local officials were legitimately concerned with the dangers of storage, as these igloos 
were not fail proof; unprovoked, he explained one troubling event from years past: 
Yes, an igloo did explode at Anniston Army Depot back in about 1957, a non-
chemical igloo, and the igloo performed as designed.  Fortunately no one was 
there; it was the middle of the night, but other igloos were not affected: big hole 
still exists.   
But that explosion did affect people outside the Depot.  Irene recalled the explosion:  
That one was bad enough that in my husband’s family’s house, it rocked the 
neighborhood enough that it broke their front glass out of their house.  And you 
know, the restricted area was pretty far back.  Nah, we felt it. 
Many people communicated they had concerns with the danger associated with natural 
disasters—perhaps more so than incineration itself.  In 2011, a rash of tornadoes devastated 
Tuscaloosa, and this disaster was fresh in the mind of the people I interviewed.  The Anniston 
area is obviously not immune from tornadoes and severe thunderstorms.  One participant 
explained how nature was more threatening to the community than incineration: 
Now, what if the tornadoes had hit the Depot, and that’s a different issue, and 
that was actually brought up, and they were talking about the strength of the 
igloos and what they could stand, but a natural disaster like that, it could be an 
issue.   
Others saw it as a strong motivator to do something.  Wendall testified to the dangers of indefinite 
storage: 
You can leave them there while they deteriorate, and it’s just a matter of time 
until there would be an accident, or there would be a natural disaster like a 
tornado or wreck or something where somehow there was a release or something.  
So something had to be done.  
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Talking about it in hindsight, the Army spokesperson capitalized on the fears of a natural disaster 
in the Anniston area: 
The storms that came through in April, very, very nasty storms, if we had the 
original stockpile, there’s no way for me to say we would have had an incident 
because of the storms, however, the entire community was able to focus on the 
storm and the aftermath of the storm; we did not have to worry about nerve agent 
weapons still stored at Anniston Army Depot, and I think that is the best thing 
about the project, that was gone, and that storm and the hurricanes earlier, we 
didn’t have to deal with nerve agent weapons as well. 
LEAKS 
“We have a theory that is: we call it nerve gas water…there’s something in 
the water.  Have you seen them?  We have these black grasshoppers…that 
ate the wrong thing and mutated into something pretty nasty…and they eat 
everything.”   
According to many of the people I interviewed, the aging stockpile contained dangers 
other than explosions.  There were concerns that the chemical weapons leaked dangerous 
contaminants into the local environment and especially the water table.  Speaking with Anna, she 
confirmed some of these concerns:  
I do believe it was decomposing and posing a risk to workers and the community 
because my [family member] worked in that area, and they were constantly 
having to get the leaking whatever they were stored in.   
In his typical fashion, Hank joked about the leaks and their possible effects on the local insects—
something I also entertained growing up in the area:  
We have a theory that is: we call it nerve gas water…there’s something in the 
water.  Have you seen them?  We have these black grasshoppers…that ate the 
wrong thing and mutated into something pretty nasty…and they eat everything. 
This issue is particularly important in light of the outstanding pollution in Anniston from 
Monsanto.  Vera explained these fears:    
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[The Army] had canister upon canister of the different agents out there, and some 
of them were starting to leach.  They were degrading, and of course with the 
PCB’s and things that came about with Monsanto, you don’t want that in the 
groundwater and into people’s lives that way.  So they needed to dispose of it.   
I inquired of Jared why he thinks the Army put these chemical weapons here in the first place.  
Citing PCB pollution, he answered, “Probably for multiple reasons: people don’t tend to think of 
this region nationally unless it’s the butt of a joke.  It was already probably considered a toxic 
dumping ground.” 
These comments really speak to the power of the Army’s diagnostic frame.  Many 
participants felt that doing nothing was a greater risk than incineration.  Sarah described this 
urgency to do something:   
They had people that worked at the Depot saying they had to do something about 
the stuff out there; they had to…so it was better to do the incinerator than just let 
everything sit there and get out into the water and everything else.  
Even fewer respondents knew of the other contaminants coming from activities out on 
the Depot and the former Fort McClellan.  These are not necessarily directly connected to the 
stockpile, but they are important nevertheless.  Interviewing Martha, she told me about this other, 
lesser-known contamination:    
Out on McClellan, it was unexploded ordinance, there was some ground 
contamination I think, but the UXO is the always the biggest thing, and of course 
out at the Depot, it’s this water-table contamination, and it’s the same water table 
Anniston water works pulls its water from, there’s a lot of concern, but the army 
has paid for filters that the water works has put in: the contamination is very 
volatile, so all you have to do is expose it to air, and it evaporates out of the 
water, so that’s what these strippers the water works has put in are all about.  
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MAKING THE CASE: ORGANIZATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO INFORM 
THE PUBLIC 
After disclosing the stockpile exists in Anniston, the Department of Defense and Calhoun 
County officials made a concerted effort to inform the community about the dangers of the stored 
weapons.  This effort emerged from the larger, federal Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP), and this national program came in response to federal legislation 
(Public Law 99-145) requiring increased public protection from chemical weapons disposal 
nationally (Chemical Materials Agency 2011).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) funded these efforts, and with the coordination of the US Army and state and local 
governments, risk information disseminated into the greater Anniston area.   
CSEPP, the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, and the local county Emergency 
Management Agencies circulated the risk information through several avenues.  They distributed 
a lot of risk information through the mail.  They produced and distributed thousands of 
informational calendars and pamphlets for the population of Anniston and the affected, 
surrounding populations.  Included in this effort was a reorganization of local geographies: they 
essentially reinscribed the surrounding populations into new zones of risk—complete with 
colorful maps to illustrate the concept.  Each zone received different risk information and 
especially, risk materials according to their proximity to the Anniston stockpile.  This effort 
complimented a rather insistent media campaign on the radio and television.  If everyone did not 
know their zones, they knew they should know.   Early in this campaign, this risk information 
included evacuation plans, and although officials eventually discarded the evacuation tactic for 
sheltering in place, the concept remained in their risk literature, and most of the people I spoke 
with regarded evacuation—at least for themselves as individuals—as the way to go. 
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MAILINGS 
“know your zones, blah, blah, blah” 
 All the research participants were familiar with the mailings from the Emergency 
Management Agencies and CSEPP.  As mentioned before, these organizations inundated the 
surrounding area with risk information.  Craig explained:   
Yeah, let’s see.  We definitely got at least three different mailings over the course 
of two or three years that describes zones of where you live, and so you can see 
geographically which one you were in, and they explained some plans: if you 
hear this particular siren or these announcements, if you are in this zone, we’ll 
explain what for you should do.  It may be you shelter in place, it may be you get 
out in your car, certain areas should evacuate.   
These efforts were very successful in getting the information to the public.  Many of the 
participants easily recalled the general message.  Lighting up a fresh cigarette, Bob told me: 
Every year they mail out maps to individual households showing you know, 
based on climate patterns and the weather which way, if something happened, 
there was a large leak, which way the things would go, who would be the most 
affected, and along with the weather alert system they put here, they are tapped 
into that with the facility if anything happens with the facility that weather alert 
system will go off, and let you know there has been a chemical accident at the 
Depot and gives instructions on what to do.   
These mailings became a little redundant over the years, although most of the people I 
interviewed did not mind the reminder.  These occasional reminders served as the only notice for 
many people living farther away from the incinerator.  Originally unfamiliar with the danger, 
Curtis told me: 
Okay, well, I didn’t realize really what the danger was, and then there was the 
whole education program where the Calhoun County disaster management 
whatever was like here’s how we shelter in place, know your zones, blah, blah, 
blah, and they always sent you stuff in the mail.  I remember I would get things 
in my apartment, and it would tell you: this is the situation, and here, if you need 
a kit, you can write to this address or whatever.   
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Many of the mailings included an attractive calendar providing important risk information; these 
calendars included: emergency contact information, zoning demarcations and their relationship to 
appropriate evacuation and sheltering behaviors, evacuation routes, and of course, pictures of 
classic cars parked at local, scenic locations.   
For many people in the area these mailings served as their main point of contact and 
source of risk information.  I asked Martha if she picked up a sheltering kit; she answered, “No.  I 
was out of the zone for the kit.  What did I get?  I got the tone alert thing, and of course they give 
you the calendars”.  Again, I asked Simon if he received any risk materials in the mail.  He 
replied:  
I’ve never received any.  I feel like Jacksonville is just outside that bubble of 
safety, you know what I mean?  People closer received packages, you know, 
warning, evacuation plans and stuff like that, and here I don’t feel like, I mean, 
the places I’ve lived around here, I’ve never received anything of that nature.  I 
did get a calendar that told me what the whooping noises of the sirens meant, but 
that’s about it.   
 People closer to the stockpile tend to be a little more aware of the zones and their 
significance.  Talking to people in my “home town”, Sarah explained, “we’ve got all the 
maps that show where we are, as far as Weaver is in a terrible zone with the way the wind 
blows.”  Others had to know about the zoning because of their line of work and its close 
relationship with emergency management: 
I was involved in initial meetings for counties surrounding and including 
Calhoun County with several different people on evacuation planning.  It was a 
big deal because Calhoun county and surrounding counties were chopped up into 
zones, and further down from the larger zones were smaller neighborhood 
zones…have been and still are on the periphery involved in a project to identify 
those who are homebound, without transportation, and latchkey kids, so that in 
the event of a disaster, initially a disaster at the incinerator, those people could be 
identified by neighborhood to say there are two people that need transportation 
and have no other means, with one in a wheelchair and one is bed bound, so on 
and so forth.  That’s still going on; the data is still being collected.  The best I 
know, it’s going into a database, and nothing’s being done with it because 
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evacuation region-wide was abandoned for what they call shelter in place.  They 
would not have massive evacuations.  
A coordinated evacuation was eventually abandoned for sheltering in place.  But the 
initial concept really took root with the people I interviewed.  Over time this keenness towards 
evacuation became associated, and perhaps even blurred, with the tactics used to deal with 
massive hurricanes farther south.  Asked about her plans if an accident happens at the Anniston 
Depot, Vera gave me the evacuation details:   
With the way traffic is and all, they pretty much planned out the quickest route to 
get to I-20 or either going over 10th street Mountain or down Quintard to hit the 
interstate, and for a while, we had the little signs—I don’t even notice any more.  
We used to have the signs like they do for the hurricanes you know, but like I 
said, I haven’t paid any attention whether we still have those or not.   
MEETINGS 
“I never attended those meetings; I’m not that type of person to attend those 
types of meetings.”    
Local officials held several public meetings to satisfy federal guidelines concerning 
community input and involvement.  These meetings provided the public relations team at the 
incinerator a chance to make their case.  Bob explained: 
Well, they held multiple, multiple meetings.  They presented all the studies…So 
they had a lot of information to provide to the community to show them that it 
was potentially safe, to do…  
But interestingly, these meetings also provided incineration opponents an opportunity to 
demonstrate their version of events, and more importantly, the chance to ask difficult questions 
about incineration.  The opponents to incineration made a lot of headway at the start of these 
meetings.  Anna described:  
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I remember attendance at those community meetings, and they were like—
sometimes you think about community meetings and maybe lack of attendance to 
apathy, I think about the voter polls and they talk about voter apathy, but some of 
those things, people can choose not to attend, but there was pretty large 
attendance at these meetings.   
But this inertia would eventually wane.  Many people became tired of the movement opposing the 
incinerator, and community involvement and interest in incineration became less and less 
popular.  All the controversy concerning incineration was short-lived.  Wendall observed: 
They would call public hearings, and not hardly anyone would go.  I mean, other 
than that handful of people that did not like the method.  And it really might be a 
dozen, and that’s about it.  So not hardly anybody would ever show up at those 
meetings.  
The meetings would eventually devolve into technocratic updates: numbers and figures.  Soon 
very few people would care about the incinerator, and even fewer would speak out against it.  
Important questions were raised at these meetings, but eventually these gatherings work in favor 
of the incinerator and proponents of that disposal technology.  Sarah remembered: 
Westinghouse would have big, nice luncheons like the P.R., you know, at first 
especially.  People didn’t want it, and they promised all this, and of course we 
got the emergency preparedness things, they’ve got all kinds of money now 
because of the incinerator around here; they’ve got so much, and they’d…What 
was your question now?  
I reminded her, “I was asking about the meetings.”  She continued: 
And they would be telling the progress: some of the things had been burned 
because they had a vast amount—a terrible big amount of all kinds of chemicals.  
And they told the reason they had to do this was because of this treaty with 
Russia—they had to get rid of theirs, and we had to get rid of ours—and there 
was so much here, and of course a lot of the chemicals were leaking out into the 
ground, and it was dangerous, and that’s true.  And there were so many 
questions.  We are sitting on a fault line, and I have questions about that.  I mean, 
we’re on a huge fault line; they say it’s as big as California’s.  Well, what’s going 
to happen to the incinerator if something happens; it’s sitting right on a fault line.  
Of course that would be the same thing will all this stuff out at the Fort, but they 
would give time for questions, and tell would tell you how many rockets had 
been burned, how many are left, and what stage, and I believe it’s in the final 
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stages now; so I don’t think, I don’t worry about the incinerator as long as 
Westinghouse is there, but when they leave, that’s when I’ll be worried.  
MEDIA 
“Yeah, it’s a good paper for it to be local, our only paper…” 
 Although Anniston as a whole had fallen into disrepair and into an economic malaise, it 
somehow maintained a fairly sizable, independent newspaper:  The Anniston Star.  Asked about 
the incinerator, Bob told me, “The Anniston Star, the local newspaper, covered every inch of it as 
it happened”, and this close, detailed coverage plays an important role guiding in public opinion 
on chemical incineration.   
Most of the Star’s coverage was not critical.  Looking back, the Anniston Star primarily 
conveyed technocratic information coming from the public relations people working at the 
CSEPP.  This dry, statistical reporting gave many people the impression that CSEPP wanted: 
everything was fine, and the incinerator was effective and safe.  As Greg told me, “they’re taking 
care of business, and what little I’ve heard in the newspapers has been positive: just giving 
updates on how far they are going and stuff like that.”  Harold echoed this positive sentiment: 
You read about it; you hear about it.  There are milestones that are announced, 
especially with munitions, percentage of munitions, or a grade of weaponry: 
whether it be the mustard gas or GB gas—the nerve agents are gone, or things 
like that. 
When asked about her awareness of the incinerator, Tonya also told me about reading the Star: 
Yeah.  Out of sight and out of mind: every now and then there will be something 
about it in the newspaper, and I’ll read it, and it’s nothing derogatory or anything 
like that [aimed at the incinerator].  Like the last thing in the paper was the fact 
that everything was going along fine, and they will probably be through with 
everything by 2011, in the fall of 2011, I think.  
Discussions on the incinerator and the Anniston Star inevitably bring up the issue of 
opposition to chemical incineration.  The paper was not immune from taking an editorial stand on 
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the issue.  Initially the owner and editor switched positions on incineration, but as Will explained, 
this became politically untenable:    
[Name Removed] was out to vilify H. Brant Ayers, the owner and editor of the 
local newspaper which everyone affectionately calls the ‘red star”—the Anniston 
Star.  [Name Removed] started taking potshots at Brant Ayers and Bill Clinton, 
and initially Brant Ayers was pro incinerator, but Brant keeps an open mind, and 
he eventually decided, no, he was against incineration, and even though the anti-
incinerator crowd was—it would had to been a minority, it was still a very vocal 
minority.  It was…oddly enough, well it tended to be a fairly well educated 
minority; it tended to be a lot of the students from the college, a lot of professors 
from the college, more of the professional people from Anniston and the 
surrounding area, and I think Brant realized, maybe he realized, well, my readers 
all don’t like my position, maybe I should change my position.  
As this passage alludes, the oppositional movement—really one outspoken leader in the 
movement—did not make a strong effort to work with the local media.  This broken relationship 
led to the stigmatizing of local activists.  Wendall explained:  
The Anniston Star, the local newspaper everybody reads, for some reason, made 
the decision to be pro-incinerator, and so they really promoted that side in a 
positive light, and the people against the incineration process, they pretty much 
labeled them as radicals, and [Name Removed] in the English Department at 
JSU, was sort of labeled as a radical for his anti-incinerator stance and asking 
questions and getting involved with the movement which I appreciate him doing 
all of that because he asked a lot of questions that needed to be asked and 
probably were not adequately addressed, and as a result of all what they did, 
there are a lot more things that had to happen: like schools had to have safe 
zones, and they had to change air conditioning system out, and a lot of things in 
schools that were close by and hospitals, so I think they did a lot of good.  The 
emergency system was improved considerably in case of an accident that would 
not have taken place if these people had not asked questions.  Pretty much, the 
community was oblivious [laugh], even with all the stuff in the paper.  
Another participant confirmed Wendall’s description.  I asked her about reading the paper, and 
Anna answered, “There was a lot of stuff in the paper, and I was not an avid Anniston Star reader 
as a high school student you know, but there was a lot in the paper.”   
I follow-up, asking, “Did the paper take a stand one way or another about the incinerator?  
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Anna replied, “I can’t remember, but I think the information that’s been printed in the 
paper in the recent years since the disposal’s been active has been positive.”  When asked about 
media coverage of local events, Dorothy told me:  
I don’t even get the Anniston newspaper.  I watch the 6 o’clock news.  If you 
don’t live in Birmingham, or somewhere around Birmingham, you don’t see 
much news.  You don’t see Anniston, Jacksonville, we don’t have much local 
news at all…but like I said, if it don’t happen in Birmingham or whatever, then 
you don’t hear about it.  I was surprised they did mention the accident out on Fort 
McClellan yesterday.  They did say Calhoun County, Fort McClellan, which is 
shocking, because they usually don’t mention it in the news. 
I asked her, “So do you think that’s a problem?” 
Looking at the carpet below her, Dorothy answered, “Yes, I wish we had more news 
coverage.” 
After talking with all the participants, I found myself noticing there was not a lot of good 
information on local matters.  The Anniston Star did a good job, but its coverage was mostly 
limited to the largely uncontroversial, technical details of incineration.  The Star was not friendly 
to the opponents of incineration, and they never got the same coverage CSEPP enjoyed; this 
omission really worked to mute any alternative narratives, and it helped cement incineration as 
the only legitimate option for disposal. 
TELEVISION 
“Everybody was so happy” 
In order to facilitate their outreach efforts, CSEPP produced and released informational 
commercials for the communities surrounding the stockpile and incinerator.  This effort was quite 
successful in communicating their messages to the participants in this study.  Although the exact 
details were fuzzy, Wendy remembered the basic message.  She told me about these commercials:  
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Definitely. Know your zone, and it would talk about the zone colors, and it 
would talk about the building downtown, and if you had questions, you could 
contact, but that’s something I haven’t seen in years.  I don’t know if those 
people exist anymore, he business or whatever: or the group.  
Asked about the efforts of Emergency Management, Craig remembered:  
They ran TV spots too, but back then I had basic cable, so I saw their TV spots 
they ran, and it was like, you may remember, a family: yes, we know how to 
shelter in place, and everybody was so happy.   
OBJECTIFYING SYMBOLIC SAFETY: FANTASY OBJECTS IN ANNISTON 
Everyone in the area received risk information about the stockpile, but people living 
closer to the stockpile were given various objects for their safety and sense of wellbeing.  These 
safety objects—if properly used—should aid in the sheltering process.  This movement to “shelter 
in place” came about once local officials and the various Emergency Management Agencies 
realized evacuation was not an ideal plan.  People living farther away could pick up materials at 
certain collection points; people close to the stockpile were given all the sheltering materials.  
Specifically, the people I spoke with that lived closer to the stockpile received large boxes.  These 
boxes contained the shelter in place kits including air filters, gas masks, instructions, and the 
plastic sheeting and duct tape to seal their room for sheltering in place.   
BOXES 
“there were other things, but I can’t remember to save my life” 
I asked Wendy if she received one of the shelter in place boxes, and she replies, “Oh 
yeah.  Well, everybody gets one of those boxes—the alert boxes that is a part of the weather alert 
system.”   
“And what was in that box?” I asked.   
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“There was the alert thing, you know, it also told you the weather.”   
“Like a radio?”  I inquired. 
Wendy answered: 
Like a radio: it would go off with certain tones—that was the incinerating, one of 
them, and they also had it for weather because sometimes, even though we have 
the big things outside, some can’t hear them.  I want to say there was a gas mask, 
and I want to say some people had suit-things.  But ours had a gas mask, and 
there were other things, but I can’t remember to save my life. 
Other respondents shared their fading memories of the box.  Carla recalled: 
I can remember, maybe I was a freshman in high school, when everybody had to 
get those kits, and me and my mom went and watched that video, and you had to 
try the little mask thing on, and so we had to keep a kit at our house, but now it 
doesn’t cross your mind until the siren goes off [smiling but not quite laughing].  
But you know, we know our zoning areas and everything like that, but…  
Many participants disregarded the box, even when they were first distributed to the 
community.  I imagined there were hundreds of these boxes rotting in basements all around the 
Anniston area.  I asked Robbie about his box; his answer was particularly interesting: 
Is that the radio thing? [walks away to get the radio]  But I remember living in 
Golden Springs, we got a huge box: 3 ½ or 4 feet tall, like a big moving box.  I 
have no idea what’s in it [short laugh]. 
I quickly asked him, “You didn’t open it or...”  
 “No.  It was like emergency stuff, I don’t know! [laughing]”  
Smiling, I asked, “So what did you do with it?”   
Robbie replied, “Put it in a corner somewhere.  What do you do with a big box like that?  
You don’t want to throw it away just in case there is…”   
I interrupted, “So what happened to it?”  
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“It’s probably still there,” he answered. 
“Do you know what’s in the box? I asked. 
“You know, I don’t know…just stuff to tape up your windows—probably like 
polyethylene.”  
People living farther away from the stockpile were not directly given the kits.  They 
could pick them up at the distribution points, and some people did just that.  Asked about the 
sheltering kits, Vera remembered:  
No, I remember hearing about the kits, but I seem to remember hearing more like 
we have kits, and you have to come here to get them.  We’re not going to give 
everybody one, or mail it; you have to come get it.   
Some people never bothered to get a kit.  Asked if she received any risk materials, Anna told me:  
And then there were the shelter in place kits that we could go out to some 
building at Fort McClellan and pick up, which I did not pick up because you 
know, if there was a need to shelter in place, I was probably not going to be 
home because people spend more hours at work, and there were no plans for 
businesses because at the time I was working in Anniston, and our nurse that was 
our administrator in charge, she specifically looked at that: were there plans in 
place, were there recommendations or guidelines for businesses should an 
incident occur, and there wasn’t, so anyway, I never picked up my shelter in 
place kit.    
PLASTIC AND TAPE 
“what to do…In the unlikely event [smiling]” 
 As previously mentioned, proximity to the Anniston Army Depot determined the 
distribution and composition of sheltering materials.  Because of all the mitigating factors, not 
everyone received the same risk materials.  Talking to some, I found there was some question to 
what exactly comprised the shelter in place kits, but the plastic and tape were a staple in the entire 
area.  Asking about the kits, Anna told me, “[laugh] I know there was like plastic sheeting and 
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duct tape [laughing].  I don’t know what else!   I don’t know what else was in there, but I knew 
that though.”  Asked about these sheltering materials, Harold told me about these zones: 
I did get a…I don’t even know what they call it now, a kit.  I was in…there are 
three levels around the incinerator identified in terms of hazardous zones.  I was 
in the middle, which meant I got a box with plastic and bottled water and a towel 
in there…instructions and duct tape.   
I ask him about people closer to the Depot.  He continued: 
They got everything, if you lived in the red zone—the hot zone.  You got a mask 
for your self or family members including children, you got an air filter with 
activated charcoal and you got the plastic stuff.  You got everything, the radio 
and everything.  
Public facilities bordering this zone were also retrofitted for sheltering a chemical release.  Asked 
about this, Wendy recalled her teenage fears: 
I think because I was scared when everything first started coming out, 
[incineration] and school scared me because they had to come in and seal the 
windows and doors—it was like a suction thing, so when they sealed it, it 
[chemicals] couldn’t get in.  We had to do drills and stuff like that, so I think it 
was…I was constantly paranoid.    
Greg explained a typical scenario for those living in the immediate zone.  His choice of words 
was quite intentional: 
They sent us stuff in the mail.  I remember getting stuff, and I had to go to some 
place in McClellan, and they gave a little talk, and then I had to get an air filter 
and plastic and also duct tape, and they also gave us a video tape to show…or 
repeat what to do…In the unlikely event [smiling].  
This “in the unlikely event” was a mantra repeated over and over in the CSEPP and EMA media 
campaign.  Hearing it so many times, it became somewhat of a joke with acquaintances and 
friends over the years.   
But people living further away received less material.  Linda matter-of-factly told me, 
“We went and picked up our little kit with the duct tape and the plastic to put over the windows 
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and seal the doors.”  Living in Jacksonville, Will told me, “we got a booklet: what to do in case 
there’s an accident.  We never got our big rolls of plastic to staple over the door or anything like 
that.” 
MASKS 
I don’t know, it’s not going to keep my skin from blistering and falling off 
the bone, but it will at least save my face.  This is my moneymaker! 
 
As mentioned earlier, people living close to the stockpile were given more sheltering 
materials.  These materials included gasmasks and hoods to protect them from a chemical release 
or explosion on the Depot.   
Most of the participants in this study live outside these high-risk areas, but they were 
distantly aware of the masks and that they are distributed to some people close to the Depot.  Bob 
told me:   
I know at one point they discussed passing out gasmasks, but I don’t know if that 
ever happened…you know what?  I think they did.  I think they passed out kind 
of a bag with a respirator—it was a plastic bag with a respirator thing on it.  
Dorothy also lived farther away from the danger.  She explained: 
Yeah, I think that one of things they handed out was some type of masks, I don’t 
know if they were gasmasks or something, because the nerve gasses that might 
leak out or something, and people that were nearby were provided those, if I 
recall.  Now I didn’t, because I’m farther away.   
But her family remains close to the incinerator and stockpile.  Dorothy goes on to tell me, “My 
sister actually got a gasmask I believe…” 
I asked, “Was she worried about it?”   
Dorothy answered: 
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I don’t think she is now, but at first she was; she had some fears.  Now I have a 
friend who’s husband works at the Depot, and they live right outside the back 
gate to the Depot, and she and I have talked about it and joked, and she got 
gasmasks.  
Many participants responded with humor to the overwhelming situation.  I asked Will if he 
received a gasmask.  He told me: 
I personally went and purchased an old, cold war era soviet-issued gas mask.  I 
figured maybe…I don’t know, it’s not going to keep my skin from blistering and 
falling off the bone, but it will at least save my face.  This is my moneymaker!  
[laughing]  
He continued: 
Well, I’ve got my gasmask incase anything happens.  It’s under my bed right 
now.  I don’t have it with me.  If anything were to happen right now, if the wind 
were blowing just right.  It would do me no good.  It was sort of an impulse, I 
guess, a panic purchase, and I didn’t want to give any American companies any 
money off of this.  You’re not going to benefit from my panic.  I’ll give it to the 
Russians, or more properly, the Ukrainians.  
RADIOS 
“It’s never gone off before, and I don’t want it to [nervous laughter].” 
 People living in the area surrounding the Depot were given warning radios to supplement 
the public siren system.  Asked about these radios, Bob described his warning radio: 
It’s a small, gray box that’s wedge shaped.  It has an antenna on it.  There’s a 
series of tones that are described in the pamphlets they gave out with the box and 
continually passed out, I’m assuming when people move into the area to make 
sure that everybody continues to have the information, but the first Tuesday of 
every month, they test it, and the boxes go off.  Any time the alert system for 
Calhoun county go off, the boxes go off.  
The radios were linked in with the Emergency Management System.  This also served to warn 
citizens about the weather.  I asked Sarah about this, and she said, “They use it for weather too.”  
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Asking her more about this, she explained that not everyone likes the radio system.  It seems a 
little redundant with the extensive siren system: 
You see, everybody took the phones [radios].  They really didn’t have people that 
said no, they weren’t going to take the phones.  I didn’t want a phone sitting 
around.  We’ve got that big tower thing that sounds out everything, so why 
would you need a telephone in your house?  
Others associated the radios with great anxiety.  This is completely understandable.  Carla 
communicated her worries, “It goes off when weather sirens go off, but if there’s a chemical spill, 
like red-alert: it goes off right then.  It’s never gone off before, and I don’t want it to [nervous 
laughter].” 
This close association with weather makes perfect sense from an emergency management 
standpoint, but it effectively discouraged some people from using the radios.  Will explained, 
“We got a radio, an emergency alert radio: we leave it unplugged.  Sometimes it goes off in the 
middle of the night for no good reason.”  Others have since discarded theirs; this is due to the 
incineration process wrapping up.  I ask Greg if he uses his radio.  He answered, “No.  I had a 
radio that they brought me to be aware, but then I got something in the mail not very long ago 
saying that I no longer need it.” 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 As shown in this chapter, organizations involved in the incineration effort have devoted 
considerable effort toward the production and communication of symbolic safety.  To this effect, 
these organizations produced and distributed information and objects to the surrounding 
community.  This illusion of safety communicated that everything is under control at the Depot, 
that a plan clearly existed, and that the community was properly protected against an “unlikely” 
incident in Anniston.  Throughout this process was the implicit assumption that the experts knew 
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best, that sane people should be calm, and most importantly, that the existing social order 
remained legitimate and intact.   
Although the Depot was somewhat of a black box to people in Anniston, it nevertheless 
presented a potentially high risk to the community, and much effort has been devoted to 
minimizing or at least neutralizing public perception of that risk.  The lack of direct, experiential 
knowledge of the Depot insulated the complex from public observation and critique; without the 
chance to observe the happenings out there firsthand, there was the perception that civilian critics 
cannot definitively speak with any sense of certainty or authenticity on military matters.   
Further, this obfuscation pushed the discourse on the incinerator and emergency planning 
away from reality and into fantasy.  This can be explained by the postmodern theory of 
sociologist Jean Baudrillard (1981).  According to Baudrillard, contemporary societies exist away 
from direct referential thinking.  We live through simulation and simulacra, not lived experience.  
The citizens of Calhoun County do not directly experience the Depot.  They construct their 
perceptions through imagination and through what they are continuously given: the reassuring 
fantasy of symbolic safety.      
Official organizations communicate symbolic safety through the production and 
distribution of fantasy documents (Clarke 1999).  The fantasy documents contain contingency 
plans for an emergency, and they have a few shortcomings.  These plans tend to assume the best 
of conditions, they are persuasive, they have no reality check, and they offer the illusion of 
preparedness and control (Clarke and Perrow 1996).  In the case of the Anniston stockpile and 
incinerator, these documents came in several forms and were distributed through several avenues 
of media.  Locals received these documents in public meetings, through the postal service, in 
newspaper articles, and through pervasive advertisement campaigns in radio, print, and television.  
These documents first instructed citizens to evacuate the area, but this tactic would eventually 
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become abandoned—although not completely—for the preferred strategy of sheltering in place.  
The documents also simultaneously informed the public of the dangers from the stockpile and the 
safety of incineration, and they reorganized the geographies of the area into its spatial relationship 
to the stockpile and incinerator.  These organizations worked effectively to produce and distribute 
symbolic safety.   
In addition to the production and distribution of fantasy documents, these organizations 
engaged in producing and distributing numerous fantasy objects.  Fantasy objects are tangible, 
physical things that sell fantasy documents.  In Anniston, these exist as shelter in place kits, gas 
masks, air filters, and the ubiquitous emergency radios.  When successful these objects work to 
embody and reify fantasy documents.  Dramaturgically speaking, they make the illusion seem 
real; these items give life to the fantasy. They make the documents factual.  Their concrete 
tangibility lulls audiences into the illusion of symbolic safety.  It silences critics and discourages 
critical thinking.  The following chapters explore the impacts these efforts have had on the 
public’s perception of risk.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
BUYING SYMBOLIC SAFETY: PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF 
OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF RISK AND SAFETY IN ANNISTON 
 
 
This chapter addresses the question of how the public consumed and ultimately perceived 
the efforts of incineration proponents to produce and successfully sell symbolic safety.  
Supporters of the incineration had several things in common.  They reported that that the various 
organizations associated with the incinerator and stockpile performed very well, and that the risk 
information and materials provided a sense of comfort and security against the acknowledged 
threats of the degrading stockpile.  To a lot of these people, the narrative for incineration offered 
several advantages over any alternative technologies to incineration like chemical 
neutralization—a possibility that staunch supporters of incineration universally contested.  Many 
people felt that the risks of incineration were far less than the risks of continued storage in 
Anniston.  Some respondents preferred incinerating the materials onsite, opposed to transporting 
the potentially unstable munitions to other locations.   
 Additional factors contributed to the persuasiveness of symbolic safety.  A number of the 
supporters knew someone working at the Anniston Army Depot; knowing an employee worked to 
make the incineration proponents seem trustworthy.  It provided the incinerator a human face and 
worked to further legitimate their efforts.  These supporters positively referenced other chemical 
weapon incinerators across the nation, and they valued the advertised safety redundancies 
inherent in the process.  Other supporters reported influencing details that played into their
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perception that incineration was safe.  These included mitigating factors like time, weather, and 
distance.  Others found comfort in surrendering to a sense of fatalism, and some remained 
ignorant of the issue, while others maintained a sense of denial about it. 
Lastly, the distributed risk information and sheltering materials comforted several 
participants in this study.  They defined these materials as adequate, and the distribution of these 
materials—especially the risk information—provided the impression that government officials 
successfully prepared the community; positive media coverage solidified this effect.   
Overall, this research suggested that incineration proponents were successful in their 
efforts to convince the community of the incinerator’s safety.  If not convinced outright, people 
were at least aware of the proposed reasons for incineration, and as time passed, incineration 
existed as a largely unopposed reality in Anniston.    
FINDING COMFORT IN DISCOMFORT 
“They’ve done an excellent, excellent job.” 
Although they were aware and fearful of the risks associated with incineration, many 
research participants were ultimately comforted with the efforts of the emergency management 
agencies and the information provided by the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness 
Program (CSEPP).  The multiplicity of factors seems to be important.  Put simply, these efforts 
were not necessarily sufficient by themselves, but together, they worked rather synergistically to 
comfort individuals.  Asked if he thought the incineration and emergency preparedness people 
were doing a good job, Bob explained:  
Yeah.  I would say that I feel comfortable with what they are doing with the 
facility and what they are trying to achieve.  You know, they put safety 
implements into place for the communities.  Every year they mail out maps to 
individual households showing you know, based on climate patterns and the 
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weather which way, if something happened, there was a large leak, which way 
the things would go, who would be the most affected, and along with the weather 
alert system they put here, they are tapped into that with the facility if anything 
happens with the facility that weather alert system will go off, and let you know 
there has been a chemical accident at the Depot and gives instructions on what to 
do.  
And other people openly welcomed the incinerator.  I asked Carla if her family supported 
incineration.  She told me, “I know my mom did, but they [the family] were definitely for it: get 
rid of it, get them [the chemical weapons] out of here, we don’t need them”—not an uncommon 
sentiment with the number of incineration supporters I interviewed. 
Although rarely mentioned by those supporting incineration, the brief opposition to the 
incinerator may actually motivate the more outspoken supporters of incineration.  Interestingly, 
Martha included these opponents with the other—perhaps more mundane—obstacles to 
overcome:       
Yeah, well, you know what all went on with CAP and all the groups that resisted 
the incinerator from going up.  They finally got beyond that and started burning.  
They’ve done an excellent, excellent job.  They burned the most insidious stuff 
first within the first year—much shorter than that I think—they had most of the 
worst stuff gone.  They’ve had very, very minor incidents happen that were 
always well under control.  The biggest faux pas they had was in the construction 
of the building.  If you were around for that, they made some bad concrete pours, 
and had to deconstruct and reconstruct things a few times.  At any rate, they will 
be finished with their mission sooner than expected, which is next…2011 
September.  
The opposition to incineration began with some fervor, but this would quickly become short-
lived.  Thinking back to when she first picked up her sheltering materials, Wendy recalled:  
I remember, I forgot what they were called, but they had their building 
downtown, and they would get out, they would get the boxes out, and they got 
the messages out about the incinerator, but I remember there was a lot of you 
know, mad people and protesting, and they didn’t want it there, and their kids, 
and the place was like this is what would happen, so it was two different sides 
telling you two different things, so it was very confusing.  But I know the 
community was very up in arms about it.  
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I asked, “I’ve heard people describe it this way, at first it was a big issue, and it kind of went 
away.” 
Wendy agreed, “Yeah, evidently it went from one extreme to nothing.”   
Interviewing another respondent, he brought up the opposition movement to the 
incinerator.  I asked Hank if he was personally familiar with anyone opposing the incinerator.  He 
paused for a second and thoughtfully answered: 
Sigh.  That’s a good question.  I wasn’t all that in tuned to it.  What happened is 
that the concept sounded pretty horrible.  They’re going to burn this stuff, well 
what happens if it screws up?  You know once the alternatives were discussed: 
trying to relocate, et cetera, I think a lot of people either got tired of the issue or 
came to the realization that the best thing to do was get rid of it somehow, and 
how are you going to get rid of it? And that [incineration] seemed to be the best 
solution.   Now there are people that never agreed with that, and probably still 
don’t agree with it, but…   
Another supporter mentioned the opposition movement in his own statements about the 
incinerator.  I asked Curtis if government officials did a good job communicating risk 
information.  Smiling broadly, he answered: 
The Depot wanted to get rid of these things, so if I were them, I would want to 
make it seem safe as it could possibly be whether it were or not, just from that 
perspective, they did a good job because I never felt like I was afraid except 
when I heard from [Name Removed]: you should be totally afraid of this thing!  I 
think the Depot did a good job at like, that’s a crazy guy!  You don’t need to 
worry.  We’re totally safe!  So, I think they did a good job in that respect.  I 
don’t…whether they lucked up or was it really safe, I don’t know, but they did 
manage to get at this point the majority of it taken care of with no incidents, or 
none that anybody has become aware of, so.   
And there was a wide continuum between opposition and support.  Illustrating this very 
point, Harold described his path from opposition to reluctant acceptance.  I asked if he supported 
the incinerator and efforts at the Depot; looking across the oval table, he shrugged and explained:  
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I didn’t at first.  I thought it was going to be such a routine for them that it would 
be an army-led project that mistake or not, who cares?  It’s just a small, rural 
town in northeastern Alabama.  Okay, we will just relocate the population.  
We’ve ruined the land, the air, and the water.  We will relocate them 30 miles 
north.  All is well and forgotten.  That was my initial as this thing was ramping 
up.  That would be the attitude.  You know?  It would be a Union Carbide thing.  
Oops, we killed five thousand people; we’ll get some bad press.  We’ll pay out 
some money; we’ll move on, but as history has defined us and been written, 
they’ve actually done a good job.  
DISCOUNTING ALTERNATIVES 
“The closer it can be to the chemical agents, the better.  If they had to 
transport that stuff across the country to incinerate it?  The likelihood of 
something happening is a hundredfold, you know?”   
Partially because the opposition movement never took off, many people did not seriously 
consider any alternatives to incineration—including relocation of the stockpile.  A salient factor 
cited by those supporting incineration was the inherent danger and difficulty of transporting the 
Anniston stockpile to another location for disposal.  Explaining her support of the incinerator, 
Irene revealed her concerns:  
I had no problem when they built the incinerator because like I said, I thought it 
was better to get rid of them on sight rather than to move them because I knew 
how unstable they were.  And from my point of view, they were there—they was 
[sic] dangerous there as they probably were going to be to incinerate, so I have 
no problem with that.  I keep up with it enough to know they were meeting their 
goals, and they had done the majority of what they planned to.   
Also concerned about transporting the materials, Linda echoed Irene’s sentiment: 
I keep up with it a little bit.  I’ve got some friends that work out there, but you 
know, it came on like in 2002 or 3 or something like that, but once they got most 
of the big stuff burned off, you know, you kind of still keep an ear open to hear 
anything going on out there, but for the most part, it’s been a pretty safe 
operation.  I would just assume them burn them out—build an incinerator than 
them to have to try to ship whatever we had out there off somewhere.   
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Part of the concern about transporting these materials was the notable danger of 
accidents.  There were a lot of unknowns when it comes to moving these highly volatile materials 
through busy intersections and highly populated communities.  Vera explained:    
I trust what they are doing.  I know what they’ve done is the way things should 
have been done. I would much rather there be the incinerator and they take care 
of the issues they’ve been taking care of than putting all that on trucks or trains 
and come through town, driving on roads and having an accident or whatever…   
INCINERATION MAKES US SAFER 
“So I think if something would have happened at the Depot before the 
incinerator, the outcome would have been much worse.” 
Many participants welcomed the incinerator into the community.  Quite contrary to the 
minority opposing incineration, these avid supporters told me that the incinerator and CSEPP 
were actually making the community much safer.     
Participants like Vera wholly trusted the people working out at the Depot.  I asked if she 
thought they would decommission the incinerator after eradication of the stockpile, she remarked:  
I think they will shut it down.  I think the same reason it was built here, to take 
care of the munitions or gases or whatever they were dealing with, to protect the 
community as far as it not being transported out of here to somewhere else, I feel 
the same thing will happen.  They will close here and move on to the next place 
and take care of it.  I feel they are as concerned as a spill or a leak or whatever as 
the people that live here with it are, and I don’t think they want to see…I don’t 
think they want that to happen, an accident to happen, or someone to be injured 
because of something spilling or releasing.   
Linking the incinerator with the federal funds and the subsequent efforts to achieve 
emergency preparedness, Anna shared her supporting thoughts on the incinerator coming to town: 
I think the fact that the incinerator came here helped our overall emergency 
preparedness for the entire community and the Depot too.  Because we were able 
to get funding, money, and resources we couldn’t have otherwise.  So I think if 
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something would have happened at the Depot before the incinerator, the outcome 
would have been much worse.  I think it’s forced us to be better prepared, but 
there would still be some issues, but anyway, that’s what I think.   
Most outspoken proponents of incineration felt the incinerator made the community safer, 
logic that parallels the overarching narrative coming from government officials.  Vera discounted 
the worry of opponents.  To her:     
I feel like the way they [people pushing incineration over alternatives] handled it 
is much better.  It’s been a lot safer.  And of course people panic over different 
things, but heck, tornadoes come in town and people are going to panic: it could 
happen, it could not happen, you have people that are going to worry over 
everything.  But I think they’ve done an excellent job with the way they have 
handled the chemicals there.   
Others also discounted the concerns and worries of the general population.  Asking Curtis 
if he thought the community was prepared for an incident or accident at the Depot, he 
downplayed the possibilities of risk: 
I don’t have any idea.  See, since I think the risk is very low, I would say yes.  
They were probably were prepared because I don’t think there’s a lot of 
preparation needed, so that may be… I think the risk on this thing my view is, the 
risk is very low, and even when there was a lot of outcry, I’m not sure how great 
the risk was, but then again, I fall more to that side…much more risk assessment 
kind of person than some people are.  Like I don’t like it they made me take off 
my shoes to get on the airplane, but one of the guys in the Sunday night group 
thinks that’s totally great because terrorists are out to get us, but the chances that 
the terrorists want to get you is pretty slim.  I want to keep my shoes on.  I want 
to go back to the pre 911 way to get on the airplane because planes are still going 
down; yes, 911 was horrible, but all the money we spent on this, I don’t know it’s 
really worth the time and energy and money we’ve spent has made us all that 
safer.  The risk was pretty low to begin with, and now, still low, maybe a little 
lower, but was it worth milking that extra .1 percent of security out of it?   
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ADVERTISING RISK AND SAFETY 
“You know, it was widely advertised.  So I think they did a good job.” 
Risk information and its wide distribution played an important role in comforting a few 
of the people I interviewed.  Most of the risk information distributed was uncritical, technocratic 
information given to the public without any chance for dialogue or meaningful debate.  But this 
kind of monologue worked to keep most people more or less aware that the immediate danger of 
the stockpile was steadily diminishing, and some people made a distinction of risk according to 
what kinds of weapons were destroyed.   
I asked Rose if she was aware of her zone.  She quickly told me, “I did back when they 
were burning off the bad stuff.”  I asked another participant, Anna, if the government and 
emergency officials were doing enough to keep the community safe, and she answered, “I think 
so.  They went to people’s houses.  You know, it was widely advertised.  So I think they did a 
good job.”  Interestingly, she equated communicating information with providing safety, but this 
was understandable when the progress at the incinerator was so conspicuous and widely available 
for consumption.  Bob agreed.  As he explained, this information works to calm the public.  I 
asked him if the government did enough to keep people safe.  He explained:  
I think they’ve done a lot to make the people here to feel comfortable with it 
being here…But I think they did a good job at making the community 
comfortable with it going to be here more so than they convince people to let it 
come here.  I mean that’s what I can remember.   
This information had a cumulative effect.  Asked about the information going to the 
public, Greg shared his thoughts: 
I think as people starting hearing a little bit more about it, that it appeared to be 
not as bad as the doom and gloom people were saying, potentially so, but it 
probably wasn’t going to be a nightmare scenario.  
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Asked a similar question, Linda pinned responsibility onto the individual consuming the 
risk information.  I asked if the community was informed about the incinerator and stockpile, and 
she answered: 
As much as they could—as much as they wanted to be, let me put it that way.   
Like everything else, if you care about it—there were some folks that weren’t 
going to pick up anything.  They wanted to ignore it or didn’t move.  It’s like 
everything else, if you wanted to be informed, you could be.  It wasn’t like the 
information wasn’t out there.   
Also asked if the community was prepared, Craig gave a slightly different focus.  Still 
comforted, he placed peoples’ fear in context:   
I think people in general fear man-made chemicals and the damage they can do.  
We’ve all learned lessons from history from the fluoroscope and everything to do 
with the nuclear this and that have done terrible harm.  So I understand people 
have fear and we’ve also seen a lot form big corporations releasing things into 
our water just because it was the cheaper thing to do.  So I understand there’s a 
lot of fear with that, but I also feel they have done a lot to do this responsibility 
as they can.  I don’t know how much of that is quelling peoples’ fear or how 
much is real, but it seemed substantive.  
In the end, this risk information effectively communicated to the public that plans were in 
place; that everything was under control.  Craig explained:     
So the way they let out the plans: there were a lot of TV commercials all the time 
for a long while.  They had the little kids explaining they had their home plan, 
and their parents knew what they were going to do.  That was very widespread 
there for a couple of years. So as a result, I felt really confident that things were 
going to be fine or at least if something went wrong, we had a plan to mitigate it.    
Ironically, several participants felt that more information would be counterproductive to 
public safety.  This was largely based in their commonly held assumption that people were 
inclined to panic in times of disaster, but assumption aside, several people mentioned this in the 
interviews.  I asked Craig about the information coming from the County and emergency officials 
and his views on if this material was adequate.  Seemingly stumped, he told me, “Uh, [pause] it 
seems to be.  I couldn’t come up with anything else that they could possibly do that might not 
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cause a hysteria [muted, short laugh].”  Greg offered a similar sentiment about disclosure and 
panic, “Yeah, they [Calhoun County] could have done more; I think all it would have done is 
amped up peoples’ nerves, it probably would have amped up opposition, and I can understand the 
saying that ignorance is bliss”.  Rob echoed this pessimistic sentiment, “I think the more they 
would do that [officials work to more fully inform the public], I think the more fear they would 
cause”.  Wendy directly connected this kind of information to advancement of the opposition of 
incineration; she clearly saw this as a bad thing.  I asked her about the media and its influence on 
the community.  She explained that the media was an important—but possibly dangerous—
influence in the community: 
I think so, but in a dangerous way.  Depending on what media outlet or 
newspaper, or the TV, you were getting so many conflicting messages, and I 
think that added to the fear and added to the public’s outrage.  And if it had come 
from the government or you know, it would have meant more to the people.  It 
wouldn’t have been so much of an outrage.   
 
PERSONALIZING RISK AND SAFETY 
“I went through this place, here’s what I can tell you.  There are 
safeguards; it’s as safe as it can be.” 
Not surprisingly, personally knowing someone that works at the Depot strongly 
influenced the people supporting the incinerator.  This kind of relationship to the Depot 
influenced people for two main reasons.  First, knowing people that work at the Depot humanized 
the project.  This firsthand knowledge provided the largely mechanistic entity with some 
humanity.  Second, people that knew employees at the complex were usually aware of how much 
training they received, and this awareness gave Depot employees an aura of professionalism.  
These factors worked together to engender trust and ultimately support for the incinerator.  After 
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telling me she knows people working at the Depot, I asked Linda, “Does that make you more 
confident, knowing people out there?”  She answered: 
Yeah, like everything else, it gives you a personal view on it.  It’s not just you 
know, you talk about the incinerator and you just think of a big furnace sitting 
out there, and until you know folks working out there, it puts a face to it.  It’s not 
just a big piece of machinery or factory out there.   
I asked another participant about her knowledge of Depot employees, “Do you think 
that’s changed your opinion one way or another, knowing people that work out there?  Does that 
comfort you?”  Without hesitation, Wendy responded: 
I think so, because the people that work out there are very, you know, great 
individuals—I know them from church, and I grew up with their kids, so you 
know, you know someone that well, and you know they work out there, it gives 
you okay, because they’re there.   
Because the Depot was so important economically, most participants knew Depot 
employees.  Carla told me, “My friend, her mom, works out at the Depot.  Some of my friends, 
their moms do”; others had family members that worked at the Depot.  Not all participants talked 
in great detail about this, but some did.  Anna told me about her family member working in the 
storage igloos:  
When I was a kid, my [family member] worked in the igloos.  He had, and I just 
remembered this, there was a pouch they had to wear, and he had to do the full 
suit and everything.   And the thing is, if you worked out there for 38 years, you 
pretty much got to do a lot of different things.  You didn’t stay in one job at the 
Depot for 38 years, so he worked in different areas during that time.  But as a kid, 
I remember this pouch that they had to wear that was part of their suit, and he 
might have it in his truck when he picked us up from school or daycare or 
whatever, but it had all this stuff on it: a mask, I remember the mask, but there 
was a long syringe, I mean it was huge—it looked like a syringe you would give 
a horse, with a huge needle if they got exposure they would inject themselves 
with.  It was just really scary, this mask and this huge needle that was in this 
pack, and you know, it was kind of freaky [laughing].   
Knowing Depot employees certainly comforted several of the research participants.  The 
closeness of the relationship certainly helps, but any degree of personal contact accomplished the 
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same effect: it comforted them.  Interviewing Curtis, he told me about his role in placating the 
nervous parents of college freshmen:      
And then um, the big thing was when they started really doing the large scale 
incineration of the stuff, I was already working here at the time, and it was in the 
news, and I was doing freshman orientation, so it was a big deal that we had to 
know enough about it.  They educated us because the parents were going to ask: 
should I send my kids here because, are you detonating nuclear bombs just 30 
miles down the road?  And we were fortunate enough to have a guy on the team 
who was in ROTC, that was a colonel in the army, and he is a great guy, 
everybody loved him, and we had somebody come in and talk, and later on, he 
came, or he said look:  I went through this place, here’s what I can tell you.  
There are safeguards; it’s as safe as it can be.   
Personal experience with emergency management officials also comforted several 
research participants.  This kind of experiential relationship provided a degree of realness to the 
people and agencies preparing emergency contingencies.  Hesitantly comforted, Roberta 
described her experiences with the people working in emergency management: 
I’ve been in the county EMA; I’ve seen the maps on the wall; they have those big 
projector things that have the plume distribution should an accident occur right 
now; the winds are doing this, and this is the way it would disperse.   
Knowing employees of the Depot also worked to give the overall impression that the 
workers were highly competent professionals.  Although this was not universal with all the 
participants I interviewed, this kind of awareness was significant in comforting many of those 
supporting incineration.  I asked Bob if he knew people working at the Depot; he paused briefly 
and told me:    
I know people there that work on the fire department and they are the highest 
trained HAZMAT firefighters that I know of in the country, and the security 
forces that are out there, they have pagers that if it goes off they get called 
in…So we do kind of have an upper leg as that goes.  The security for the super 
bowl and the Olympics were trained at the center for domestic preparedness, so 
people who were involved in the gulf spill, they were a part of this emergency 
management agency here and the center for domestic preparedness, so we are 
fortunate as far as that goes to have those resources at our disposal here, so close 
by.  
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Several of the participants felt like the Depot workers were very careful with the dangerous work 
of incineration.  Asking Wendy about this very point, she explained: 
Yeah, and I think they’ve been very careful, and I know people that work on the 
incinerator, and they talk about how they are very safe, and they make sure 
everything is done up to code and properly.  They take pride, and they know it’s 
dangerous; they better do it right…they have to go through a lot of training 
before they can even go near it.    
Tonya also made similar conclusions about the Depot workforce.  I asked her about her level of 
concern with incineration, and she answered, “I wasn’t concerned.” 
I asked, “And that was because mainly you thought they know what they’re doing?” 
She confidently smiled and said, “Yeah, and they were taking all the safety precautions 
that’s necessary.”  Quite understandably, several people told me that they have to maintain faith 
in the ability of others.  This makes perfect sense sociologically because so much of our 
contemporary lives depend on the basic competency of strangers.  The incinerator was no 
different in this regard.  Laughing about it, Simon replied, “Yeah.  All I … I have to have faith 
that our government and scientists know what they’re doing [slight chuckle], at this point, you 
know?”  He then provided a slight caveat: 
You know, I have faith in scientists, but I don’t have faith in people who manage 
scientists.  You know what I mean?  Scientists made the atomic bomb for the 
right reasons; it was used for the wrong reasons.  I would hope the people 
handling this stuff know what they’re doing or [are] well trained.   
Echoing Simon, Vera said:  
I guess I just have to have faith and confidence that the right people are there for 
the right job, and it’s going to get done the proper way.  I always though this was 
safer to do what they were doing than put it in a big truck and cart it out of town.   
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FANTASY OBJECTS 
“when I saw how flimsy or what the solution was, to me it didn’t seem 
like that big of a threat” 
The distribution and subsequent consumption of disaster materials offered more certainty 
and comfort to a number of participants.  This was most evident considering the dismal fate of the 
opposition movement.  After telling me about the initial, negative reaction to the construction of 
the incinerator, I asked Tonya, “ So you said when it first came here, there was a pretty loud 
uproar?” 
Tonya replied, “Yeah, nobody wanted it.”   
“So, why did you think it [the uproar] went away?”  I asked. 
Seemingly perturbed, Tonya replied: 
Well, I think that everybody out there was telling [us] how safe it was going to 
be, and they gave us all these kits and things, and the zones, and the maps and so 
on and so forth; where I live is the furthest away from the incinerator, so I didn’t 
have to worry that much about it.  People that lived closer in were given more in 
their kit, and I can’t tell you what it was, but besides the plastic to seal the doors 
and a type of radio or something to alert them when something happened at the 
incinerator, which nothing ever did.  They had to shut it down a couple of times 
because of incidents that happened out there that didn’t affect anybody else, but 
they repaired it, and everything’s fine.  
Many other people felt that everything was just fine.  Asked if the community were 
prepared for an emergency, Craig explained:    
As such there has been a lot of emergency preparedness packets that came 
around in the last few years which has declined a lot lately, but over the last five 
years there has been a lot about knowing your zones, being prepared, calendars 
coming out, you know emergency radios being made available, and because of 
that, I feel there is safety, and there is preparedness for it.  
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Asked about these same mailings, Harold recalled: 
It seems like they distributed out calendars in pretty colors that…in a nice way 
said, don’t worry about things.  But I don’t remember a letter or presentation sent 
out saying here’s what’s out there, this is what we are doing, and this is how we 
are going to do it, and this is why we feel it is safe to do it this way.  There 
wasn’t anything like that.  If there was, I didn’t receive it; I didn’t search it out; I 
didn’t care.  
In particular, the infamous duct tape and plastic worked fairly well to calm a number of 
people I interviewed.  Tonya explained the basic premise:   
They first sent out letters and things to go pick up your stuff out at the Fort to 
seal your doors and oh, what else?  I can’t even remember.  So I did that, and I 
picked up my kit, and took her home; I think I measured it, and made sure I had 
the right amount of plastic or whatever it was they gave us, and I’m trying to 
remember what else they gave us, but I think you know some people are so 
worried about it, but I wasn’t worried: I really wasn’t.  
I asked her a follow-up question, “With the kit, did you have to pick a room?  Is that how it 
works?”  She answered:  
Yeah, you have to pick a room where you’re going to stay in, and make sure 
you’ve got supplies like water and canned food and stuff like that, and in my 
house [laughing], you pick a room without any windows, and about the only 
place in the house without any windows was the laundry room and the one 
bathroom [laughing], so you didn’t really have much choice…I wasn’t 
concerned.  
Other respondents were also not concerned.  Knowing Vera works relatively close to the 
incinerator, I asked her if she received one of the shelter kits:  
Yes.  Matter of fact, on Noble Street, we got our kit and all that, there before we 
got it at the house, and I’m what, six blocks from work?  So it was interesting to 
see, they started with the closest with the zones and worked their way out.  We 
got the alert radio and all the information, somebody came in and set up the radio 
and went over things with us, and I felt like we were as prepared as you can be.   
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And others felt fine with this solution.  Investigating this, I asked Linda, “About the duct tape and 
plastic, did you feel pretty good about that?   Did you feel confident if something were to happen, 
you were going to get out okay? 
Yeah, you know, I didn’t have a problem with it.  I was fairly content with what 
they gave us and the information about how to evacuate, but I felt fairly 
confident in what we were told.   
And this solution of sheltering in place was exactly what people were instructed to do.  Citing her 
friend “in the know”, Rose told me:  
He did chemical training, so he trained people for what to do if something wrong 
happened, but he would you know, tell us horror stories: oh, this is what happens 
if mustard gas hits you, and this is what happens when this hits you, and I got the 
impression that if something did happen, you were better off not trying to get in 
your car and outrun it, you are better off staying inside and duct taping 
everything.   
Interestingly, the simplicity of this solution worked to calm those who believe in it.  In many 
ways, this sentiment revealed the fantastic nature of these risk materials—these safety objects.  
Greg explained:  
When I saw how flimsy or what the solution was, to me it didn’t seem like that 
big of a threat because if some plastic and duct tape was going to save me, then 
to me that’s not that big of a deal.  That’s how I felt.  
 
MEDIA FRAMING OF RISK AND SAFETY 
“The public was educated and not just me.” 
Several respondents told me the media provided a sense of comfort concerning 
incineration.  This was in part because the information conveyed to the public was largely 
technocratic in detail.  Concerning the incinerator, Greg explained, “they’re taking care of 
business, and what little I’ve heard in the newspapers has been positive: just giving updates on 
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how far they are going and stuff like that.”  Asked about the progress at the incinerator, Linda 
gave a similar, glowing account, “well I know it’s finished up because what I read in the papers, 
the stuff they could get out—all that’s gone.  She continued: 
And they [the media] were good on getting that information out and keeping it 
fairly up to date when they were doing the burns, but since the major stuff got 
taken care of, you don’t hear much about it.   
The sheer amount of coverage also worked to comfort some individuals.  Craig told me of the 
widespread media campaign:   
So when people did have their emergency preparedness plans and their zones, I 
had the zone on a thing, but honestly, I didn’t put a lot of trouble to memorize the 
details because I thought well, it will be on radio, on television, it will be easy to 
find.   
Other participants confirmed the effectiveness of the media campaign.  Reflecting on how the 
media cover the incinerator, Martha explained: 
The construction process did had some bloopers, but when they finally got it up 
and going, and it started burning, and paper reported on it every time there was a 
little blip, it made headlines in the Anniston Star, but the whole process went 
particularly smooth, and one of the reasons I think most of the community was 
fine was because they had so much community outreach, the army did; they did 
that right: so much community outreach.   
Perhaps a part of this comfort stemmed from the assumption that the community would act with 
some coordination and common purpose; again, Craig:  
I really feel like it was organized and planned.  Because they had blanketed the 
radio and the television and the mailing, at least everyone had heard of it and 
there wouldn’t be widespread chaos and people trying to break down my door to 
get in. The public was educated and not just me.   
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SAFE IN MY BACKYARD 
“There isn’t a thick, yellow fog hanging over everything, and everyone’s 
dead.” 
Many of those comforted by the incinerator had knowledge of other locations where the 
Army successfully incinerated chemical weapons.  This information worked in significant ways 
to calm their concerns, and although tautological, it worked as a powerful rationale to keep 
incineration as the primary form of chemical weapons disposal.  Wendall communicated the basic 
idea:      
They [the DOD] just decided this [incineration] is the way it should be done, and 
they used it in that place in Utah and some place out in the Pacific, and they 
thought it was the way to go.  And they were pretty successful at those places, so 
they wanted to duplicate the process here.  
The fact that these locations already maintain established incinerators worked well to 
counter accusations and claims that the military is experimenting in Anniston.  I asked 
Greg about his support of incineration, and he explained: 
I might not have felt that way if this was the first time they’d ever done it, but 
since there were at least two other places where they had, I felt okay with it…I 
think at the time that there were other methods that were being thrown out there, 
and from what I remember though, it seemed like the incinerator or incineration 
seemed to be…[pause] to work best or at least had a proven track record.   
CSEPP, in particular, produced and communicated this information about the other incinerators in 
their public relations efforts.  Bob explained:   
Well, they held multiple, multiple meetings.  They presented all the studies…So they had 
a lot of information to provide to the community to show them that it was potentially 
safe, to do…  
Asked about his feelings on the incinerator and its risk to the community, Bob referenced this 
commonly known CSEPP material:   
 
 
90 
They’ve had incinerators, what’s the one on the island?  Um, [Name Removed]’s 
dad used to work there.  [Name Removed] always had that lighter.  But there’s 
other incinerators that have been running for decades and haven’t had any 
incidents at, so you know, they’ve got plenty of studies that they’ve done.  
And this was a particularly powerful narrative against the backdrop of the opposition to the 
incinerator.  The opposition essentially asserted that incineration was extremely dangerous, and to 
many respondents, they never communicated a clear alternative.  These narratives providing 
examples of “successful” incineration were quite convincing to many.  Even though Will opposed 
incineration, he told me:   
There was a late math professor here [Name Removed]. I remember when he 
observed that I was in the no incineration movement, told me: well, you know, 
this technology, they’ve built these two other places; they’ve learned; this is third 
generation technology; this is going to be very safe, and of course [Name 
Removed] was ex-military, smart guy, and so far its been relatively safe.  There 
isn’t a thick, yellow fog hanging over everything, and everyone’s dead.   
This sentiment became amplified when coming from people within close social circles.  
Anna explained: 
Actually at the time the incinerator came or was coming, my [family member] 
was working in safety at the Depot, so he had actually visited some of the other 
sites like the Johnston Island and the Tooele Utah, and those other sites; so I had 
information that the average family in Anniston didn’t have.  That this was really 
the safest way.  Transporting it on trucks was risky, and sitting there was really, 
really risky just sitting there.    
But perhaps in a more academic sense, knowledge of other locations worked to give 
some people a sense of solace.  Vera put the incinerator in perspective this way:  
I guess we chose to stay here for one reason or the other.  You choose where you 
live now.  Of course y’all are living there because of school, and then you will 
work toward getting where you want to settle for your lifetime, but if something 
goes totally crazy and doesn’t work out, you can pick up stakes and move 
somewhere else.  I guess I feel like if you aren’t comfortable where you are, then 
get where you are comfortable.  And I guess that’s the way I look at the 
incinerator and stuff.  It doesn’t bother me.  It doesn’t worry me to the point 
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where I want to put up a for sale sign in the front yard and go somewhere else.  
The grass isn’t greener on the other side.   
Indeed, respective of how many incineration sites there were nationally, the grass may not be 
greener in other locations. 
SAFE SYSTEMS 
“it’d be almost impossible for something to happen” 
Individuals comforted by the incinerator often brought up the redundancies built into the 
process of chemical incineration.  This narrative was rather pervasive in those I interviewed.  
Asking Wendy if she feels the incinerator were safe, she told me:  
Yeah, I feel really safe about it, you know?  I don’t think there’s a high 
possibility that would happen because I’m sure they have so many safeguards in 
place that something drastic would have to happen for that [a disaster] to happen.   
Addressing some of the initial problems at the site, Greg echoed Wendy’s basic sentiment: 
I think early on there were a couple of times they shut down temporarily because 
they were running into a problem here or there, but to me it seemed just standard 
operational stuff, and working out some of the kinks, but there were so many fail-
safes, so it seemed fine. 
I inquired to Bob about the safety of operations at the Depot.  Smiling a rather large grin, he 
explained, “I do know for a fact that redundant after redundant system for safety on the facility, 
that once the first one goes off, you know, people will respond, and they are highly trained.”  As 
before, this comforting factor became even more convincing when it comes from someone close 
to the respondent.  Feeling confident in the system, Sarah shared: 
Well, from people I’ve talked to that work out there, there’s so many ways that 
they have…safety things…this one has this to do, and they can’t do anything 
until this is done, and they’ve really…you hear all that and realize there would be 
no way, it’d be almost impossible for something to happen when they were 
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transferring stuff—you know, with as much as they had, and they’ve really 
gotten it pat-down as far as operations right now. 
Curtis also conveyed this personal connection and the redundancies at the Anniston incinerator: 
No, I don’t know a whole lot about it, but like I said, [Name Removed], the 
colonel, he told us how they did it.  I remember, he described the whole process, 
and I remember imaging there were these multiple doors, multiple sealed doors 
they would have to go through to incinerate this one muntion or whatever, and 
there were these big igloos that were keeping it all in, but that’s been god, it’s 
been a long time.  I don’t remember now all of the details, but at the time, I could 
picture enough of it in my head that it made sense from his descriptions.  But not 
everybody had a guy who had taken the tour I guess.   
Asked about the possibility of a catastrophic event at the incinerator, Simon explained the 
unlikelihood of such an event.  As he put it, the real danger would be from a terrorist attack on the 
stockpile:   
These kinds of weapons are not, from what I understand, and it would be hard to 
think this, they aren’t kept in a large vat.  They are kept in very small doses 
separate from one another.  If you dropped one, sure it could cause a lot of 
trouble, but it’s not going to kill the state.  You know what I mean?  I don’t think 
it would be a catastrophic, ecological disaster if one canister of something 
springs a leak.  They’ve got containment protocols and stuff, you know.  It would 
take a…coordinated attack to make that stuff happen.  It would have to be 
intentionally done.   
Asked the same question, Greg also saw a large disaster as unlikely: 
I knew someone in military intelligence, and I asked him about it, and he assured 
me that unless they just totally screw up, there wasn’t really anything to worry 
about.  It would have to be something completely abnormal.  So I was okay with 
that.   
MITIGATING FACTORS 
“You know they say time heals all wounds.” 
A few, additional factors provided comfort to certain individuals.  These mitigating 
factors included the weather, distance, and time.  Vera compared the dangers of incineration to 
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the dangers of weather and tornado activity.  Asking her, “Did you guys take any special 
precautions?  You said you knew people that did…” She did not even wait to let me finish my 
question: 
No.  No.  No.  I don’t even do that when a hurricane or tornado, when they say 
we may have remnants of a hurricane—forget it.  I don’t go fight at the grocery 
store or building stocks or whatever.  I’m weird that way [laugh].   
Craig intellectualized this comparison to weather and the recent tornadoes that revenged 
Tuscaloosa that previous Spring: 
Yeah, in large part people, we’ve done some reading on this, a matter of fact 
[Name Removed] talking about risk and fear.  That our fear is greater than the 
actual risk, especially when it’s a bizarre death—something that can do crazy 
harm.  We downplay the danger of driving around in our own car, but we up it 
with having an airplane accident or whatever.  I think people may have a bloated 
fear of chemical weapons and things like that, and not so much when getting into 
a shelter with tornadoes, which is such a topical thing right now unfortunately…I 
thought well, when is that ever going to happen.    
Because of the very physical nature of chemical weapons, atmospheric conditions play a large 
role in their potency, effect, and longevity.  I asked Greg about the possibilities of a disaster or 
accident at the Depot.  Knowledgeable of the somewhat fragile nature of the munitions, Greg 
explained:   
So as far as just a basic leak or something like that, I didn’t think too much of it 
because when the emergency management person came by, a lot of discussion 
revolved around the weather, and that it would depend on which way the wind 
was blowing; it would depend on what the temperature was outside, and it would 
depend on whether or not it was dry, wet, humid, or raining, and I remember one 
of the computer science faculty saying something along the lines of, well let me 
get this straight: you mean to tell me, if all of a sudden there is an accident, and if 
the wind is blowing this way, and if it’s not raining, and it’s not hot, then I have x 
amount of minutes to either hide in place or get in the car and drive away, and it 
just seemed like there were a lot of ifs involved, and when they were giving us 
calculations as to how long something would be dangerous, I kind of assumed 
that if something’s going to happen, I want it to happen in the Summer time, 
because it seemed like most of that stuff would be dissipated enough to where it 
wouldn’t be a problem. 
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When I asked Roberta about these projections and calculations, she acknowledged their 
predictive value, but she did not discount the uncertainty involved:  
Yeah, they are more or less meteorological items: the winds blowing, and if an 
aerosol was dispersed, it would be picked up by these winds, and because of the 
velocity and all of that, it would spread out like this, and because they are based 
on meteorological-weather-type stuff, yeah they are pretty accurate.   Now would 
a chemical release act the way that they say it’s going to?  Is it heavier than a 
certain air molecule, or some of the stuff will stay it will stay close to the ground 
because it’s heavier; some stuff says it’s lighter…  
Other people found comfort in the amount of distance between them and the incinerator.  
Asked about the possibility of a disaster in Anniston, Simon confidently told me, “I think we are 
far enough away to escape the carnage.”  Asked the same question, Craig explained: 
I think if I had lived in Weaver or 5 miles away or less from the epicenter, I 
would have been a lot more concerned.  As it was, it was hard to imagine 
something—something would have to be very large to reach us with any potency.  
So that was a big thing.  I would have been exponentially more afraid the closer I 
got to Anniston—to the Depot.   
A part of Craig’s confidence and sense of certainty was due to the fact that he lives in 
Jacksonville—relatively far away from the incinerator, and this was an understandable comfort.  
But his sense of safety was also due to his access to information on the possible projections and 
predictions of an incident at the incinerator.  Explaining this, he told me:  
And I had, when I was in school here, there was a project that the lab where I 
worked was doing, it was about modeling plume clouds in case there was a…in 
case it did get out.  How would the plume spread?  So I had a different kind of 
view I guess, where most people were like they’re incinerating weapons—
chemical weapons, and they could be deadly, because either if you just hear it in 
the news, either you disregard it and you don’t care, so you’re not afraid, or you 
don’t understand enough, and you are afraid because you don’t know, and it 
sounds very dangerous, but in my case, when they did the plume modeling and 
stuff like that, the chances were: if you were on the Depot and something 
happened, probably not a good time for you, and if you lived kind of close to the 
Depot, within a mile or two, probably not a good time for you, but in 
Jacksonville where we are how many miles away we are, the confluence of 
events that would have to happen to make anything toxic enough to get here in 
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enough quantity was so slim, not to mention all the safeguards they had taken to 
make it safe, so I was never afraid of it, and I always told my parents [of 
students], and I’m not afraid, and I live here.  I don’t think there’s anything to be 
concerned about.   
But his confidence came through the realization of the nature of these chemical munitions.  As he 
put it, distance matters with chemical weapons:    
The distance and the realization that this stuff is only bad when it’s concentrated.  
This stuff is made to drop on people [giggle] that are very near the drop site.  It’s 
not made to affect people 10 miles down the road, so you have to have a pretty 
good concentration, so my perception was that the danger for us here [in 
Jacksonville] was pretty low.   
Others linked distance with the possibility for an evacuation.  Living fairly close to a major 
highway, Bob invoked his ability to make a hasty escape:  
I think that I would feel more comfortable where I am, being as far away, and 
having routes of egress; there’s lots: 431, you know, if you are Jacksonville, you 
can go out to, you can go out 204 to get to 431; 431 is a fairly large road with a 
good speed limit and lots of places to go to get away from it.  
Greg echoed this sentiment.  Asked what he would do if there were an incident at the Depot, he 
looked to the window, commenting:  
If I was at work, I felt okay, for different reasons.  Here I was far enough away; 
all I have to do is get on 21 and head north, no big deal.  I would have more than 
enough time…I probably felt more comfortable with just where I lived and what 
my routes were to get out.  I could get on a highway in the matter of a few 
minutes…in an unpopulated area.  
Distance had a similar calming effect to the few people I interviewed that live close to the 
incinerator.  However, this effect was rather counterintuitive.  The comfort came from the fact 
that the incinerator would destroy the weapons, and it had little overall connection to the logic of 
those living farther away.  Irene explained:   
There’s a big group in Jacksonville that’s still against the incinerator.  We’ve 
always laughed and joked about it.  You know?  They’re sitting up there in 
Jacksonville thinking it’s a terrible thing, and we’ve been living there outside the 
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gate for fifty years now, knowing they are there, and you know, kind of glad they 
are getting rid of everything.   
Time also worked to calm concerns about the incinerator.  Acknowledging the problems 
with this kind of rationale, Wendy still told me, “I kind of feel like, which is such a bad way of 
looking at it, that if something was going to happen, it would have already, which I know it can 
still happen, but it doesn’t really scare me any more.”  She continued, “After so many years, [if] 
something was gonna happen, it would of.”  Others told me that as time passes, the incinerator 
became less and less important to them.  I asked Carla, “Is it [the incinerator] something you 
think about much?  Smiling, she answered: 
Not any more…Probably because it was so big at one point.  Do this, get that, 
you’re in this zoning area, we’re starting to destroy these chemicals right now, 
you know, after 911, it was on a lot of people’s minds, but I mean, you keep 
going further and further, and there hasn’t been anything, you know, big that’s 
happening, so it’s just died down…we barely thought about it after a couple of 
years, but when it happened [being built] everybody thought about it.   
Vera also felt this way.  Asked if she ever thought about the incinerator or the stockpile, she told 
me: 
No.  I remember when I was in high school, this is like 10 years ago, I remember 
that’s when they were still burning stuff, so I remember then when I heard about 
it, I felt kind of concerned, but as I got older, and I don’t know they’ve stopped 
or gotten through what they were supposed to be burning, or if they’re almost 
done, I think I even heard that if they had anything left, it’s not the really bad 
stuff.  They burned what was really bad, so no.  It’s not something I really think 
about.    
Asked about the progress at the incinerator, Bob recalled the community’s transition from 
opposition and unease into acceptance:  
I don’t remember that I do. [Pause] Like I said, initially everybody was kinda 
opposed to it.  I don’t think anybody was like, [sarcastically happy] yeah let’s 
burn chemicals here!  And I think that the longer that they’ve done it without any 
major incident: I think there was one point where something—a truck or 
something like that broke down, and something fell off, but there wasn’t a spill or 
anything, but it seems like the longer it goes, the less people think about it.   
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Many others communicated how time eased their fears.  Asked about his concerns, Craig told me: 
No I’m not [concerned with incineration] mainly because it’s almost over.  I 
think if it had just begun, if were a few weeks before it started, I might have a lot 
more fear.  It’s something you get comfortable with.  It’s been 6 months and 
nothing has happened, and that will be safe…My sense of it is that things are 
coming to a close and it’s becoming no longer a big deal.   
The passage of time also worked to dissolve opposition.  Initially against the incinerator, Roberta 
described her change of heart:  
I don’t think about it a lot now, but when it was first here, I was against it.  I felt 
that neutralization would have been a better alternative.  After living in the 
shadow of it so long, I don’t think about it…it hasn’t killed me yet. So…  
Asked if she worried about the incinerator, Anna summed up this sentiment perfectly: 
Well, we’re on the back end of incineration luckily, but I felt like it was really the 
safest way to dispose of agent out there, and it now that we are more years into it, 
I think it has proven to be a very safe method of disposal.   
Vera felt the same way.  In her words:  
It’s been there almost ten years isn’t it?  It’s not on the forefront anymore.  Now 
we’re worrying about city council fighting [laughing] or something else has 
come along.  But in the beginning it was a big part of people’s 
consciousness…Time.  You know they say time heals all wounds.  Yeah.  It’s 
time.   
FATALISM 
“when your numbers up, your numbers up.” 
Lastly, some of the individuals I interviewed found comfort in surrendering to a sense of 
fatalism.  This kind of sentiment was easy to understand.  Living right next to something so 
potentially dangerous was difficult to rationalize.  Being so helpless against the danger, it makes 
sense to surrender control to a higher power.  Asked about these dangers, Vera calmly told me:  
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I think sometimes people worry too much.  I really and truly do.  I mean, in your 
line of work, you deal with a lot more of that than I do, but sometimes I think 
people are over-panicky.  They are really gloom and doom, and like I said a few 
minutes ago, I guess being a paramedic and nurse in my life, I feel like the time 
and date is there for your last breath, and when it is, it is.  And there’s not a 
whole lot anybody can do about it.  When it’s your time to meet your maker, you 
are going to meet him.  So it’s best to be prepared for that.  I just think that some 
people go overboard sometimes with their thoughts and let things get away, their 
imagination takes over.   
She continued to say, “I figure God knows when it’s your time, and when your numbers up, your 
numbers up.  So I never really worried about it, but I think the majority of the public, it was a big 
part of their minds.”  Interestingly, Vera criticized those who can imagine the possibilities of 
calamity with the stockpile and incinerator.  Strongly supporting the incinerator, Martha also 
remained critical of those imagining the possibilities: 
I didn’t think it [an accident] was going to happen, and if it did happen, I didn’t 
think it was going to be major.  There was way too much dramatization of what 
would happen if something went wrong.   
Collectively, the surrender of control to a higher authority and the discounting of imagination 
worked to calm some individuals.  Again, it was exceedingly difficult to seriously consider the 
possibilities of potential danger contained within the stockpile and incinerator.  Sometimes people 
try not to think about it.    
BLISSFUL IGNORANCE AND DENIAL 
“I just pushed it out of my mind.” 
Many of the participants supporting incineration acknowledged their ignorance 
concerning the incineration process.  I do not mean this in a bad way, as I also lived extremely 
close to the Depot for many years, and I never bothered to learn anything about incineration, and 
I certainly never investigated into the nature of the stockpile in Anniston.  This was for a host of 
reasons, but primarily, I did not want to know.  Looking back, I think I was in a state of denial, 
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and that denial kept me from actually coming to terms with the potential dangers of chemical 
weapons.  I lived on military bases all through my childhood.  There is no way to live a decent, 
normal life if I had seriously contemplated the dangers of my environment.   
I asked Dorothy if the incinerator were safe.  Recognizing her ignorance, she answered, 
“I do, but of course, like I said, I don’t know a whole lot about it.”  Other participants had a vague 
idea, but that was about it.  Prompted to explain the incineration process, Wendy told me, “Yeah, 
I know it’s canisters, and they do something with canisters, but other than that, I have no idea.”   
To most people, the incinerator was a complete mystery.  I asked Harriet about her 
awareness of the complex.  She leaned forward to explain: 
It is so far off the radar.  You do not hear anything about it except the first 
Tuesday of every month, and one of those alarms is a chemical excursion 
alarm—I believe they call it—it sounds like aliens are coming.  They should 
really tell newcomers that they test the alarms every first Tuesday of the month 
because my first Tuesday was a scary experience.  
I asked Simon if he ever thinks about the incinerator.  Breaking into laughter, he told me: 
That’s a good question.  I don’t! [laughing] I do not.  It’s not that big of a… it’s 
not made that big of a deal around here.  There’s no one putting flyers in my 
mailbox or knocking on my door or anything.  It’s not that I feel safe, I feel 
ignorant.  You know what I mean?  I just don’t know anything.  So I don’t think 
about it.  
Jared returned to his childhood to explain this kind of ignorance.  I, too, remember the 
commonplace explosions that would shake our homes weekly.  He recalled:   
Yeah, I didn’t understand chemical warfare when I was little of course, and I 
didn’t understand until we were in high school or middle school exactly what that 
base was for you know.  When you are a kid, you don’t think of chemical 
weapons, just guns, plus the range was always out there booming, so you never 
really think about that sort of thing.   
While many supporters of incineration remained ignorant of the incinerator, other 
respondents went beyond ignorance.  Some were in outright denial.  This kind of denial is 
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completely understandable, and to a large extent, I was also in denial about the danger of the 
stockpile when I lived in the area.  I asked Dorothy if she thought of the incinerator often.  She 
told me:     
It [thoughts of the incinerator] used to be right when they started talking about 
using it, and what would we do, but you can’t sit around an dwell on stuff like 
that: doomsday, you know?  The chances getting killed in a car wreck is higher 
than that.  So I just try not to think about it.  
She tried not to think about it because as some level, she realized the serious implications if 
something were to go wrong.  I asked her about these dangerous possibilities.  Pausing for a 
second, she explained:  
I remember back when we got first got that stuff: the calendar with the routes and 
all if we had to evacuate.  I remember thinking, well my mother was invalid, and 
my sister had to sit in her power chair, and she couldn’t walk, and I did have, 
what if something like that happened in the middle of the night; how could I get 
my mother and my sister to safety; you know, what would I do?  I had to do like 
you said, just get it out of my mind.  You know, if you sit around and think about 
stuff like that, which will never occur, you know, so I just pushed it out of my 
mind.   
Jared noticed these tendencies in the general population.  I asked him why the incinerator was 
built in Anniston.  Citing denial, he answered: 
People here are willing to sell that kind of safety for jobs, and because they are so 
good at pretending that’s nothing wrong…they probably think they’ll be 
okay…because they are good at glossing themselves over; they are going to think 
the best; they don’t want to be scared because they know they’re going to be 
staying here.   
And Jared goes on to tell me that the main factor contributing to this kind of denial was 
economic.  In an almost conspiratorial tone, he continued: 
People around here are like, “It will be okay.”  The government would never do 
anything to put us in harm’s way, and we need jobs because they closed Fort 
McClellan, and it was that; they don’t like to think that the government doesn’t 
really care about them.   
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Greg extended this logic into justifying secrecy.  I asked him if local officials did enough to 
prepare the public for an emergency, and he surprised me with the frankness of his answer, 
“Yeah, they [Calhoun County] could have done more; I think all it would have done is amped up 
peoples’ nerves, it probably would have amped up opposition, and I can understand the saying 
that ignorance is bliss.”  Harriet understood this level of denial somewhat differently.  Asked 
about the risks coming from the Depot, she explained, “Oh yeah, yeah, I mean, we don’t even talk 
about it, so how can you really resist it? [laughing]  It’s and accepted part of the risks of life; I 
don’t think anyone would call it a risk any more.”   
To a certain degree, this illustrated the banality of the risk in Anniston.  This was so 
normalized that Carla told me that, “some people don’t get anything at all because they think 
nothing’s going to happen, and if it happens, oh I can’t do anything about it, so I guess I’m going 
to die.  I don’t think that way!  [laugh]” 
Wendy explained this same phenomenon, but she related it more to denial, “Maybe 
people feel the way I feel.  After so many years, [if] something was gonna happen, it would of, 
and you’re scared at first because it’s all in the media, but once the media stops covering it, you 
think of the other issues coming up, so it’s pushed back.” 
Simon rationalized this denial against the “risk society” in which we live.  I found this 
explanation to be very honest and truthful to my own experiences in Anniston.  He told me: 
But it’s everywhere.  Not to mention, I would say, the majority of people around 
here can’t afford to move.  If you have a decent job, you can’t afford to uproot 
your family and move to another state.  So you push it out of your mind.  You 
can’t handle that kind of anxiety.   
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the extent to which the organizational production of 
symbolic safety worked in Anniston.  Despite the potential risk posed by the stockpile 
and incinerator, many participants in the study found some level of comfort and safety 
even with their close proximity to the Depot.   
This comfort came directly through the consumption and internalization of 
symbolic safety.  These participants shared the official definitions of risk.  They 
consistently recited the narratives found in the distributed mailings, calendars, media 
reports, and official talking points coming from incineration proponents.  They praised 
the Depot for its efficiency and safety.  They candidly discounted alternatives to 
incineration, and they denounced those few who opposed the incinerator.  Many of these 
supporters knew people working at the Depot, and they referenced successful incinerating 
projects in other locations.   
These supporters also valued the distributed sheltering kits, masks, filters, and 
emergency radios.  As previously described, these fantasy objects effectively reified the 
fantasy documents (Clarke 1999) outlying the official definitions of risk and proposed 
solutions.  As with fantasy documents, these people did not entirely believe or disbelief 
that they worked (Clarke and Perrow 1996:1041), but this contradiction was not an issue 
with these people.  These objects were not produced or consumed for their utility.  These 
products signified that something was being done; that the social order remained 
successfully intact.  Borrowing from the words of Baudrillard (1990), these objects offer 
the simulacrum of safety.  Consuming these objects reaffirms that the social order 
remains legitimate, effective, and trustworthy.  This consumption genuinely comforted 
many participants in this study.  
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  Lastly, some of the supporters defined the situation in fatalistic terms.  A few 
felt safe by remaining blissfully ignorant about the stockpile and incinerator.  Others 
actively denied the threat of a disaster.  As we will see in the next chapter, participants 
also maintained some degree of skepticism toward the official definitions of risk and 
safety. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
LOSING THE SALE: PUBLIC SKEPTICISM OF RISK AND 
SAFETY IN ANNISTON 
 
 
While a number of the people I interviewed reported a degree of comfort with the risk 
information and materials produced by incineration proponents, others felt genuinely 
discomforted by these same efforts.  This chapter describes those skeptical of the incineration 
proponents.  Simply put, these people were not comforted by the efforts by emergency officials, 
and they did not buy into the comforts found in symbolic safety.   
Skeptical participants did not share official definitions of risk, and they did not believe in 
the fantasy documents constructed to inform and calm them.  This sense of discomfort stemmed 
from an overall distrust of government, military, and corporations in general, and this skepticism 
extended into their perception of the very products and information provided to mitigate a 
disaster.  These respondents did not value the official line, and they certainly did not express any 
confidence in the sheltering materials or evacuation planning.  Many of these research 
participants saw the evacuation plans and sheltering materials as simply unrealistic, or at the very 
least, untested.  Unlike supporters of the incinerator, these participants did not deny the
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possibility of a chemical disaster, and they fully expected chaos and panic from such an event.  In 
some ways, these people were more willing to imagine the possibilities of something going 
wrong at the Depot.  These individuals openly questioned the motives of the military, and they 
recalled the purported problems—not successes—at the other incineration locations.   
 Clearly, skeptical respondents wholly rejected the fantasy documents and objects 
distributed to the community.  This is in part to their respect of the lethality of chemical weapons 
and the population density of the surrounding area.  These participants did not expect that an 
untested evacuation could work, and they doubted the ability of the citizens to properly shelter in 
place.  Overall, skeptics felt there was little that could mitigate a serious disaster in the area, and 
if something serious were to really happen, they believed that many people would die horrible 
deaths. 
This chapter outlines the failures of incineration proponents to calm some of the public.  
These are accounts of people that were not convinced of the existence of symbolic safety; these 
skeptics did not share in official definitions of risk.  They challenged the legitimacy of the 
existing social order, and they felt disturbed by incineration in Anniston.  
LACK OF PREPAREDNESS 
“that’s all a security blanket.  They’ve done enough to calm people down.” 
Talking to respondents about the preparedness of the community, several expressed 
concerns about the prospects of something bad really happening.  I asked Jared if the community 
was ready for an accident at the Depot and if emergency officials did enough to prepare the 
community.  In a deadpan manner, he answered:     
Absolutely not.  Zero percent.  They put up that crap from the beginning from 
what I gathered, and how scared they are around here, they were probably 
pumped up for what they were supposed to do, but that’s it, nothing else.   
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Roberta also saw the disconnection between the informing efforts of emergency 
preparedness and the gravity and heavy requirements of a real event.  Asked about the community 
and their preparedness, she explained:  
They’ve been educated, yes.  They’ve been prepared as far as education and 
public information and that type of thing.  Um, if it actually happened, no.  Even 
after all the time and money that’s gone into it, I don’t think so.  We still have 
real limited numbers on first responders as far as any type of HAZMAT; let’s 
face it, we don’t have the best HAZMAT team around here.  [unintelligible] A lot 
of the firefighters are volunteer firefighters, the only reason they are is to hang 
out at the fire station, have a little club, and I don’t mean to be negative, there are 
some good volunteer firefighters out there, but anyway… 
             I asked Sarah about the possibilities of a disaster or an accident in Anniston, and she 
compared this possibility to the community’s reaction to other, more natural events.  Concerning 
the chances of a good response, she countered: 
It would be great if it could work like that; you know that it wouldn’t.  If you’d 
been around anybody when they have a tornado, or for god’s sake, when power 
goes out, there’s no safety mechanisms there, too many things can happen.  This 
won’t know what that is doing.  You know?  
Harriet equated this lack of a coordinated response with a lack of basic infrastructure.  
Many of the communities adjacent to the Depot have numerous, winding roads.  There are no 
community shelters, and even if there were, it would be difficult to impossible to coordinate a 
response in real time.  I asked her if the plans were adequate; she quickly responded:  
Adequate, if I would call it adequate, I’d say it would save their life, and so I 
would have to say no.  We would need more roads for more evacuation, maybe 
more shelters of some kind, so even if they have access to what zone they’re in, 
the kit, and there’s an alarm, I don’t call that adequate.  I don’t think, maybe I’m 
wrong, maybe your research will show this, I don’t think that anybody thinks 
[laugh] it’s adequate.  And I don’t know what you could do to make it that way, 
aside new roads and shelters.  
Other respondents reported discomfort in the lack of good information coming from 
government officials and the Department of Defense.  I asked Harold about the information he 
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received.  He told me that, “They informed the public of the surface of probabilities…it was only 
what was necessary.”  Asked about the amount and quality of information, Harriet revealed that 
she thought, “There was more community dissention than got press, talking to students, that’s 
what I hear.”  She continued to tell me that: 
The Anniston Star I would say is the best information.  As far as radio, I know 
out in [City Removed], I can’t get the JSU station because of the distance, and I 
guess the tower isn’t tall enough, so immediate information, no; I think our 
communication system, like if something were to happen, is an alarm—it’s after 
the fact.  They will blow the alarm for us to move, but to what’s going on, I don’t 
feel like we get good information.  
Asked the same question, Roberta outright accused them of lying: 
I do remember public service announcements: the jest was, [in a tough voice] 
well, now we’ve got most of the nasty stuff out, which they’d hadn’t got most of 
the nasty stuff out, they were still burning the really nasty stuff, they were using 
that as a little perk to make it sound a lot nicer for people to go pick up their 
shelter in place kits, and that’s all I’m going to say about that.  
Sarah questioned the intention of all the emergency planning and materials.  She asked me: 
And why spend all that money?  I kept thinking you know, I didn’t believe in 
them, but I think people really and truly…a lot of people really wanted all that 
stuff.  They wanted it.  They felt more protected if they had all this equipment 
and everything.  It was something that would make them feel like they were 
taken care if they had the phone system…they would do something, you know?  
It’s P.R [in a higher tone, smiling]….you know?  
Sarah saw the efforts as a public relations ploy: something to make the community feel better 
about themselves.  Accusing the community of being in denial, she continued:  
They have workshops all the time and spend so much money on all this, but it’s 
just, you always got these, they send out these calendars that you get at city hall 
and all that:  Be prepared, be prepared, find out what zone you’re in, know what 
to do.  You got all this stuff.  Call this number, and everything they could do.  
People think, well gosh, then we are alright, where they know we’re not.  You 
know.  Everybody knows, it’s just false…making yourself think you are all right.  
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Talking to Will, he revealed similar feelings.  I asked him if he thought the materials and plans 
were adequate for the community’s safety.  Looking upward, he paused and said:  
No.  It’s all this stuff, all the warning system and the radios, everything, the home 
emergency preparedness kits and all that, it’s all…that’s all…like I say, that’s all 
a security blanket.  They’ve done enough to calm people down.  They’ve done 
enough to, I guess silence the opposition.  When the incinerator went in, the anti-
incineration movement ended.  
PUBLIC DISTRUST AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE 
“But of course I’m sure they’re making more of those weapons somewhere, 
so we’ll have to do it again later.”   
People discomforted by the risk information and materials shared a distrust of 
government officials and the military.  To a certain degree, they felt as if the government 
misrepresented the truth, and some told me that the government and Department of Defense lied 
to the public.  Remembering the disruptive effects of Fort McClellan’s closure, Will expressed his 
thoughts on the military’s attitude towards his community: 
Oh, the military didn’t give a rat’s ass about how anyone in community felt about 
this.  They didn’t give really a rat’s ass about closing the Fort.  They closed the 
Fort; they put in an incinerator that everyone opposed.  They did two things that 
there was really a large outcry against:  They closed the Fort, and then they built 
the incinerator.  Nobody really wanted either of those things. [long pause]  Is 
there more I should say? [laughing]  
Also cognizant of the devastation after the Fort’s closing, Jared felt much the same as Will.  
Asked about the motives of government officials, he lamented: 
Yeah, I think about it because the same people out there running it, they have the 
same attitude of the people working at that place: they don’t give a crap about 
anything except for themselves and what they can get; not all of them, but a lot of 
them, so it’s troublesome.   
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Acknowledging that most of the opposition to the incinerator came from outspoken professors at 
Jacksonville State University, Greg explained why this segment of the population distrusted the 
military so much:  
I think there is amongst a lot of faculty in particular, I think a little bit of a 
hesitancy…you know it’s ironic, for all the bleeding heart liberal labels attached 
to university faculty, and this label of being socialist, there is a tremendous 
distrust of the federal government and especially the United States military, I 
mean the military-industrial complex, as something to be feared by a lot of 
faculty.  They just don’t trust, so I think in part anything dealing with the United 
States government, as it applies to the United States military is…a red flag 
always goes up, and so… 
Intrigued, I interrupted him with a quick follow-up, “Why do you think they distrust the 
military?”  He paused momentarily and told me: 
The military’s attitude has always been that it’s not so much the means, it’s the 
end.  And if people die or get hurt along the way, well there’s going to be 
acceptable losses.  You look at even the way things are described going on in the 
Middle East.  If somebody dies, it’s collateral damage.  Hold on [he takes a 
phone call].  You know when people die, it’s collateral damage.  When my father 
fought in world war two, he was in Patton’s third army.  He didn’t like that 
because he said Patton had little regard for human life.  All that mattered was 
winning.  So there’s this thing of, well we’ve got to win, and what’s the 
acceptable amount of loss?  The bombing of Japan with atomic bombs, it’s 
always been: well look at how many millions of lives were saved, or how many 
hundreds of lives were saved.  Yes we killed this many but, you know?   It’s that 
kind of mentality.  I think the United States military, if there was all of a sudden 
an accident or something, and people did get sick or hurt, it would be framed in a 
way saying yeah, but if we didn’t do anything, the outcome would have been far 
worse than this.  And for a lot of academics, they don’t like that.  They see the 
military as falling into that argument too readily, too easily instead of searching 
out alternative ways of doing things, and certainly I’m guessing there were 
alternative ways of getting rid of these chemical weapons, I just don’t remember 
it being a big topic of conversation.  
Harriet communicated her skepticism of the military, but she was mainly weary of people 
claiming expertise: 
I’m not a big trusting, especially of the experts.  Maybe I’m an anomaly of that 
working-class mantra, or had enough experience or enough experiences, not a 
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whole bunch, just to be like: maybe they always know what they’re doing. [said 
in a skeptical, higher-pitched voice]  
Others felt that the military was outright lying to the community.  Some of the 
respondents felt that the military will ignore the legal prohibitions on the importation of new 
weapons into the area.  They even thought this will happen through nefarious means.  Sarah was 
one of these people.  She accused the military of polluting the area before, and now she fears 
more deception at the Depot:    
After Westinghouse pulls out, I want to see what’s going on and have it 
monitored.  I would like the Anniston Star, if they’re still here, you know they are 
struggling too, I would like to see someone—outside the Depot—be able to 
monitor what goes on there, or have somebody inside that would be willing to 
tell because they say now, and [Name Removed] would know too, whether they 
could get something in right now because it’s so strict.  The Westinghouse people 
have it so strict.  But after they’ve gone, who’s going to…they could do 
anything.  There’s no telling what, I mean, a Coca Cola truck could come in 
there—that says Coca Cola that’s got chemicals and shit in it.   You know?  That 
they would put in there, but it will be okay to know that they were going to do it, 
but if they aren’t going to do it right, but if they are going to do it on the sly, and 
cut corners and save money.  Think what could happen.  That’s frightening to me 
to think that.  I don’t trust our government at all.  I would trust a big corporation 
before our government.  Of course I’m sure Westinghouse is right in their 
pockets, but still, they have so much liability, they’ve got to be careful.  That’s 
what I would really like to know, what’s going to happen afterwards, after they 
leave, you know.  But they could tell me nothing, and I probably wouldn’t 
believe them.  There’s so much that went on at the Fort that nobody knew about, 
you know how they toss chemicals and nerve agents into the water, and did all 
kinds of stuff and didn’t care, you know?  Oh well.  
Will foreshadowed a similar situation at the Depot.  I asked him about some of the alternative 
technologies supported by opponents to incineration in Anniston.  He quickly discounted the 
seriousness of that option:   
No.  It was cheaper to build the incinerator, and once, I think, the military 
understood, that once they incinerated the stockpile here, they would have an 
incinerator where they could haul other nerve agents too, and burn those nerve 
agents.  The whole chemical neutralization thing was more expensive, and they 
would have to pick up and move to neutralize the next stockpile of agents. 
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I asked Wendall if he thought the government was telling the truth.  He answered, “I don’t know.  
They get fined by the ABEM periodically for violations, but they claim they are minor and all 
that, but who knows, when they monitor themselves, it is sort of hard to know.” 
I then asked, “Is it fair to say that there isn’t a lot of civilian oversight or transparency?” 
He replied with a smile, “No.  It’s the military, the government, and I don’t think they are 
funded well enough to do that, and I’m not sure they would report some of those fully anyway 
[laughing]…they’ve done a very good job hopefully, if they tell the truth.”  Roberta linked this 
kind of deception to the substantial pollution and damage left by Monsanto, but she also saw a 
similarity in motive: 
My take on Monsanto is that they knew that PCB’s were a hazard.  However, 
they were cheap, they were durable, and so what if you lose a few eagles and 
fish?  The corporate side of that was well, we are going to keep doing this until 
we can’t do it anymore, and then everybody started getting sick, and all that stuff 
happened—the lawsuit, and Monsanto had to pay and clean it out, but they knew 
well before any of that the hazard that all of this, the PCB’s presented, and I think 
that perhaps somewhere in some vault somewhere, there is a little piece of paper 
that says: oh yeah, if we burn these chemical weapons, there’s a point 0002 
percent chance that 90 percent of people are going to develop thyroid cancer, and 
to the government and the powers that be, that’s just a small chance we won’t let 
anybody know. 
I then asked her, “Are there any studies in place for the long-term effects?  You just said 
that there wasn’t any?”   
Revealing her rationale, she said, “There are none that I know of.” 
             Some participants contextualized the incinerator with other criticisms of politics and 
overall spending priorities.  The project in Anniston was very expensive, and some people 
questioned the actual motivations for the construction of the incinerator.  I asked Harold why the 
Department of Defense chose incineration as the primary disposal tactic.  He answered: 
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Without giving weight to one or the other, there are two big reasons, and not to 
say my first reason is more important than the second reason, but I’ll say one at a 
time, and I don’t mean to weigh one more than the other.  First, there is probably 
a historical, proven method, safe or at least safest method of chemical weapon 
destruction, and the second is money.  This is a very expensive project that 
brought over a billion dollars into the community.  
Although Martha supported the incinerator, she aimed her criticisms at Calhoun County and its 
grab for federal dollars: 
The county got so much money to do emergency whatevers [sic] they needed, 
and of course they wanted to go all out and get some excessive stuff done like 
have those electronic signs that are over the highways that give you traffic 
information: but they were going to be specifically for emergency exit 
information…it was going to be way overkill.  The county just wanted to milk it 
for what they wanted.   
Sarah wondered why we spend so much money on defense:    
What I can’t understand is that with all the stuff they were storing out here, and 
then they had the treaty to get rid of all of them.  Now they are making more and 
spending more money on more and then what are we going to do with that?  
We’re just going to destroy them?  It’s just ridiculous the money we spend on 
shit like this.  People not even having health insurance and hungry and all, and 
we’re doing this superpower…imperialism, we are doing that! [giggling]  
As I interviewed Harriet in her place of work, she pointed to her phone with some distain: 
Our phones are down.  So why am I not trusting the Depot?  There you go.  We 
can’t even keep our phones working at [her place of work].  On these things, I’m 
conservative.  
Talking with Hank, he revealed to me that he was willing to give government officials some 
credit, but he tempered this optimism with experience:     
I think people, because people in the community raised a little bit of a ruckus 
about it, I don’t think there was a lot of information we were privy to, more than 
we needed or wanted to in some respects.  You know, how well does anybody 
disclose information on stuff like that?  It’s hard to tell, but my sense is that we 
knew pretty well what was up.  Unless something happens, and we find out that 
we were told the wrong thing…which has been known to happen.   
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UNSAFE SYSTEMS 
“everybody says: [in a dumpy voice] oh yeah, clean scrubbers and they’re 
doing all this; nobody…it’s like Monsanto all over again.  They’ll do it as 
long as they can get away with it.” 
A few people communicated their concerns about the stockpile, incinerator, and the 
redundancies for safety.  Now, a general sense of unease was shared throughout the community, 
but a few participants were particularly outspoken on these aspects of the Depot.  This kind of 
critical sentiment was rather rare, and this rarity was not something I expected going into this 
project.  I fully expected more people to criticize the stockpile and incinerator.  Asked about the 
stockpile, Roberta told me: 
I think it’s dangerous.  I don’t like the image it gives the city: that this is just the 
place where America and all these warmongers dump all their toys.  I don’t like 
what it does to the environment.  
This critical view stems from her skepticism:  
There are some uncertainties; I think it does do…it gets rid of the chemical 
weapons, which is what it’s supposed to do, which is a good thing.  Um, but you 
know, what the long-term effect is going to be, if there will be a long-term effect, 
I’m just skeptical.  
And she placed this skepticism against the generalizations of others and their knee-jerk response 
to such critical thinking: 
Everybody says: [in a dumpy voice] oh yeah, clean scrubbers and they’re doing 
all this; nobody…it’s like Monsanto all over again.  They’ll do it as long as they 
can get away with it.  I’m just a conspiracy theorist…  
Interestingly, Roberta was the only respondent to question the widely accepted redundancies in 
the system.  I asked her about this specifically, and she told me: 
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Human error, somebody comes into work stoned or just got in a fight with their 
husband or wife, and they’re not watching what they are doing, but then again, 
you have all the safety things in place out there, where if Billy Bob forgets to 
unplug the red wire, nothing else happens, and the whole system shuts down. 
I asked, “You feel pretty confident in those redundancies that people talk about: like you 
said, those safety steps?” 
Pausing for a moment, Roberta responded, “Uh, I feel fairly confident they will keep the 
thing from exploding, but when you put human error, you’ve just eliminated all your 
redundancies.” 
Harriet questioned the whole premise of the incinerator itself.  I asked her if she 
supported the incinerator, and she quickly told me:  
No!  No.  To me, an incinerator shouldn’t be mixed with people.  You know, I’ve 
been across the country enough times to know there are some really deserted 
areas.  If we absolutely have to have some place to incinerate, why aren’t we 
doing it where it’s not by people?  
Much of Harriet’s criticism comes from understanding how these organizations are policed—or 
the lack thereof.  As she put it:  
My understanding is that the incinerator people themselves are responsible for 
reporting the excursions; I liken that to a driver reporting themselves for speeding 
cause they get fines for it.  I don’t think they are very likely to do that.  
Much like Roberta, Harriet engaged in the language of conspiracies.  I noted this, not because 
they were engaging in conspiratorial thought, but because both qualified their criticisms with this 
narrative.  Another reason contributing to Harriet’s suspicious was her inside information:  
I hate to think of a conspiracy, but if it’s going to cost you money in fines, you’re 
going to guard what you say.  And I think they are very careful about talking to 
the newspapers, and the employees are afraid for their jobs because there hardly 
any jobs out here anyway, and some of those jobs, it seems to me that the more 
information you get, the higher your pay is: you have more of an incentive to 
close up.  I know that, I’m thinking of one of my students, [his or her dad] had 
been involved in—[Name Removed] called it an excursion—and [Name 
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Removed] was afraid for his health, you know.  So…yeah.  But he apparently felt 
that his family was far enough away to be protected and that the benefits of the 
steady pay was worth it.  I don’t know if his family agreed.  
NOT (SAFE) IN MY BACKYARD 
“there’s some incinerator out there where things were always breaking” 
Whereas knowledge of the incinerators at other locations worked to calm many 
participants, this kind of information discouraged skeptics.  This was probably due in part to the 
source of the information, as knowledge coming from incineration opponents was likely to be 
particularly negative, and conversely, supporters tended to gloss over the other locations’ 
problems.  I asked Will about the alternatives to incineration, and being familiar with the 
opposition movement, he told me that:  
We’d all heard horror stories of the incinerator in Tooele Utah, and the one out 
on the Pacific on one of those south…Hawaiian Islands; there’s some incinerator 
out there where things were always breaking, and you really couldn’t evacuate 
the island.  They were always having problems at Tooele, and nobody really 
wanted that here.  
Others were not convinced by the “safety” of the other locations.  Asked about her feelings on the 
incinerator’s safety, Roberta invoked the incinerator at Umatilla: 
No.  I mean, I don’t think they are pumping stuff out that is going to poison us 
and kill us, but you just don’t know.  There’s an uncertainty.  I wouldn’t say 
confidence.  There’s an uncertainty.  Even though there is Umatilla and all these 
other weapon disposal centers, nobody knows.  You aren’t looking at it 20 years 
after the fact and seeing what’s occurred within the population and the 
environment.   
Remembering the past, Sarah recalled problems with other high-risk locations, “Well, with 3-mile 
island, you know what happened with them, god, and Chernobyl, I mean, we don’t want to be that 
way”.  
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EVACUATION IMPOSSIBLE 
“they give you the emergency exit routes and things like that, which was 
really weird because for a while they were telling me to get on I-20 on the 
eastern entrance, but that was all blocked off by construction for years.”  
The initial plan for disaster mitigation was a general evacuation of the area surrounding 
the Depot.  As incineration progressed, this tactic would eventually become less emphasized but 
never completely abandoned.  The “sheltering in place” method would become the main strategy 
to mitigate tragedy in the Anniston area.  Harold recalled, “evacuation region-wide was 
abandoned for what they call shelter in place.  They would not have massive evacuations.” 
Interested, I asked, “Do you know what went into that decision?” 
Harold quickly answered, “Logistics: moving that many people in a very short time, it 
can’t be done.  So they would quarantine an effected area, and deal with that area.”  He then went 
on to tell me that this decision was made, “about a third the way through the incineration 
process…[because] in an immediate disaster, it [evacuation] would be impossible.  
I asked Roberta if she knew her evacuation routes.  She also told me how the plans 
changed:   
Yeah, just the standard, you know, you’re in the pink zone, and if you hear this 
siren, well, and they’ve changed it over the years too: at first, you had to evacuate 
if you were in this zone, head north if you’re in this zone, head south if you’re in 
the this zone; and then the shelter in place kits came about after they realized that 
if anybody tried to evacuate [laughing] it would be total gridlock.  
I then asked, “How did they come to that conclusion?” 
Turning to me confidently, she said: 
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They did a study; they found that: with the amount of time to build the roads, the 
panic, we might as well come up with something else.  So they said, maybe this 
isn’t going to be so bad after all.  If there is a leak, we’ve got all these protective 
measures in place, we’ve got the EMA out there, they can study the plume and 
tell exactly where it is going to go, so maybe we’d be better off with shelter in 
place.   
I asked all the respondents about the possibilities of an accident at the Depot and the consequent 
conditions if something were to happen.  Many participants told me that there would be utter 
chaos, and this feeling worked to undermine the confidence for the possibility of successful 
evacuation.  Bob compared it to the recent disaster at a concert, where people were burned alive 
from the misuse of pyrotechnics and the apparent disregarding of a fire code:      
Yes, the White Snake concert.  There was a fire started, and people freaked out, 
and they trampled each other, and they crammed into one door, and got 
themselves caught, and a similar thing could happen but on a larger 
scale…people trying to get out of the area.  
Asked about the possibility of an evacuation, Greg also predicted pandemonium and disorder.  He 
told me: 
Oh I don’t think it would be orderly at all.  I think at this point, we are so far 
removed from where it started, I think that most people probably don’t know it’s 
there anymore or what’s going on there.  So I think it would catch people off 
guard, where when it first started, it seemed to be a topic of conversation.  So you 
would go places, shopping at the mall or whatever, and people would start 
talking about it.  Now it’s not.  So I think there’d be a lot of hesitancy as to what 
in the world is going on?  And probably a lot of people not knowing what to do, 
so I would think probably there would be a few different scenarios all happening 
simultaneously.  Some people would go about their lives as if there are no 
poisons in the air, and there would be people probably getting in their cars racing 
out of town, and there would be some people hunkered down in their homes or 
here at work.  I know where I’m supposed to go here, and there’s no way I’m 
doing that.  
Wendall felt that the evacuation planning was good and well conveyed, but he doubted that 
people would exit the area in an orderly fashion.  In the case of a major disaster, many people 
would die:   
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Yeah, it’s a pretty good system and they’re well trained and well versed.  The 
word would get out.  Now if people would leave in an orderly fashion, I doubt it.  
It would probably be lots of trouble, and there are a lot of people that couldn’t 
leave that would die in that kind of worst case scenario.  
Carla predicted a mass panic.  Learning something about the local culture, she compared a 
potential evacuation to the disorganization coming from a semiannual dusting of snow:   
I think it would probably be a sheer panic of people trying to migrate to Georgia 
and get on the interstate as fast as they could…There would definitely be a panic 
if something like that happened.  If we get snow, we run out of bread and milk at 
the store.  God, I don’t want to even think about it.  It would be mass panic.   
Craig also evoked common disaster myths of panic and disorder:  
Well, I think that you know, even with as best as they can do to educate people, 
there would have been a certain amount of chaos.  Even if a gas or chemical 
weapon or whatever didn’t reach anyone, I think just the announcement would 
cause a certain amount of crime or vehicular death.  
Several respondents simply did not accept evacuation as a legitimate answer to a disaster in 
Anniston.  Thinking of the serious infrastructural obstacles, Harriet communicated her disbelief:  
I don’t see how that many…we have that one road.  I don’t see how that many 
people can get on that one road, and then you look at some people, you 
remember when I talked about people with broken down cars, they don’t have 
cars. 
Roberta noticed the same difficulties stemming from infrastructure and the rather chaotic outlay 
of roads leaving the area.  Inner Anniston was highly organized—it was the “Model City” after 
all, but outwardly, this organization was clearly abandoned.  Citing this, she told me that an 
evacuation would be incredibly difficult: 
Because you have to deal with infrastructure you have.  Most infrastructure has 
developed not because of plan: this was the road that Farmer John used to take 
the pigs to market, and it’s nice and flat, well let’s put some black top on it.  
Well, there’s our road.  The city itself was thought out because you have north, 
south, east, west: the little grid of roads, but when you get away from the city and 
pull out on a map, you see the roads going off here, there, everywhere.  
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Rose agreed.  She compared it to the chaos of Hurricane Katrina:  
Yeah.  Not everybody has access to go out and get something.  That’s the people 
that understand and talk about Katrina and stuff, not everybody can get out.  Not 
everybody can do that…there would be like…it seems to me there would be 
giant traffic jams, and you wouldn’t know, be able to get anywhere, and you 
would be, you could make your house more airtight than your car.     
As a kind of thoughtful plan to address this serious problem, some evacuation planning 
called for carpooling to get people out of the area.  Rose lamented her high school’s plan 
to evacuate for a disaster: 
You know, I remember now when I was in high school, and I think this was after 
911, we had a big drill, and everybody had to partner up with somebody that had 
a car.  They had a list with everyone in school with a car, and I had a Ford Probe, 
and they gave you a partner, like, I had two freshmen that I was in charge of, that 
could ride with me I guess, and there was a drill where everybody had to go 
outside and go to the car.  If something happened, you could get away for some 
reason.  Which always terrified me more because I have a fear of being stuck on 
the interstate with like, you know a hundred thousand people in front and in back 
of you, so for me, if something happened, I would be the one that stayed.  I 
would be the one during hurricane Katrina in the Superdome.   
Others saw this kind of evacuation as a problem.  A seasoned teacher, Wendall explained his 
concerns: 
If there was an accident, what would I do with the kids in my class?  What would 
I tell them to do?  There has never really been a plan that I think that would be 
very adequate, other than they get in their cars and drive in the opposite direction, 
which would be a huge problem.   
Greg also told me about the emergency plans at a local school.  He clearly envisioned problems 
with the concept: 
I’m supposed to go to the basement in the library, and if I have a class, that’s 
where I’m supposed to take the class.   I think it would be very difficult for me to 
be able to do that.  Not because I wouldn’t want to, it would be difficult to keep 
the students in order to do that. 
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Wendall continued, essentially pointing out how these kinds of plans were never tested.  They 
were simply unrealistic: 
I’m not sure how well it [an evacuation] would work.  Nobody’s had to try thank 
goodness, but our students, they don’t know what to do.  And I think most of the 
faculty don’t know what to do.  I think there’s a warning system that’s in place, 
and it’s pretty good; it will let us know, but most people won’t know what to do, 
but the probability of us ever really needing to use that this far away and with the 
wind blowing the right direction and carrying whatever that would be is super 
low, but it is still sort of, scary: to tell people to get in their cars and head north, 
and take one of two routes…It would be pretty tough.   
Harold also noted that these evacuation plans were essentially untested.  He told me that people 
will die, and unlike other, perhaps more prepared, communities, the area would not successfully 
evacuate: 
You have to accept that in the event of a disaster from the incinerator where 
you’ve got a gas cloud that is moving and settling, you have to accept that the 
people in the immediate area of that gas cloud will die no matter what you do, or 
get very sick no matter what you do, and to panic hundreds of thousands of 
people, and try to move those people in an untested evacuation plan, unlike what 
you have around nuclear facilities with evacuation routes and signage and drills, 
we never had any of that as a community.  And an untested evacuation plan, it 
would clog the system both physically on the street and mentally in terms of 
responsibilities; you couldn’t do anything.  There would be nothing done.  
Anna doubted the efficacy of these plans.  As she put it, without a reality check, there is no real 
way of knowing if the evacuation will work.  Laughing, she told me: 
You know, I’m not sure.  I mean, it’s kind of like, I think of 911, it was so far 
fetched, that nobody had any idea of how to respond or prepare for it because it 
never happened before.  So I kind of think it’s the same way with an incident that 
would have occurred out there, there’s some things maybe you can do to prepare, 
but without actually going through an incident, it’s hard to say if the measures 
would actually be adequate.   
Wendy also felt that the schools were not prepared.  I asked her if she would be okay if something 
bad were to happen.  She told me: 
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I don’t think so.  I mean, especially with school.  How are you going to get 
hundreds of kids to their place: it would be chaos.  I thought it was unrealistic 
because it’s one thing during drills for students, but if you know something is 
really happening, it was one teacher for 40 students, there was no way they could 
control the chaos.     
The concern for children was a common fear.  I asked Sarah about the prospects of a mass 
evacuation, and she communicated her concerns about parents trying to rescue their children in 
the schools:  
They would all panic.  They’ve already done everything at the school; they can’t 
come and get their kids.  They have places they can lock down; they’ve got the 
buildings where they’re completely locked down, and nothing can get in.  
They’ve done all the buildings like that.  Well, can you imagine the people when 
they want to get their children out?  And they’ll take guns if they have to, 
because they want their kids.  If they’re going to die, they will want to all die 
together.  They’ve got the system all set up to where they couldn’t get them.  So 
that will be horrible.  And the roads, they have routes for you to go and take, but 
they will become so…people will be so afraid there will be mayhem; you will get 
killed trying to get out it will take you so long.  There are not enough ways to go.  
It’s just futile because we’re right in the path, you know?  It’s the worst, I’m 
telling you, and here we sit.  If I had a family, if I had small children, I wouldn’t 
live here.  Uh, uh.  I don’t think I would.  
Vera remembered talking to her teachers about the possibilities of an evacuation.  It is 
difficult to say if they were serious, but she remembered them openly telling her that 
students would be left to their own devices:    
I do remember, and this was mainly like in my sophomore, junior, senior year, 
right after 911, that’s what I remember the most: people talking about the 
incinerator because everybody was scared that somebody was going to try to 
blow it up, and I remember them saying there was really tight security around the 
incinerator, and during those drills where we had to buddy up with people in the 
car, and I remember two female teachers saying they have children that go to the 
elementary school down the street, and if something happened, they would not 
take care of us in the high school [giggle].  They were like, I know we’re 
supposed to help you, but if something happened, I’m going down the street to 
get my children, sorry.   
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Disturbing as it was, Jared told me about his thoughts on some of the police officers in the area.  
Although they are entrusted to stay and provide order in case of an emergency, Jared thinks they 
would panic and leave like everyone else:   
Talking to some of my friends that are county cops, if something happens, they 
would be the ones to usher people out and keep safety, but I guarantee those 
people would just bolt too.  They would run as fast as they could…can’t really 
say you could blame them too much.   
Sarah agreed.  She did not expect law enforcement to remain in the community if a disaster were 
to happen.  At its core, this may reflect a generational distrust of government, but as she noted, it 
would be very difficult for officials to stay away from their families:    
What I told them [workers giving out radios] is, do you know if you have 
something out there, there’s no way that anybody’s going to get out.  There’s no 
way…And then I’ll have to be at work anyway, and that’s another thing they 
expect.  They expected all the police officers…they send them and tell them all 
this stuff they had to do, they didn’t provide them with any kind of equipment, 
and they expect them to just forget their families and do that?  They weren’t 
going to do that.  So it would be mayhem, it wouldn’t work.  
FANTASY OBJECTS 
“And then they want you to put plastic and all that, and that’s a bunch of 
shit, you know?”  
Of all the safety material and information distributed to the public, the pervasive plastic 
sheeting and duct tape received most of the respondents’ criticism and doubt.  In fact, not 
everyone had a high opinion of these materials supplied to the community, and I found that even 
people ostensibly supporting incineration openly questioned the value and effectiveness of this 
material.   
I asked Wendall about his knowledge of what he was supposed to do in an emergency.  
He put down his cup of coffee and cogently explained the basic idea of sheltering in place: 
 
 
123 
I forget what their terminology was, something in place—where you would put 
up duct tape and put up plastic, and go to a safe room; it didn’t seem like the 
ideal way, and then wait for instructions before coming outside.  
At the core, many people found this tactic to be ineffective and unrealistic.  I asked 
Roberta about this strategy of sheltering in place with tape and plastic; she described the basic 
plan:   
So they came up with plastic sheeting and duct tape, and everybody was 
supposed to go get their shelter in place kit, and pick out a room in their house, 
and in that way when the sirens go off, they are supposed to duct tape all this 
stuff up and hang out in a plastic capsule. [laughing] 
Concerned with that option, I then asked, “So how do you feel about that?” 
Roberta answered, “It’s ridiculous.”  
I interrupted, thinking her language was rather strong, “It’s ridiculous?  Why is 
something like that ridiculous?  I understand, but how would you…” 
Roberta explained, “The time factor involved…senior citizens, uneducated population, 
you know, grandpa Jones is not going to get up on a ladder and tape off his ceiling.”  
Talking with another participant, I found that he lived close to the Depot, and he received 
a full box of materials, but he never bothered to even open it.  Perplexed, I asked Rob why he has 
not opened this material.   
He laughed, answering, “[laughing] It just doesn’t seem like whatever was in it, they 
would hand to everybody, would really work.    
I told him, “That’s fascinating.  You got the box; you didn’t open it because you thought 
it was silly?  Is that right?” 
Jokingly, Rob looked around and answered: 
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Well, I mean…yeah, I thought it was real silly, but I didn’t want to throw it away 
because I thought it might be useful, but I didn’t see any point of opening up 
until it started [laughing through the words] raining acid or whatever is supposed 
to happen.  
When asked about these boxes, other participants also told me they were unsure about the 
whereabouts of these materials.  I asked Wendy if her family still had the tape and plastic, and she 
answered, “I’m sure we do somewhere, but I don’t think my parents have thought about it in 
years.  There’s no telling if we still have it or not.”   
 I asked another participant about the possibilities of sheltering in place.  Greg qualified 
his disbelief in the materials, as he did not see a major catastrophe as a realistic possibility.  This 
distinction was important because it showed how a person could simultaneously disbelieve in the 
materials but still feel relatively safe against the possible dangers of storage and incineration.  He 
explained:  
Just kind of a huge mushroom cloud over the Depot where every single weapon 
goes up all at once, which I don’t even know if that was even possible.  Just 
really something along those lines, in which case the plastic and all that, the air 
filter, I think was only good for about 8 or 9 hours, and that didn’t seem long 
enough.  I don’t know if it would have been or not, it just didn’t seem long 
enough, but it seemed like I would die anyway, and there would be chemicals 
everywhere, and there would be a lot of residual problems.  
Much like myself, Harriet saw the commonsensical value in duct tape, but she ultimately 
does not have faith in the shelter in place strategy.  Of this, she told me, I have no confidence in 
that: not one little bit.”  She illustrated this through telling me of her recent dream of a disaster: 
I have not gone and picked up one of those kits you can get with the I guess 
plastic and duct tape to tape your windows.  You know, that seems so ineffectual 
to me; I’m a big fan of duct tape, don’t get me wrong, duct tape can fix a lot of 
things, but I can not imagine thinking that some plastic and some duct tape 
around the windows is gonna make me safe.  Although I did dream the other 
night we had a release, maybe because we talked, and I was running around my 
house looking for plastic and duct tape and saying, why didn’t I get that stupid 
kit?  Why didn’t I get the stupid kit?  So I was trying to find garbage bags that 
may work, and I’m a big fan of duct tape—I had it.  
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I asked Hank about the materials he received.  Living very close to the Depot, he smiled and 
cracked a joke about these sorts of tactics:   
The other joke is that… what [Name Removed] refers to is the kiss your ass 
goodbye radios.  We’ve got one of those, and then we all joked about the—what 
was it—shelter in place: give us some plastic and duct tape so we can you know, 
conceal ourselves in our houses, and I guess we won’t smell as bad when they 
come get our carcasses out of town [laughing]!   
One participant referenced these kinds of sardonic remarks.  Asked about the emergency 
management efforts of the County, Martha told me: 
I don’t think the county did a bad job.  Of course everybody was of course 
critiquing them because people love to critique that kind of thing, but I don’t 
think the county approached it as well as they could have.  I’m trying to 
remember.  There were a lot of tongue-in-cheek comments made about the kits.  
What do they call it?  The shelter in place kits, because they were basically 
plastic and duct tape [laughing].    
She goes on to expose acknowledged problems with these kits, although she rationalized it—like 
many others—with the belief that she can successfully escape a disaster in Anniston: 
And a lot of people, found these air-filter things they had…they were like those 
dehumidifier units, but they were supposed to clean the air, and they had specific 
instructions: do not use until you need it because they have a limited life on the 
filter or something, I’m not really sure.  Well some people plugged them in 
anyway, just to test them, and some of them didn’t work.  So there are some 
issues there, and lot of people said I’m not going to get one of those kits; I’m 
going to get in the car and hightail it out of there, you know?  So, which was my 
plan, I was going to duck behind Cheaha Mountain.   
Carla also mentioned the possibility of escape in our conversation.  Unlike Martha, she predicted 
chaos in the streets escaping Anniston.  I asked her about the kit she received; tilting her head for 
a second, she remembered: 
It was masks; it was basically stuff to put over your skin: protection for that stuff, 
to seal off air vents, but if that really happened, knock on wood [she literally 
knocks on the table], I don’t think those are going to help that much [short 
laugh].  I think it would probably be a sheer panic of people trying to migrate to 
Georgia and get on the interstate as fast as they could.   
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Escape or not, many simply saw the prospect of duct taping a shelter as unrealistic if not 
impossible.  I asked Rose if she felt confident with the tape and plastic.  She remarked: 
I do not know.  I feel more confident about sheltering in place than I do driving, 
but I’m a pretty paranoid person, so I don’t know.  To me, it’s like, I feel like it 
probably wouldn’t work either.  It would probably still get through.   
Hank explained his issues with the tape and plastic method:   
I figured if it got to that stage, it’s not really worth messing with.  I may be silly 
in that, and I may regret it one day, but I felt duct tape and plastic is not going to 
go around here [points to the massive Victorian ceilings and windows].   
Simon also questioned the efficacy of taping up a room for sheltering in place.  Giggling the 
whole time, he told me: 
I mean, if a cloud of VX gas floats over Jacksonville, there’s no amount of duct 
tape and plastic wrap that’s going to keep it from killing you.  Less people would 
probably die if everybody stayed still.  I don’t know.   
Even respondents telling me they felt completely safe with chemical incineration display doubt to 
the efficacy of sheltering in place.  Asked if he was confident about the disaster planning and risk 
management in the community, Craig confessed:  
One silly part—or it seemed silly—was they handed you a big roll of duct tape in 
these boxes, and it was like: in case you need to shelter in place, you need to 
place this over your windows to make sure the gas doesn’t get in, but I was like 
man, I got to duct tape the house; that’s pretty bad…I would say everything but 
the duct tape was better, but that actually made it a little bit of a minus, because 
man, am I really going to have to use this?  Because I can’t cover up every single 
crack?  So it’s true, that might have undermined it a little bit.   
I asked, “Do you still keep the duct tape around?” 
Grinning, Craig told me, “Only for house projects [smiling].”   
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The prospect of quickly constructing a shelter may sound good in theory, but when you 
really think about the impoverished communities surrounding the Depot, it becomes quite 
problematic.  Thinking of this, Will pointed out: 
Nah, I mean…you look around, you go and look like I said, at the impoverished 
part of town or any town in the county, and houses are being held together with 
scrap and tarpaper, and there’s holes in them.  No, no it’s not going to help.  It’s 
just…It’s not going to help the bulk of people.  It’s duck and cover, part two.  It’s 
a security blanket.  It’s whistling as you walk past the graveyard.  You know it’s 
not going to really help at all.  
Other respondents communicated a similar theme: they saw these efforts as largely psychological 
in nature.  They told me that the purpose of sheltering in place was to calm people down—not 
that it would actually save anybody.  I asked Harold about the tape and plastic.  In a deadpan 
manner, he revealed:   
I thought it was stupid.  It was a band-aid on a bleeding wound.  It didn’t mean 
much at all.  It was window dressing…Want me to tape myself up in my 
bedroom as a gas cloud passed over…It was window-dressing; it really didn’t 
mean much.  The people were poorly informed in their use and would not 
probably used them anyway—wouldn’t of helped anything.  It was a move by 
politicians both on the city and county level that insisted those things be 
distributed to the public to show something that there was something being done 
on their behalf.  
Simon also saw these mitigation efforts as ridiculous.  Speaking of the idea of sheltering in place, 
he told me it was laughable:  
It’s laughable to think that some duct tape and plastic sheeting could protect you 
from that kind of stuff.  It’s laughable.  It feels like you know, minor effort to 
make people feel safer.   
Others responded to these materials with a sense of humor.  This was understandable when you 
realize the immediacy in a disaster situation.  With impending doom, how were people supposed 
to calmly and effectively seal up their houses?  Irene explained: 
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We got everything.  The air, we got tape up your windows; we got I guess, 
masks.  Frankly, we thought it was probably all a joke too [laugh].  If something 
does happen, like we’re going to have time to dig it out of our closet and tape our 
windows up, and how safe is that going to make it?  We really felt more that if it 
was going to happen, it was going to happen.  It might have happened 20 years 
earlier, so we took the stuff; we went to the demonstrations; we talked about it, 
and of course, if it happens in seconds, will you have time to do any of that?   
Talking about her family’s proximity to the Depot complex, Dorothy told me, “they live right 
outside the back gate to the Depot, and she and I have talked about it and joked, and she got gas 
masks.”  This humor may seem strange to an outsider, but living in the area for many years, I 
commonly heard people joke about the stockpile and incinerator.  It diffused the tension. 
 Other participants refused to prepare for an incident.  They had no real emergency 
preparations, and they were fine with that.  Several respondents told me that they never connected 
their warning radios.  Interviewing Rob, I noticed his emergency radio was collecting dust in the 
corner of the room.  I asked him why was it not plugged in and fully operational.   
 He told me, “I don’t have any faith in it.  I guess it would work, I don’t know.  I guess 
I’m not scared of hurricanes and stuff like that.”  This response was particularly interesting 
because he did not overtly associate the radio with a chemical incident.  He saw the real purpose 
of the radio as a weather-warning device, and he was not alone in this manner.  Hank jokingly 
described the device as a: 
Kiss your ass goodbye radio, because when it goes off, you know, it’s not a good 
thing!  [laugh] But actually it’s a weather radio, a weather report thing, and every 
time there’s a hurricane—I mean, a tornado, it goes off.   
 I asked Roberta about her radio, and she told me the radio was, “more of a comforting 
thought.  Whether it is effective?  I don’t think so…the only reason I have a radio is because 
someone brought it to my house.” 
 
 
129 
I asked, “Do you have it plugged in?  You don’t have to tell me if you could get in 
trouble.”   
Citing the weather, she answered, “Yes, it’s plugged in, but the only reason it’s plugged 
in is for the tornado warning aspect”. 
Anna never bothered to put her radio out.  Joking about it, she told me, “Well, we got 
those warning radios, which I just put in the closet.  It didn’t match my décor! [laughing]  I didn’t 
want it out.”   
Sarah outright refused to accept her warning radio.  She explained: 
They [Calhoun County] force you to do all this stuff. You are supposed to have a 
telephone [warning radio] in every house, and I don’t want a telephone.  I don’t 
care.  I had to sign a piece of paper; they came to my house, and said if I wasn’t 
going to take one, I’d have to sign something.  So I’ll sign it then.  I don’t want a 
damned phone like that in my house, you know?  
Jared did not value the radios because of the potential for tragedy and irreparable damage.  He 
imagined there was little to do if an accident really did happen.   As he put it: 
I never saw anything on the radio.  I never saw commercials.  I remember being 
home and mom having the packet they gave her: I believe it was a booklet and a 
radio, which she never even hooked up because let’s face it; you’re dead if 
something happens.   
One significant factor influencing the perception of legitimacy with the radios and warning 
system was the proximity of the household to the stockpile.  The people doubting their usefulness 
tend to discount the chances of people working and living closer to the incinerator and stockpile, 
and they tend to think there was little to do if something were to really happen.  I asked Wendy 
about the radios and sirens, and she told me, “I think they work pretty well, but I think at certain 
areas, it’s going to be a moot point [chuckle].  It’s going to go off, and you’re dead a couple 
seconds later, but overall, they work really well.”  Living very close to the incinerator, Vera 
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communicated her helplessness, “If something got out, I mean, it’s like, what the hell could you 
do?”   
In a similar fashion, Simon joked, “on the other end, if something happens and it gets 
over here, I will never know it!  [laughing]  You know what I mean?”  I asked Bob about the 
prospects of those near the Depot, and he sadly admitted:   
[sigh] I think they [people close to the incinerator/stockpile] might be S.O.L. 
[shit out of luck], and they might be affected by it: like the people who work 
there, who don’t work on the incinerator, that work for others, like General 
Dynamics or the heavy mobile equipment repair facility or any of the other ones.  
Harold explained this sentiment very matter-of-factly: 
You have to accept that in the event of a disaster from the incinerator where 
you’ve got a gas cloud that is moving and settling, you have to accept that the 
people in the immediate area of that gas cloud will die no matter what you do, or 
get very sick no matter what you do…the employees at the Anniston Army 
Depot, which are next door to the incinerator, they don’t have gas masks, and 
[short laugh] I don’t think they have a safe place to hide: shelter in place is what I 
think that’s called, but they are pretty vulnerable, I feel, all those people close by, 
especially those people that work next door at the Depot.  
Talking about her family member that lives very close to the Depot, Dorothy told me that there 
was little hope if something bad were to happen.  She told me this with a healthy dose of dark 
humor: 
But living that close, I don’t think she’s going to need anything.  If anything 
happens, I don’t think they are going to know it, they’ll be gone so quick, both 
will disintegrate or whatever, you know?  Living that close…You can actually 
see the gate entrance from her front yard.  So it’s pretty much a sitting duck!  
[laugh]  
Cracking a similar joke, Craig lampooned the television commercials for emergency 
preparedness:    
If you lived on, or right near the Depot, then there wasn’t much you were going 
to be able to do unless you had precognition and not be there when it happened.  
That was at least the impression I got from his [an emergency management 
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official] work on the thing.  I don’t remember that being in the TV spot though—
they didn’t go into detail on if you live too close, don’t even bother picking up a 
kit because that never came up [smiling].   
Will linked immediate death with long-term environmental problems that would haunt the area—
that is, if they were not already resulting from the incineration of these hazardous chemicals:  
Probably the death of workers there…contamination of the community.  If there 
were an accident, it would be localized of course.  Basically the workers would 
die—the people in the immediate area, and then of course you would have people 
injured, and the surrounding community would have to be evacuated, and 
somebody would have to go in there and clean it up.  I really don’t really feel that 
there is an immediate threat, of course some of this crap could get picked up by 
the wind…carried out.  Like I said, the place is already toxic, and we’re dumping 
more pollutants into the environment.  Trash is unsightly, but you don’t burn it, 
you know.  You don’t burn plastic, you shouldn’t do that, and that’s the analogy I 
would draw here.  We’re burning all of our trash, and surely to god, something is 
getting out.  Something’s getting out in the smoke; something’s getting out in the 
ash.  This stuff isn’t, well, it’s some of the deadliest stuff on earth.  I don’t think 
it’s going to break down into harmless ash and water.  Surely to god something 
awful is left over.   
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the organizational production of symbolic 
safety worked to some extent, but in this chapter, we observed that public perception of and 
response to official definitions were mixed.  Many respondents, as described in this chapter, were 
not appeased at all by official attempts to make them feel safe.  They were skeptical of the 
information they received, they doubted the community’s readiness for an actual disaster, and 
they were not at all convinced that incineration was a safe endeavor.  These people did not 
believe in the symbolic safety sold to them.   
In this case, we can see how audiences determine the viability of fantasy documents.  
Skeptical participants detected and subsequently rejected the assumptions of these documents.  
Skeptics do not accept the “most benign assumptions about the environment (Clarke and Perrow 
1996:1053)”.  They rejected that “everything will work out right the first time, that every 
 
 
132 
contingency is known and prepared for (Clarke and Perrow 1996:1041)”.  In short, these 
respondents essentially saw the fantasy documents as fictitious and as an attempt to placate the 
public.  Ironically, this came about not through deliberated rationality; it arrived through their 
ability to seriously imagine and entertain the dangerous potential of the Anniston stockpile and 
incinerator.   
The same can be said for fantasy objects.  Distrusting the military and government, 
skeptics did not share official definitions of risk, and they did not assume that fantasy objects 
would work in a disaster scenario.  They doubted the efficacy of the sheltering materials, and they 
rejected the generous assumptions made by emergency officials about the environment, their 
knowledge, and their capabilities.       
Thus, when thinking about public response to the organizational production of symbolic 
safety, disaster researchers should recognize the diversity of our communities and the myriad 
ways people process information, perceive risk, and attempt to protect themselves.  Audiences are 
important.  They do not passively receive information and materials.  They make evaluations and 
judgments to what is and is not realistic.   
Based on the interviews with participants in this study, the next chapter explores some of 
the factors shaping people’s perception of risk and their response to the organizational production 
of symbolic safety.
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
SYMBOLIC SAFETY AND INDIVIDUAL RISK PERCEPTION: 
FACTORS INFLUENCING BELIEF AND SKEPTICISM 
 
 
As shown in the previous two chapters, participants in the study differed in their response 
to organizational attempts to produce and communicate symbolic safety.  Some bought into the 
idea and believed they were safe, while others rejected the efforts and felt skeptical about the 
safety of the stockpile and incineration.  These differences resulted from differences in perception 
that directly related to how people defined the situation, and how they defined the situation 
played heavily into how they coped with the possible dangers of living so near both the stockpile 
and incinerator.   
A few contextual factors influenced participants’ attitudes towards the organizations 
advocating incineration, and in turn, these important conditions superseded any questions 
concerning the utility or reality of symbolic safety.  These factors contributed to whether 
participants deemed the organizations as legitimate.  This legitimization factor transcended the 
reality or practicality of emergency planning; this contextualizing effect helps explain how some
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respondents could simultaneously disbelieve in symbolic safety and still support incineration 
efforts.  In turn, this will also reconcile how staunch critics remained largely acquiescent against 
what they see as a serious existential risk.        
This chapter will demonstrate what factors influenced respondents’ views towards 
symbolic safety efforts in the area.  The first important factor influencing how the respondents 
defined the situation was simple economics.  As previously stated, the Depot was the largest 
employer in Calhoun County, and the incinerator brought in many jobs to the impoverished area.  
Many people still remember the closing of Fort McClellan and the devastating effects of its 
decommission.  This basic economic need overruled the unknown risks of the incinerator.  In 
some regards, these economic fears overpowered questions concerning the reality or practicality 
of symbolic safety. 
The second important factor influencing participants was the widespread patriotism in the 
area.  Because the old Fort McClellan was always accessible to the public, a clear division 
between the civilian and military populations never really existed in Anniston.  The large number 
of military retirees remaining in Calhoun County further compounded this blurring, and both of 
these factors contributed to the strong, persistent military identity of the Anniston area.  This 
tradition of patriotism contributed in many ways to perceptions concerning the legitimacy of 
organizations connected to the stockpile and incinerator, and this legitimacy engendered trust, or 
at least some allowance for ambiguity and ambivalence, towards symbolic safety efforts.  
The third influencing factor was the untested perception that one can escape a disaster.  
This assumption effectively reduced perceptions and consequences of risk, and it contributed to 
several respondents reconciling their disbelief in symbolic safety and rationalizing not preparing 
for an emergency. 
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Last, those critical respondents that rejected symbolic safety and defined incineration 
proponents as illegitimate must resolve their cognitive dissonance in some manner.  This chapter 
will illustrate how this dissonance manifested as ignorance and general apathy.  Further, these 
skeptics also surrendered to a sense of powerlessness and fatalism against incineration 
proponents, and this also illustrates the insidiousness of symbolic safety.  Even when rejected, 
these efforts can still communicate and reinforce the social order.     
Each of these factors worked in a synergistic fashion to disarm criticisms of emergency 
planning, and through these varied rationalizations, many people tolerated—and even thrived 
in—a high-risk environment.  Overall, these seemingly small rationalizations combined to create 
a strong foundation for acceptance of incineration.  This helps explain why incineration became a 
reality in Anniston. 
APATHY AND INDIFFERENCE 
“It doesn’t affect my day-to-day life”. 
Indifference and apathy played a large role in how people make sense of the stockpile 
and incinerator in Anniston.  Although the local opposition movement made some progress 
initially, the movement never caught on with the public, and to a large degree, some of this can be 
explained through the general lack of coordinated attention or concern.  Put simply, a lot of 
people just did not care about the stockpile or incinerator, and this was for understandable 
reasons; many people were busy living their lives, and they cannot concern themselves with these 
kinds of issues.  Like people living on fault lines or next to nuclear power plants, they were more 
concerned with life’s more pressing issues.  The other obligations of life took primacy.  Not 
concerned with the incinerator, Bob explained a common sentiment, “It [the incinerator] doesn’t 
affect my day-to-day life”.   
 
 
136 
I asked Wendall about the reaction of the community to the incinerator.  Living and 
working in the area for over forty years, he described his experiences with the community: 
Pretty much, the community was oblivious [laugh], even with all the stuff in the 
paper…Apathy [laughs].  Apathy and ignorance…that sounds so arrogant, but I 
really think that’s true.  I don’t think they are informed, or up to date, or involved 
in the risk.  
I asked Harold about opposition to the incinerator.  He told me, “There were pockets of 
resistance.  There was a greater population of indifference…I didn’t talk about it [the incinerator] 
with anybody.  It wasn’t a concern.” 
Nodding my head, I asked him, “It doesn’t come up?” 
Harold answered, “No, we didn’t wear outfits that showed us in skeletons marching 
against nuclear weapons.  It wasn’t that.  Nobody cared.  My circle of friends didn’t care.”  
Intrigued, I then asked, “Why is that?” 
 Harold solemnly explained: 
It’s hard to grasp the actual danger, and once through my work, I was involved in 
the distribution of protective gear, so I was aware of all that.  There was a spike 
in interest, but it was like the needle registering an earthquake.  It was a moment.  
It didn’t last very long.  They started up the incinerator.  Nothing 
happened…Move on.  
The danger was difficult to understand, and the apathy of the community should not be 
linked to a lack of information on the situation.  Aware of the stockpile and incinerator, Rose 
conveyed the indifference in the community: 
Yeah, I still hear things today like every once in a while on the radio—mostly on 
the radio, you’ll hear a public advertisement for the chemical stockpile 
aware…something, and they say, gosh, I don’t remember, I don’t remember how 
the commercial went, but you can get information on what do to in the event of a 
chemical emergency.  It feels like a non-issue to everybody I guess.   
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I asked Curtis about his preparedness for a disaster, and he told me how it was not a priority for 
his family.  Thinking this over for a second, he communicated how this apathy affects other areas 
as well:  
No.  I mean that’s the kind of the forward-thinking thing that’s more rare.  You 
know, on the TV on the family sitcoms and stuff, I think it happens more than it 
does in practice.  I don’t even think we have a fire safety plan.  We have some 
fire extinguishers under the counter like you’re supposed to have, but I guess 
when my kids get old enough to really understand the process, we’ll do a fire 
drill just in case, but if we don’t have a fire safety plan, we’re not going to have a 
if the incinerator goes up, shelter in place plan.   
Simon told me that he viewed the incinerator primarily as a military issue: something to be left to 
experts.  I asked him how the community reacted to the construction and implementation of the 
incinerator.  He answered:  
Um, pretty stoically, I guess.  You know?  Kind of the same.  If it’s a military 
issue, I kind of listen to whatever my dad has to say about it.  He never really 
talked about it much.  Yeah. It’s kind of one of those things: if I’m really worried 
about it, I guess I would move.  You know what I mean?   
Respective of the dangerous work at the Depot, this kind of view made sense.  Some 
participants felt that worrying about the stockpile and incineration did not help the situation.  This 
became compounded with the feelings of patriotism.  Sarah explained why people were so 
apathetic towards the incinerator:  
I think a lot of people, if they think they don’t think they don’t have power to do 
anything about it, [unintelligible] they don’t want to cause trouble.  They melt in, 
and a lot of people think it’s un-American; we’re not going to do anything 
against Uncle Sam or whatever, these conservatives.  
Others agreed.  Roberta linked the apathy concerning the incinerator to the general political 
attitudes of the local population:  
I think several of them were pro-incineration because it was the quickest, 
cheapest way of doing it.  I think the economics of the area, the attitude—you 
can’t fight the government; they are going to do what they want to do—a lot of 
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low income, uneducated people that just didn’t make politics part of their lives, 
so they didn’t even bother to get involved: apathy.  
Jared agreed with Roberta’s description of the community.  He had a rather low opinion of people 
in the area, specifically their tendency to allow those in power to do what they want:  
Most of the people I’m really friends with don’t expect anything less than for 
people to take something like this, if that makes any sense…When I heard they 
were doing this [building the incinerator], I was like, well that figures. It figures 
they would do that, and the people would let them because that’s their mentality.   
And others noticed this utter lack of resistance to the Department of Defense.  The community 
acquiesced.  Wendall recalled, “There wasn’t much of a reaction from the community at all.  It 
was sort of weird.  There were a handful of local people that voiced concerns and some outside 
people who came in to voice concerns, so there was really very little reaction.”   
Harriet said of the silence, “Oh yeah, as far as the town goes, you don’t see or hear 
anything about it.  Nobody talks about it.  It’s not on the news.”   
I asked Wendy about the response in the community, and she told me, “Yeah, evidently it 
[public opposition] went from one extreme to nothing.”   
I asked Rose about her memories of the public reaction to the incinerator.  Stumped, she 
shrugged, confessing, “Um, I don’t know.  I don’t really…I don’t remember anyone really talking 
about it.”  Speaking to some of the respondents, one could get the feeling that the incinerator did 
not even exist.  I imagined for many people in the community, it was probably a complete 
mystery. 
 A few participants linked the lack of attention in the community to a larger generational 
tendency for apathy.  I asked Simon if the materials he received were useful or meaningful.  In a 
rather whelming fashion, he told me:  
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Yeah, it made sense I guess, but it didn’t feel very pressing.  It wasn’t something 
I sat down and devoted to memory.  I don’t know.  Maybe it’s just my 
generation’s mentality about life.  It’s kind of, we’re like whatever!  Right?  So, I 
don’t know.   
Looking back at the events leading to the incinerator becoming a reality, Curtis recalled his 
youthful inattention to these matters:  
I am not aware of any alternatives.  I assume that alternatives were considered, 
but I didn’t keep up with it all that much.  I was you know, at the time I was still 
in school, like in my undergrad, and undergraduates don’t pay attention to such 
things.  Yeah, I would pay more attention now, definitely.  I said that I wouldn’t, 
but I totally would.  I’ve got kids.  It’s dangerous, and if it’s something 
dangerous for my kids, I need to know about it…When you’re young, you don’t 
worry about stuff like that.  Plus I don’t remember ever thinking it was all that of 
a danger for us.   
Craig also noticed this inattention, but he limited it to his own experience and not the overall 
attitude of the community.  Speaking for himself, he explained his individualistic take:   
I would blame it mostly on youth and inattention to political and those sort of 
things.  If it wasn’t in a videogame or something that applied to my school 
classes, I wasn’t likely to notice it.  I was pretty obtuse.  I think it was mainly me.   
Recalling my own youth, I found these statements to really resonate with my own experiences.  I 
remembered living rather obliviously, never really even thinking about the stockpile or 
incinerator until many years later.  It just was not important at that time in my life.  Much like 
Craig, I was preoccupied with my own, narrow interests, and worrying about something like the 
stockpile was alien to most everyone I knew in the area.  Summing this sentiment of indifference, 
Harold revealed:  
It seems like they distributed out calendars in pretty colors that… in a nice way 
said, don’t worry about things.  But I don’t remember a letter or presentation sent 
out saying here’s what’s out there, this is what we are doing, and this is how we 
are going to do it, and this is why we feel it is safe to do it this way.  There 
wasn’t anything like that.  If there was, I didn’t receive it; I didn’t search it out; I 
didn’t care.  
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VULNERABLITY 
“Because we’re dumb; we don’t question authority.” 
Several participants gave explanations to why they thought the stockpile existed in 
Anniston.  Although many respondents did not offer a justification, the ones that did were often 
critical of the Department of Defense.  I asked Sarah, “Why do you think they had all these 
chemicals out here? 
Sarah looked to the window and recalled a rumor I remember from growing up in the 
area: 
Because they could: because people are poor with farms and stuff.  They say, and 
it is true, that in Weaver, in world war one, this was just a place where they 
buried mustard gas.  That’s all.  There was this pasture that they’d put mustard 
gas.  They paid people. They didn’t have any money.  It was just poor people, 
ignorant people…because they could.  
Harriet shared a similar sentiment.  She told me of her perceptions of the community and the 
difficulties of adjusting to the local culture, and I asked her about her thoughts on why Anniston 
was chosen to house so many weapons.  She related it back to her criticisms of local employment 
practices:  
Because we’re dumb; we don’t question authority.  I think some people are 
employed, and that’s a big push of that place.   Going back to that not 
questioning authority: they must know better, they’re trusting, [sigh] that’s the 
ticket.  
Even though he strongly supported the incinerator, Curtis still maintains a rather critical view on 
the rationale for storage in Anniston.  He linked this to money and power.  I asked him if he knew 
why weapons were stored in Anniston.  He paused for a second and flatly answered: 
No, but I would assume it’s the same reason they store all the nuclear waste up in 
Yucca Flats, because nobody of consequence lives up there.  So what does it 
matter?  If you don’t have money to convince your representatives otherwise, 
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they are going to store it where it’s cheapest and least vocal and least represented 
people live.  So that’s my guess, and then because they stored it here, they started 
doing the chemical weapons program here at Fort McClellan, which is the only 
part that’s still active, so that’s why so I’m assuming that’s the order of events 
and how it happened.     
JOBS 
“We need jobs, you know.” 
Although most respondents gave no justification for why the chemical weapons were 
stored in Anniston, almost every person clearly understood why the incinerator and Depot were 
so important to this community.  Almost any way you look at it, Anniston was economically 
depressed.  There were isolated pockets of wealth, but the overall economy had become rather 
bleak over the last twenty years.  The entire community suffered greatly after the closing of Fort 
McClellan, and new economic opportunities remain very limited.  Regardless of how participants 
view the act of incineration, they universally valued the profound positive economic influence 
coming from the Depot.  I asked Will about the Depot and its influence on the community.  He 
quickly explained it in economic terms:    
It’s one of the major employers of people.  It’s, I don’t have the exact number on 
the people that work there, but it’s in the thousands for sure.  I know several 
people who work on the Depot doing various things: some people working as 
skilled labor, some people working as professionals with specialized degrees in 
computer science and math, and some people pushing a broom…Oh yeah, it’s 
real positive.  A lot of people, the largest employer in Calhoun County is the 
Depot: largest payroll.  
These government jobs maintained a high value in the community.  Civil service jobs were 
especially helpful due to their hiring practices.  These kinds of jobs offered important 
opportunities to people that have few options, as fair employment in Alabama can be tentative at 
best.  Minorities suffered serious discrimination in employment, and as Bob explained, fair hiring 
practices can provide opportunities and make a big difference:  
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If I’m not mistaken, the Depot is the largest employer of citizens in Calhoun 
County.  They provide a lot of good opportunities, and as the government goes, 
their diverse hiring practices, it gives a lot of opportunity that wouldn’t be here if 
it weren’t here, and I think raised the economy…the level of the economy.  
These federal jobs were good for the entire community.  Because Anniston was so depressed 
economically, a job with benefits was difficult to find.   
 Carla described the community’s cheery view of the Depot, “Usually people describe it 
as that people make good money if they work out there, but there’s never anything negative when 
you mention the Depot.”   
 Agreeing, Rose explained: 
It [the incinerator] is for jobs.  Um, I know there are just tons of people that work 
at the Depot, and it’s always like it’s a good job no matter what you’re doing—
even if you’re a janitor.  If you’re working at the Depot, you probably have 
health insurance.  You know what I mean?   
Sarah described the Depot as a local tradition: an economic institution in the area where 
generations benefit from employment.  Noting the overwhelming, commonplace support for the 
incinerator, she told me:   
Everybody that graduates from high school, they go out to the Depot.  Their 
daddy works out there or they know someone that gets them jobs, and they can 
hire husbands and wives, you know, it doesn’t matter.  It’s really the only 
industry they’ve got here, so people will want to burn all that stuff out there 
because that will be their livelihood.  They won’t care; they are thinking about 
themselves. 
I asked Jared about the Depot, and he supported Sarah’s assertion.  Getting a job at the Depot was 
like winning the lottery.  He explained:   
I’ve driven out around it, but never to it, but from what I hear, it’s like 
everybody’s savior around here: you got to get a job at the Depot, like you just 
struck gold.  You’re in, and you’re a company man: you’re set; you’re a made 
man; they won’t fire you because you can be a complete idiot and not do 
anything, because from what I hear, that’s most of what the managers want 
because they’re doing the same thing as far as milking the hourly wage.   
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Struggling with unemployment, Rob related the Depot’s economic value to the community: 
You can just tell how good…everyone wants to get on out there.  Even when I 
was with the temp agency, the guy in front of me was always asking how you get 
on at the Depot, and people at the bar would say they had a good job at the 
Depot.  It’s like the local factory or the local good job, the stereotypical good 
hiring; it seemed like them and Honda were the two biggest.  If you get on there, 
you’ve got a good job.  It’s like the steel mill or something, I don’t know. 
I then asked, “Why are those considered good jobs?” 
Comparing the federal jobs to the local employment prospects, Rob quickly explained, 
“The benefits and it’s tough to get fired.  It’s a government job generally, but I think the 
contractors work out too, and the pay is decent.”  And the pay is decent.  Working at the Depot 
can supply a comfortable middle class lifestyle.   
Asked about this, Anna shared her warm thoughts of the Depot:  
He [a family member] worked there for 38 years.  So it was a good source of 
income.  I would say that generally.  People that are employed at the Depot can 
provide well for their families, not that their salaries are above average of 
anybody in the country, but for around here, it’s a good, honest living.   
Others do not share this sense of the Depot’s benevolence.  Although he acknowledged the 
economic benefits, Jared described employment there as exploitation of tax money:    
People keep sucking off it [Depot] basically.  With the Depot now, Anniston 
Army Depot people that work there, they brag how they only really work three 
hours a day and get 60 hours a week, and they don’t have to do anything.  Things 
like that… it’s just, it’s like they think everything is just going to be there, and 
it’ll be okay.  They’re living off the government basically: this place, the 
government healthcare.   
I asked Greg about incineration and its possible benefits.  He told me that most of the supporters 
see the incinerator as a creator of jobs, and that, “it’s always nice to live somewhere where there’s 
employment.  It makes a difference for all of us positively.”  He continued: 
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It’s [the Depot] the creation of jobs.  I know when they started the whole 
incinerator thing, that all of a sudden, there were a lot more jobs, and people 
seemed to be, at least the ones getting jobs, were feeling pretty good about it.  I 
don’t know.  It just seems like a place for employment more than anything.  
This kind of comment did a lot to explain how incineration proponents were able to defuse the 
dangers of incineration.  To argue against incineration was to argue against thousands of good 
jobs, and even without the recent economic downturn nationally, that was a hard sell in rural 
Alabama.  This basic economic fundamental explained why people were so supportive of 
incineration efforts in Anniston.  I asked Wendy about the Depot and who opposed it.  Without 
hesitation, she replied, “I know there’s a lot of jobs out there.  I don’t know how many, but I 
know there’s a lot.  I know a lot of people didn’t want it here, and people wanted it here for jobs.”  
I ask Jared the same question.  He put his hands together near his face and said:   
It seemed like it was a small majority [minority] outcrying [sic] like it was awful 
and a really bad idea, and other ones were saying it was jobs and that’s good—
we need these jobs…There are going to be people here who will fight tooth and 
nail, but after a while, most common people will say, ah, I think it will be okay.  
We need jobs, you know.   
This economic rationale was to the point where some people completely disassociated the Depot 
with its military role.  Asked about her views on the Depot, Wendy explained, “I really don’t see 
it as a military thing.  Well, now after the war, because they rebuild tanks and stuff like that, I 
don’t still don’t look it as military…it’s just a base where people work is how I look at it.”  This 
disassociation explains how some people can define the Depot as an exclusively benevolent force, 
and this is withstanding the possible dangers of an accident or pollution.   
Harriet spoke to this fear, “Yeah, and that employability factor is huge, and I get that, but 
the mantra that some jobs are better than no job, even if it will kill you? Even if it kills your 
kids?” 
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 Many respondents commented on this issue of danger.  In some ways, there existed 
ambiguity when it came to danger from the stockpile and incinerator.  No one really had 
definitive knowledge on this issue; any way you look at it, the danger was largely hypothetical, or 
at the least, contestable.   What really was not contestable was the danger of unemployment.  
Nearly everyone in the community remembered what happened when the Fort closed.  Thinking 
of the possibilities of losing the Depot, Tonya told me:   
It is one of the largest employers…companies, not companies, but anyway, the 
largest that hires people, and a lot of people out there, but if that were ever to 
close down I mean, Anniston would be absolutely nothing…It would devastate 
Anniston, that’s for sure. We have people transferring in from other depots to 
Anniston, and they do a lot of good work out there: repairing vehicles and things 
for the military. 
An owner of a local business, Vera also worries about the possibilities of decommission.  She 
explained her worries: 
The Depot plays a huge part, you know.  I didn’t mention that, but I should have 
because it’s military; it is a huge part.  I think it’s the largest employer in our 
area, and of course has a big part in our servicemen and women overseas, 
providing them with the tanks and the equipment they need, and if we lose that, I 
don’t know what Anniston will do.  I mean, that is…that supports so many 
families in this town, one way or another, so many people have at least one 
member of their household that works out there in some form or fashion.  I know 
a lot of people from the Depot that shop with me.  So that’s going to affect a 
multitude of people if we lose the Depot. 
I asked her, “Do you think that’s a realistic fear?” 
Vera expressed a common held view: 
Oh yes.  Every time it’s come up on the closure list or whatever, I know people at 
the chamber of commerce and other community leaders are immediately going to 
congress and congressmen and getting in there, working hard, and digging deep, 
fighting to keep it.   
Losing the Fort devastated the local economy, and people generally cherish the Depot because of 
that very reason.  Losing the Depot would more or less be a death sentence for the economic 
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wellbeing of the area.  I asked Rob if the community thought the incinerator was dangerous.  He 
illustrated the common fears of unemployment, “Yeah, I’d say so.  I think for people to make that 
distinction, or to understand it is dangerous, but the lack of jobs is more dangerous.  That’s the 
opinion.” 
 People knew incineration was only temporary.  Eventually the weapons will all burn, and 
the future remains uncertain.  Anna told me of her neighbor and the ensuing end of employment 
in Anniston: 
Well my neighbor works there, and I know she has to wear the safe suit [short 
laugh], and she works a really crazy shift.  They work really unusual shifts, but 
they make good money, but they don’t have a guarantee of a job beyond the end 
of the disposal period.  They know that.   
Linda has a close friend that works at the incinerator.  Her concerns were that the community will 
not find another use for the facility.  Imagining the end, she told me:  
My pretty good friend, I was talking to him the other day, and they just got 
through, I think they’re 75 % finished, and I was talking to him about it, and he 
said: yeah, I think I’ve just about burned myself out of a job here…I do wish 
someone could determine another use for it, but if you don’t, I think there’s a 
thousand jobs out there, and if they don’t find a use for it, there’s another 
thousand people on unemployment.   
Roberta placed this event in context.  Once incineration ceases, she feared there will be a great 
exodus from the county.  A lot of people that work at the incinerator are highly educated and 
relatively well paid.  She told me of her concerns:  
Another thing they are looking at is what they calling the great brain drain.   
There are eleven hundred employees out there that have been trained in 
specialized positions specifically for that.  Once the facility is closed, the work is 
done; these people aren’t going to stay around here.  They are going somewhere 
else to find a job.  Which is pretty much to be expected because it’s not like you 
can open up your own shop around here to do that, so the county, as well as the 
other municipalities in the county, are concerned with here you have these highly 
technical, trained people—eleven hundred of them—and their families, and once 
the facilities close, these people are going to scatter to the winds and find other 
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jobs, and what’s that going to do to the economy?  What’s that going to do to the 
housing market and everything else?  So what they want to do is keep those 
people here.  One of the things they are looking at is [laugh] getting a grant, 
government money, to refurbish that facility into something else so those people 
can continue to work there but be retrained to work something else.  
Martha told me a very similar worry.  She hoped to keep some of these incinerator employees in 
the county, and this makes sense because Alabama was not exactly known for its highly trained 
and educated workforce.  These incinerator people were valuable to the economy, and she wanted 
to keep them in the community: 
Now the big focus is when that closes down, there are almost eleven hundred 
jobs out there—and a lot of them are very highly skilled jobs, very good paying 
jobs, and the community does not want to lose those people for several reasons: 
number one, many of them may not move right away, so unemployment will go 
up, but the main thing is that if we can keep that workforce here, it gives us a 
better opportunity to attract a company that pays well because they are looking 
for skilled workers.   
But some people remained pessimistic about the incinerator’s future.  I asked Anna about the 
incinerator’s future, and she expressed her lack of optimism, “Since my neighbor works there, 
and she knows in two years her job will end.  I think if they were intending to bring in other stuff 
or refit it, they would have some kind of indication of opportunity for further employment.”   
 Speaking with Vera, she divulged her inside knowledge on the plans for the incinerator.  
She owns a local business, and the topic of refitting the incinerator occasionally comes up in 
conversation with her customers.  I asked her if she was hopeful for a new use, and she simply 
told me: 
No.  The only thing that comes up in conversation is when a customer comes in 
and says, our time is going quickly, we aren’t going to be here for long.  She and 
her husband works out there, and that’s what’s on some people’s minds now.  
The job’s almost finished.  The reason they transferred here is almost over with, 
and they are looking at moving again in the future.  That’s the only time things 
come up about it.   
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PATRIOTISM 
“You can’t play the national anthem or put a flag up unless I start crying, it 
just hits me that way [voice wavering].” 
The incinerator became a reality in Anniston for several reasons, but one important factor 
was the widespread patriotism in the community.  Southerners are known for involvement and 
participation in the military, and they are typically outspoken in their support of national defense 
and nationalism.  However, in an old military town like Anniston, this supports runs very, very 
deep.  I asked Wendall about the apparent lack of opposition to the incinerator, and he linked it to 
the patriotic nature of the people living in the Anniston area and the common fear that negative 
press could contribute to the Depot’s possible decommission:     
They would never say anything because they’d lose their job I bet, and they 
would not want to be disrespectful of the military because they would be fearful 
of saying negative things or things like that, well, the Anniston Army Depot 
would be the next thing to be closed, and then there would be a big hole, not just 
the Fort leaving, but if they shut down the Depot, that threat has been out there 
for quite a few years, but when W was the president, they thought they would 
shut down the Depot and send all the work to Texas—the place in Texarkana, the 
Depot there, so a lot of these people are retired military people, or career 
politicians, or relatives, or family members, and so…they are very respectful of 
the government and the military, and don’t want to do anything that would shed a 
negative light on any of their dealings, so there hasn’t been a lot…they feel it 
would be unpatriotic, and southerners are very patriotic…typically, and pro-
military.  
Other respondents linked the patriotism and lack of critique to the war effort.  Sarah told me, 
“Yeah they’ve made it so.  You know, they made it, to well, if you don’t like the war, then you’re 
not patriotic.  You know what I mean?  So they’ve done the same thing with the incinerator.  I 
asked Roberta if this is so.  She agreed, explaining that the military role of the Depot is a source a 
pride in the community; it makes people feel like they are important in national matters of 
defense: 
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Oh yeah, in certain circles, yeah…like if you go down to Clay County, yeah, it’s 
sickening, and in certain areas of Piedmont, it’s pretty much like that too.  
Anniston is probably 50/50, and there’s a very strong good ole’ boy network, and 
[in a bravado voice] you gotta support our troops, you know…As far as the good 
ole’ southern attitude: [said with toughness] everybody’s got to support our 
troops and all that; and with different wars going on and different military 
actions, it’s kind of odd: it brings a sense of community to this area because they 
are doing something that’s nationally supportive…but it’s got an important role.  
And this sense of community was something people want to maintain, especially since the painful 
death of the old Fort.  Dorothy recalled a familiar story about the old days at the Fort, “Yeah, it 
used to be with Fort McClellan.  It used to be a big part.  I remember I used to hear the playing 
music when they would bring the flag down and up, you know? And we’d go out there on base a 
lot, and watch fireworks and stuff.”  Irene told me of the ups and downs of patriotism in the area: 
Let’s see, I’ve gone through different periods [laugh].  When I grew up, the 
military was respected and looked up to, you know, and I would say the military 
was on that level of doctors and lawyers and people to be respected, and then we 
went into the military, and during the period my husband was in the military, we 
were in during Carter’s administration, and I think that’s when the military hit a 
big nose-dive, and during the Vietnam War, where you went from being 
respected to being spit on, and then it came back when Iraq, they’re revered 
again.   
There was a strong generational aspect to this kind of nationalism.  Again, talking to Irene, I 
discovered how deep this patriotism runs in a family: 
I’m very patriotic.  I was before I married my husband.  I was before we went 
into the military.  You can’t play the national anthem or put a flag up unless I 
start crying, it just hits me that way [voice wavering].  It makes me proud.  My 
nephew went to Iraq, and I said, look at the tanks and see if you see anything on 
them.  He said why, and I said because there’s a good chance that tank came 
from the Depot, and he said are you kidding me?  And I said no.  And so once he 
got home, my youngest son now works at the Depot, so he took my nephew to 
tour the Depot, and I don’t know if it gave him a sense of wellbeing or a sense of 
home—even away from home—maybe he saw a tank rolling through, he could 
say, hey, that came from grandmother’s house—right outside her house, you 
know? 
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FATALISM 
“this was going to happen regardless one way or the other, so you just deal 
with it” 
 Talking with many respondents, I discovered a lot of them share a common feeling of 
fatalism in regards to the incinerator.  They fundamentally saw the incinerator as predestined.  
They felt that nothing they could do would affect the outcome of events, and while opposition 
may be good for communicating grievances, it was basically a worthless pursuit.  The incinerator 
was going to happen, and it did.  Period.  Will explained:   
I think that the military just knew what it could do.  It was going to do it, and all 
they really wanted to do was to calm everyone and reassure everyone in the area: 
no, everything is safe.  Everything is fine.  It’s all under control; pay no attention 
to the man behind the curtain sort of thing.  And um, I’m sure the military 
understood that there would be opposition, and they came in with their PR 
people, and had town hall meetings and all that good business, and didn’t really 
listen, but said we’re listening to you, and it ended up here anyway.  It was 
always going to be here.  It was foreordained, predestined.  
Bob agreed, “I think it was more of a…it was gonna happen, no matter what.  I don’t think the 
forces trying to stop it were going to be able to stop it.”   
 Sarah echoed this sentiment, “Yeah, even though they had the meetings, it was inevitable.  
The senators and representatives already agreed to do it…so people wouldn’t get up in arms.”   
 Martha told me, “I think most of the community wanted to build it, burn it, get rid of it, 
be done with it attitude.”   
 Jared compared it to Cold War thinking, “I think people would kind of group it into the 
whole nuclear weapon idea: there’s nothing you can do about it.”   
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 Craig told me, “it’s disliked but I think a necessary evil.”  Talking to Harold, he clearly 
illustrated this surrender to fatalism:  
There’s a perception that you have more voice than you actually have.  
Ultimately yes.  If they want to put more munitions out there, you can go out 
there with whatever posters saying whatever you want, and that won’t change the 
fact that if those who wanted it to happen, it will happen.  Cause those who 
wanted those munitions burned in Anniston, at the Depot, it may have taken 
longer than they had wanted it to take, but they got it done.  
Will shared Harold’s pessimism: 
We’re just being boned again, yeah.  You get used to it after a while.  Anal sex 
reference…every so often they give you a reach around.  I don’t know, man, after 
a while you get used to it, and nothing anyone here does is going to change what 
happens.  Nothing that happens here is going to prevent them from hauling in 
more material.  
Intrigued, I inquired Will to expand on this view.  I asked him about the government’s tactics and 
how they related to the strategies used by the opposition movement.  Although tautological, he 
offered a useful explanation, arguing that the opposition wielded no real power: 
It was more focused…well, they used a multi-pronged attack, but in the end, I 
think the anti-incineration argument failed first of all because it was never going 
to succeed.  The military was never going to allow it to succeed.  And second of 
all, because it was a lot of sound and fury.  Any academic, any…to my 
knowledge, the anti-incinerator movement, the people running this, only hired 
one batch of consultants to perform a study.   I don’t think they were that well 
funded.  I don’t believe that studies that may have been able to sway important 
politicians, important civic leaders, to throwing their weight behind the anti-
incineration movement, I don’t think they were keen on generating that kind of 
data, that kind of research.  It boiled down to a question of: we don’t want it; we 
live here, you go away and leave us the hell alone! [in a southern accent] And 
being mostly leftists and academics, we didn’t have assault rifles at this rally.  
This wasn’t the tea party.  Nobody really felt threatened by a lot of: hey you go 
away talk; you go and leave us alone. There was no convincing, coercing, or 
intimidating the military away.   
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Greg also recognized the limited academic nature of the opposition movement.  Most of the work 
to stop the incinerator began and ended at Jacksonville State University—not a bad place to start 
a movement, but for whatever reason, it never really took off in the community.  He explained: 
I think in terms of here at the university, there seemed to be a lot of tension—
seemed like there were a lot of people against it.  I don’t think a lot of people in 
the county were necessarily happy about it, but people weren’t going, oh that’s 
fantastic!  But at the same time, I think there was just kind of this 
acknowledgement that this was going to happen regardless one way or the other, 
so you just deal with it, and you move on with your life, and I think that was 
probably more the sentiment. 
The incineration narrative was so powerful that many people were not even aware of any 
alternatives technologies.  Again, many respondents did not see any option other than 
incineration.  A staunch supporter of incineration and the military, I asked Irene about alternatives 
to incineration:   
I don’t know.  I really don’t know.  I’m sure other alternatives were probably 
discussed.  There was a lot of stuff in the paper, but I think that was determined 
early on that it [incineration] was the best and maybe only way to get rid of them 
on site.  
Simon remembered the upstart opposition as well, but he also related the issue to the lack of a 
“real” alternative to incineration.  Given the strong voice of the military, many people saw 
incineration as inevitable.  As he put it:  
At first I remember this kind of outrage.  People don’t want that.  They’re afraid 
of toxins in the air, and what if something breaks loose you know, and we have 
contamination everywhere.  And that’s understandable, but at the same time, if 
it’s not here, then where?  [short laugh] You got to do it somewhere.  If you have 
to destroy something, these horrible chemicals, you have to do it somewhere.   
Curtis told me a similar opinion.  He offered a rather pragmatic take on the issue of incineration: 
Now, if you ask me if we should be incinerating these things near people, that’s 
different issue, I don’t know.  They have to get rid of them somehow.  Better 
they had never built them, but once the genie’s out of the bottle, what do you do?   
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And since many people perceived incineration as primarily a military issue, they also were 
inclined to surrender agency and responsibility to the government to take care of the danger.  
Perhaps this was a reason so many respondents feel fatalistic towards the incinerator.  Roberta 
explained: 
When it comes to something like this, people do not feel—a general statement—
many people do not feel like they are responsible for this, that is the government 
that’s doing this; the government is responsible for this; they are supposed to 
protect me.   
Harriet tied this kind of thinking to a larger cultural tendency to blindly accept authority in 
whatever form it may be.  Asked to describe this, she told me: 
It’s hard to articulate, but it’s quite, quite common.  Respect authority, I almost 
call it a working class mantra, to respect authority, law is god, don’t question 
anything, that’s just the way it is…One thing it does on the positive side [said in 
a high pitch as if questioning], it is a great example to use in classes, and because 
it makes the topics I study: [Subject Removed], it makes it so applicable, that 
students are able to identify and expand on that into other potential areas, and be 
a little more suspicious of the authority figures they’ve been so conditioned to 
accept without question.   
One participant’s sentiment was particularly revealing.  I asked Vera about the incinerator, and 
she basically explained to me that people were free to leave if they do not like the happenings at 
the Depot.  It was a “love it or leave it” kind of message, and this kind of dismissive mentality 
resonates deeply in my memories of growing up in the area.   
I guess the incinerator has come, things are okay, and like I said, time has come 
along, and time heals all wounds and heals all things.  I guess as time has gone 
on, I guess it’s gone to the back of people’s minds, and you deal with the politics 
or whatever is going on at the time.  I guess if that bothers people so much, 
people could leave.  Maybe you can’t fight the bureaucratic thing going on, and 
the incinerator’s coming, well I’ll go somewhere else where I feel more safe, and 
I think having that option helps people too.  People don’t have to stay in the place 
they don’t feel safe.   
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BLISSFUL IGNORANCE 
“I think it’s very interesting that I haven’t, like I said, thought about the 
incinerator in years, haven’t heard about it, so when you brought it up: oh 
yeah, we have that!” 
 As mentioned earlier, many of the participants reported being rather ignorant of the 
goings-on at the Anniston Army Depot.  This should come at no surprise because the early years 
of the stockpile were shrouded in secrecy.  The munitions were officially classified for decades.  
Of course people in the community knew about the weapons for years, but it was not openly 
disclosed to the public until the United States agreed to destroy its chemical weapons.  Looking 
back, Harold explained:   
They probably didn’t put it on billboards or hand out flyers as to what they were 
doing in the first place.  It was just done.  They put munitions out there; they 
didn’t tell people it was sarin gas.   
Wendall moved to the area back in the sixties, and he had no idea there were thousands of 
chemical weapons bedded in the community.  As he recalled: 
Nobody knew they were parked here.  The reasons are the same reasons: political 
atmosphere, apathy, a lot of retired military here, the Fort used to be here, the 
Depot was here, and you have all these retired military people, the pro-
government people, the pro-military people, patriotic people, people busy doing 
their own lives that weren’t—there was no way to even know it was here, and 
they didn’t tell them until the treaty came about [laughing].  
But some things never change.  He did not see much progress in the awareness of the community: 
Nobody knew about it until just a few years ago.  Back before the incinerator 
thing raised its head.  I would say almost everybody didn’t know it was there.  
And I would say a whole lot of them faintly know it is there now….Out of sight, 
out of mind. 
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And others saw the same persistent ignorance, even in themselves.  During our interview Harriet 
suddenly realized the extent of how many weapons were stored at the Depot.  She exclaimed:   
Oh my gosh.  No, and I’m doing the same thing that we’re saying we all do: out 
of sight, out of mind, I don’t think about that.  So we have enough here to blow 
us up, and living in [Location Removed] isn’t going to help me out! [laughing]  
This ignorance effectively contributed to the creation and implementation of the incinerator in 
Anniston.  Craig remembered his early days in college at Jacksonville State University: 
When I first came here as freshman, and maybe it was a couple years later, 
actually—maybe 99 or so, I remember seeing a bumper sticker on the back of a 
car that had the word incineration—it had the N and the O bolded out and in 
large, and I had no idea what that was talking about.  I was like, incinerating 
what?  Burning trash?  I had no idea what they were talking about.   It wasn’t 
until years later I heard it was because they were destroying weapons because 
they were getting rid of old chemical and biologic weapons—I’m not sure 
entirely what’s being destroyed.   
For obvious reasons, locals do not advertise of the incinerator’s existence.  This may not be for 
disreputable reasons, as the emergency management people certainly blanket the community with 
information regarding the stockpile and incinerator.  But even so, some people still missed the 
message.  Greg found out about the incinerator after he purchased a house in its shadow:    
When I was hired, I didn’t know anything about the incinerator, and right after I 
arrived here, all of a sudden they are talking about this, and I have a house in 
Anniston, and it’s like what?  Why didn’t anyone tell me this?  And so I was 
pretty upset.  
Ironically, he then told me how he never wants to hear information coming from the complex—a 
possible sign to why others never mentioned the incinerator to him in the first place: 
[takes a deep breath] Well it’s kind of out of sight, out of mind.  You only, or at 
least I only know what’s going on over there if I hear something bad, but 
hopefully it’s one of those things where you don’t hear anything about it: they’re 
taking care of business. 
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Harriet found herself in a similar situation.  She had no idea of the incinerator’s existence until 
after she moved to Calhoun County.  Thinking back to her first impressions of the incinerator, she 
recalled the shock of first hearing the emergency sirens: 
It is so far off the radar.  You do not hear anything about it except the first 
Tuesday of every month, and one of those alarms is a chemical excursion 
alarm—I believe they call it—it sounds like aliens are coming.  They should 
really tell newcomers that they test the alarms every first Tuesday of the month 
because my first Tuesday was a scary experience.  
She jokes about it now, “And who would think to ask: By the way, do y’all [in a sarcastic tone] 
have a chemical incinerator in the area?  Actually, [Name Removed] told me, after I accepted the 
position [laughing].” But one can imagine how this could unsettle a person.  She told me, “It was 
a shock to me.  It was.  I knew the Army had closed the base, yeah, but it wasn’t on my radar.  It 
was shocking.  It was shocking as the scorpions I found in my home.”  
 Rob admitted the basic concept of the incinerator and stockpile seems dangerous, but he 
put it in perspective with the more immediate and subsequently occupying demands of life.  It 
also comforted him that he knows very little about such a potentially overwhelming source of 
danger:  
It sounds pretty dangerous, but I guess around here you get used to things like 
that.  It’s like one more thing, so I would like to move and get away from it, that 
and everything else.  I guess I don’t know enough about it…so it’s just another 
dangerous thing in the world that I can’t do anything about, and I don’t know 
enough about it.  
Other participants reported similar feelings of ignorance when it came to the incinerator and 
happenings at the Anniston Army Depot.  Like so many other people, Craig moved into Calhoun 
County from an outside location, and he had very little awareness of the incinerator or stockpile.  
I asked Craig about his early impressions of the incinerator.  He told me: 
I didn’t even think about it.  Like I said, when I first came here as a student, I 
didn’t even know it was a thing, but since there wasn’t a lot of public outrage or a 
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lot of people going man, we got to get out of here otherwise something bad will 
happen; since I never heard any of that, I didn’t think of any reason not to 
say…it didn’t reach my ears…none of my family has ever talked about the 
incinerator, even one sentence.   
Some participants were ignorant of other, perhaps more basic, elements of disaster mitigation and 
preparedness.  Asked about his zone of danger, Rob told me, “I don’t know if we were zoned or 
whatever.”   
Like Rob, Wendy had no idea.  She confessed, “I used to know my zone, and now I have 
no idea...Yeah, I haven’t thought about red zone, orange zone, or the numbers.  I know it was 
numbered with different colors, but I haven’t kept up with it since high school.” 
 Roberta felt that the Department of Defense was implicated in this widespread ignorance.  
She worried about future ramifications of incineration, but she felt people will never know if any 
harm were done to the area.  According to Roberta, the proper studies were never done: 
When the facility was first put here, we are going to destroy all the weapons; 
once we are done, we will even destroy the incinerator, and leave it cleaner than 
when we found it, although nobody did a baseline study on any of the 
environment or biological aspects before they built the incinerator.   
PERSONAL ESCAPE: A PARADOX 
“No, it’s not something I put a lot of thought into it.  If anything were to 
happen, we would just evacuate.” 
Even though not all participants found comfort in the efforts to promote emergency 
preparedness in the area, many respondents shared a common belief that they—as individuals—
can successfully escape an incident.  And this must be contrasted with the simultaneously held 
view that many other people will die in the event of an accident, or in the least, many others will 
not be able to successfully evacuate the area.  This interesting view may relate to a shared belief 
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in individualism, but no one provided a reason for why they felt so exceptional, and no one 
addressed the paradox.  It was just accepted that evacuation would never work for the 
community, but somehow “I” could just drive to safety.   
Against all the emergency plans, the idea of someone personally escaping somehow held 
a lot of unquestioned legitimacy.  Asked about the possibility of a disastrous event, Craig 
revealed, “I think everybody’s…what my first knee-jerk reaction was that if you said there were 
chemical weapons nearby that were loose, I would want to get in my car and drive.”   
Bob answered in a similar fashion, “I would probably head north, considering that I’m 
north of it, and it’s going to go east, and there really isn’t a westward route from here that is 
easily obtainable, and the main east route, you would have to go back toward [short giggle] the 
Depot to get there.”   
Greg expressed a similar story, but he took into account what the public would do, “I’ll 
be honest with you, I would look at where I would be at a given time and think well, what’s my 
quickest way out of here, you know?  Compared to what would the rest of the population be 
doing, and trying to think ahead just in case.”  He then returned to the question, and I can tell he 
put a lot of thought into this kind of scenario: 
Here [Jacksonville] I was far enough away; all I have to do is get on 21 and head 
north, no big deal.  I would have more than enough time.  At home, I probably 
could get in the car and drive… I would get in my car and drive north; go spend 
the night in Tennessee or maybe Rome, Georgia.  Go breathe in some of the 
paper mill air…I probably could get in the car and drive away faster than it 
would have been to put all the plastic and tape up.  My fear was being in my car 
and being stuck, because then I don’t know what I would have done.  I would 
have to close the vents, turn off the air conditioning or whatever I guess, I don’t 
know, roll up all the windows.  It would have been a very uncomfortable 
situation. 
Tonya’s son voiced his concerns about the incinerator, and she attempted to calm him with the 
possibility of her escape to other locations.  As she told it: 
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He was worried that I lived too close or whatever, but I said no, I’m one of the 
furthest away from it, don’t worry about it—keep my car full of gas, and if 
something happens, I’ll go fly over to Atlanta [laughing]… 
Her confidence was reassuring, but she then revealed a possibly fatal mistake in her assessment, 
“so all I had to do is go right around the corner to DeArmanville and hit the interstate, and I 
would be there, in Atlanta, so… not to Birmingham, that would be the wrong way! [laughing]”   
Harriet explained how the prospect of escape overrode the other emergency possibilities:  
I get a calendar, and the calendar tells me my zone.  Maybe I’m in that active part 
of denial too because I don’t even know my zone.  I don’t even look at that 
calendar.  To me, I hear an alarm, I get on 9, I go north; I’m not looking for no 
plastic or duct tape [laughing], you know?  
And she weighed this against the possibilities of other people evacuating the area.  Laughing 
about the absurdity of the situation, she told me: 
I really, really do.  You know, in that dream, I would have gotten in that car and 
gone north.  That’s my plan; I knew it when I bought that house; it’s right on 
9…I can go on 9 and go north.  I’m good…I’m thinking everyone else is going 
on 21.  So 9 will be a little more deserted.  I think that’s a good idea, Jeremy 
[laughing loudly].  
Other respondents shared a similar story.  The narrative of personal escape had a lot of purchase 
with the people I interviewed.  When asked about the shelter in place kits, Martha told me why a 
lot of people are not overly concerned with even picking them up.  She explained: 
A lot of people said I’m not going to get one of those kits; I’m going to get in the 
car and hightail it out of there, you know?  So, which was my plan, I was going 
to duck behind Cheaha Mountain.   
And others had much the same plan.  Irene told me about she and her husband: 
With my husband and I, it was more of if something happens, if that siren goes 
off, he gets in one car, and I get in another. He picks up his parents up; I pick 
mine up, and we meet in Sylacauga.   
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Linda shared her plan, “Our evacuation route wasn’t too…if something happened, you got on the 
interstate and headed to Georgia, or get on 431 and head south.”   
 On some level, these escape narratives worked because they resonate with the 
individualistic views of the local population.  Many people in this area believed in the power and 
agency of the exceptional individual.  Reflecting on my own experiences in Anniston, I shared 
this narrative, as I never questioned my own ability to escape an event, but paradoxically, I 
always imagined a far worse scenario for the larger population surrounding the Depot—even 
when I lived and worked in the stockpile’s shadow.       
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter illustrated several factors that shaped perceptions of risk in the Anniston 
area.  These underlying factors largely influenced the participants’ evaluations to the credibility 
of the organizations creating and distributing risk information.  This assessment of legitimacy 
affected their opinions concerning the efficacy of symbolic safety.  The respondents defining 
incineration proponents in positive terms generally did not criticize the fantasy documents and 
objects distributed throughout the community.  On the other hand, participants defining the 
incinerator proponents in negative terms generally found the fantasy documents and objects to be 
extremely problematic and unrealistic.  As this chapter makes clear, this critical evaluation 
usually resulted in surrender to fatalism, apathy, or indifference.  
These findings suggest what sociologists already know: that context matters.  The basic, 
bleak economic reality of the Anniston area remained a crucial influencing factor in how the 
participants evaluated symbolic safety.  As Marx and Engels (1947) described long ago, social 
relationships are both historical and primarily material in nature.  Historically, the 
decommissioning of Fort McClellan remained salient in the memories of local people.  Many 
folks remembered the negative impact of the base’s closure, and they feared the same possibility 
for the Anniston Army Depot.  Further, many people saw the incinerator and Depot as an 
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economic godsend.  Not only were these decent jobs, these were good jobs with federal benefits 
and protections.  People defined these organizations as benefactors, and accordingly, they found 
ways to circumvent whatever cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962) concerning symbolic safety 
this positive definition engendered.         
A deep patriotic and nationalistic sentiment also emerged from this socio-historical 
milieu.  As in other military communities (Shriver et al. 2000), patriotic identity and economic 
saliency largely influenced public attitudes and beliefs towards the military and government 
entities.  This patriotic identity in Anniston did not support tolerance for criticism, and to a large 
degree, it softened skepticism towards symbolic safety.  One could argue that these organizational 
pressures contributed to a “culture of silence” (Beamish 2000) in Anniston, where institutional 
practices and identity discouraged objections and open displays of nonconformity to the 
organizational status quo.  The fate of Fort McClellan entrenched this effect. 
As previously mentioned, skeptical respondents reported feelings of apathy and 
indifference towards matters concerning symbolic safety efforts.  Some simply surrendered to 
fatalism and forgave any opportunity for resistance or hope.  These attitudes reflect the “crisis of 
culture (Weinstein and Weinstein 1990:79)” Simmel observed in Postmodern society, where the 
detached individuals withdraw from Modern structures, forms, and interests.  In these anomic 
conditions, people cease caring about the collective good, and they primarily dedicate their efforts 
pleasing themselves.  I observed this in the sense that skeptical people find themselves in a 
serious existential dilemma.  Given they do not believe in symbolic safety, and that they define 
the stockpile and incinerator as dangerous, these skeptics must still resolve and explain why they 
remain in the area.   
This research suggests that skeptics essentially rationalized their lack of agency.  They 
talked about the incinerator as if it were immune to their influence and opinion.  Others became 
indifferent to its existence, as if ignoring it would make the threat go away.  Regardless of the 
method, these skeptics had to resolve their own fears concerning the stockpile and incinerator. 
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One popular tactic used to rationalize risk and dismiss potential problems with symbolic 
safety was the aforementioned sense of exceptional individualism.  Entertaining a hypothetical 
disaster, many participants envisioned a tragic fate for much of the community.  However, they 
simultaneously expected they could somehow personally escape any carnage.  This finding 
suggests the provocative possibility that audiences have the potential to also engage in fantasy 
production: that they—as a necessity to resolve cognitive dissonance—have the capacity to 
construct their own fantasy documents and objects.  This fascinating possibility warrants future 
investigation.  
In closing, the lack of real opposition to incineration suggests the importance of these 
contextualizing factors.  As Clarke (1999) predicted, successful fantasy documents silence critics.  
This fact was evident in Anniston.  This silencing quality only became stronger with these 
contextualizing factors.   
The next and final chapter summarizes the major findings of this study and discusses its 
implications for sociology, emergency management, and future research.
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CHAPTER IX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This purpose of this research project was to examine how organizations create and 
communicate symbolic safety and assess how members of the public perceive and respond to 
those efforts.  Symbolic safety is a social construction.  Producing and distributing symbolic 
safety is a concerted attempt to persuade people to internalize official definitions of risk.  People 
in power promote these definitions to rationalize the risk they produce, and they hope these 
efforts appease and calm the public.  When accepted, symbolic safety communicates and 
maintains the impression that things are under control.  It secures the existing social order in 
place, and it convinces audiences that oppositional thoughts are unmerited, illegitimate, and 
ultimately problematic.   
This project began by placing incineration within its socio-historical context.  Although 
known as the “Model City”, Anniston has a complex history that includes an undeniable legacy of 
environmental pollution, remarkable social inequality, and significant technological risk.  The 
town also has close historical ties to the military, and for at least the near future, the local 
economy maintains deep ties with the military-industrial complex.  These contextualizing
 
 
164 
conditions work as the foundation for the construction of the incinerator, and they largely 
influence the perceptions and opinions of people living in the area.  
 Drawing upon past research, this study merged insights from the vulnerability paradigm 
of disaster research and the social construction of risk.  It started with and significantly expanded 
the notion of fantasy documents (Clarke 1999) to include a much broader range of fantasy 
objects.  Powerful organizations engage in the production of these objects not for their safety 
value but instead to communicate social order and effectively reify a fantasy of control and 
safety.  This highly symbolic nature conforms to the non-literal, non-utilitarian production and 
consumption found in Postmodernity (Baudrillard 1981).       
Summary and Discussion of Findings 
 In the first phase of analysis I documented what risk information and objects were 
produced and distributed to the communities surrounding the Anniston Army Depot and its 
incinerator.  I included narrative descriptions of this information and objects, and I contextualized 
the material with autoethnographic insight.  This phase outlined how these organizations 
produced and communicated symbolic safety.  In the second phase I chronicled the comments 
from participants comforted and discomforted by the risk information and materials they 
received.  This portion documented how respondents consumed and reacted to symbolic safety 
efforts.  In the third phase I illustrated some of the important factors that contributed to the 
perceptions of the research respondents.  These factors interplayed in complex ways to affect how 
respondents negotiated the reality, value, and necessity of symbolic safety.     
 Wishing to comprehensively address the research questions, I chose to conduct 
qualitative research methods.  I personally traveled to the Anniston area and interviewed twenty-
five people living and working near the stockpile and incinerator.  The goal of these interviews 
was to discover what risk information and materials these people received, and perhaps more 
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importantly, what they thought of these materials and objects.  Qualitative methods, in particular 
autoethnographic accounts and personal interviews, offer a detail and character of 
phenomenological information that cannot come from any other method.  Although limited in its 
statistical generalizability, it rings true.   
Incineration in Anniston became a reality, and this happened for several important 
reasons.  Although the distributed risk materials and information did provide a degree of comfort 
to certain members of the population, others remained skeptical of these endeavors.  Support or 
opposition to the incinerator did not necessarily connect to perceptions of these risk products.  
Interestingly, several contextual factors circumvented these emergency management efforts. 
The bleak economic reality of Anniston was foremost in the minds of many people in the 
area.  This was partially due to the painful legacy of Fort McClellan’s closing.  Many people 
valued the incinerator as a source of good jobs.  Widespread unemployment and 
underemployment was a commonly understood risk in the Anniston area.  The possible risk from 
an accident remained far less certain.  This basic, economic reality became compounded, as 
people framed these jobs within the larger themes of patriotism, nationalism, and even sacrifice.  
Local people took pride in the Depot and its importance in national defense, and many people 
defined this kind of dangerous work as a necessary aspect of their duty to the country. 
 These factors made opposing the incinerator exceedingly difficult.  To oppose the 
incinerator was tantamount to betraying the country.  People clearly defined the Depot in 
unflinching, nationalistic terms, and there was little tolerance for vulgar displays of dissent.  
Some respondents justified their burden of risk in terms of sacrifice.  Military families often 
suffer difficulties, and some respondents validated their burden in these same terms.  Patriotism 
aside, many people placed opposition against the positive economic contributions of the Depot.  
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To oppose the incinerator was to oppose jobs, and that remained a hard sell for most people, 
especially in an area this economically depressed. 
Another important factor that makes these risk materials and information moot was this 
widespread sense of what I call exceptional individualism.  This refers to the untested, 
paradoxical belief that the unprepared individual will somehow transcend the bleak fates of other 
people in a disaster.  In this case, many respondents predicted and expected widespread chaos and 
destruction from a hypothetical incident or accident in Anniston.  They held this view 
simultaneously with the belief that they have the capacity to personally escape this same 
hypothetical calamity through an undefined degree of composure and exceptional skill.  It seemed 
most people never questioned this problematic view; it was just accepted on its face that they can 
get on the nearest road and somehow leave the carnage behind.  One only has to look at the 
complications associated with hurricane-induced mass evacuations to understand the problems of 
this belief, but even much smaller events—such as traffic generated from sporting events--serve 
as a good reality check to the untested views of exceptional individualism.  People plan these 
annual events months or even years ahead, and communities make a coordinated effort to 
organize and direct traffic through the employment of extra police officers and the redirection of 
traffic so that cars may more efficiently flow away from the stadium.  But inevitably the town 
becomes gridlocked, and these plans—even though carefully thought out and properly 
executed—seem to make things marginally better.  And all of this usually happens within a 
celebratory environment; these evacuations happen without a sense of impending doom or the 
pressures of dealing with mass casualties, fires, or serious chemical contamination.  As previously 
mentioned, no respondent directly addressed this paradox in the interviews, and no one explained 
exactly why they felt so exceptional.  Perhaps it resonated with the individualistic tendencies of 
our culture.  This issue begs for more research.   
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For many people, this uncritical and untested view effectively diminished the need to 
prepare for a disaster.  After all, why prepare for a disaster when you can simply get in your car 
and leave it all behind?  Further, this assumptive view reduced critical thinking, and it negated the 
purported, overt reasons for the public consuming risk information and sheltering products in the 
first place: that they provide the community safety from a chemical incident.  Unfortunately 
exceptional individualism worked to undermine emergency preparedness efforts, and emergency 
planners need to address this obstacle to disaster mitigation. 
Another reason explaining this circumvention of emergency management efforts can be 
found in the more covert nature of these highly symbolic risk products distributed to the public.  
Support or opposition for the incinerator was not contingent on believing the efficacy of these 
materials.  Many people that support the incinerator did not believe in the emergency plans 
(evacuation or sheltering) or materials (tape, plastic, filters, et cetera).  This may seem 
counterintuitive, but considering the postmodern production and consumption, this makes sense.  
People do not consume or produce these materials for their utility, and these products are not 
produced for their overt, physical properties.  Instead, these products are highly symbolic in 
nature; they effectively communicate that a social order exists, and further, the consumption of 
these products reifies power structures.  When successfully communicated, these products 
produce a simulacrum of safety.  As with so many aspects of postmodern reality, “real” safety no 
longer exists, and consuming these products affords people the opportunity to chase their desires.   
Not all supporters of the incinerator entirely believed in the information and materials; to 
them, this disbelief was not troubling, as the products were irrelevant to the issue.  On the other 
hand, opponents always disbelieved these products; to them, this disbelief effectively manifested 
as apathy, indifference, and surrender to a fatalistic view of events related to the incinerator.  In 
both cases, the public consumed these products, and what became communicated was not real 
safety.  This was symbolic safety.  The semiotic exchange confirmed the existing social order and 
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further embedded power with legitimacy, hence the public’s apathy and lack of concerted 
opposition to the incinerator.    
Conceptual Implications of the Study 
This research provides a unique conceptual contribution to the sociological literature 
addressing risk.  Following the suggestions of Tierney (2007) and Quarantelli (1994), it addresses 
the need for fresh theoretical insight into the sociology of disasters, and it offers a novel look at 
how people perceive and negotiate risk information and planning.    
This project demonstrates two things.  First, it confirms that audiences are active 
participants in the creation and negotiation of social reality.  Second, it illustrates how important 
contextual factors can interplay with the perceptions of risk and efforts to mitigate disasters.  
These perceptions of risk differ greatly, and these perceptions change over time and space.  They 
are socially constructed, and this construction becomes accepted as reality through a negotiation 
of discourse and a complex process of symbolic exchange—both manifesting in diffuse and fluid 
forms.  These perceptions are often contentious, and complex organizations like Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Management Program and the Department of Defense put a lot of effort 
into successfully communicating their versions of reality to the public.  This study confirms their 
successes in Anniston.  
 All complex organizations that engage in risk make contingency plans.  We may return to 
the writings of Clarke (1999) to better understand this whole process and how it relates to these 
events in Anniston, Alabama.  Clarke writes that organizations often cannot account for the 
substantial risk they produce.  They do not acknowledge or even see their own limitations, and 
they may overestimate their ability to manage risk.  Again, this is not for nefarious reasons 
necessarily, but it is an unfortunate, reoccurring theme with large organizations in contemporary 
times.  To alleviate this, these organizations create plans to reduce risk to the public, and 
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according to Clarke, some of these plans have little to no actual utility.  Clarke calls these plans 
“fantasy documents”, and as the name indicates, they are fantastic in their promises to the 
consuming public. Fantasy documents offer the public an illusion of safety and basic competency.  
The case of the Anniston incinerator provides an illustration of Clarke’s concept.  By any 
reasonable definition, the degrading stockpile in Anniston is an example of a significant risk 
imposed on a population by an organization.  In this case, the risk comes in several forms: 
possible leaks and contamination of the environment, explosions from stray lightening or periodic 
tornadoes, or simple human error and mistakes in transporting, handling, or incinerating these 
volatile munitions.   
Several organizations created and produced plans to mitigate the danger with the aging 
stockpile and subsequent incinerator.  These plans included risk information and objects for the 
public to consume.  In terms of information, all the plans revolve around a central reorganization 
and redefinition of local geographies.  CSEPP, local, federal, and state emergency management 
agencies reorganized the surrounding populations into four core zones, all based on proximity to 
the stockpile and on estimates of timeframes dealing with the dispersal of contaminants.  Initially 
this planning called for an untested, coordinated evacuation of surrounding communities, but 
realizing the problems of a mass evacuation, organizers eventually deemphasized—but not 
completely disregarded—this plan for sheltering in place, a concept still based on the newly 
constructed zones of risk in the Anniston area.  At first glance this abandonment of evacuation 
plans for sheltering seems odd, but seriously considering Clarke’s definition of fantasy 
documents, this abandonment becomes sensible.  Fantasy documents are neither believed nor not 
believed by their producers (Clarke and Perrow 1996); perhaps that also applies to their 
consumers as well.  Perhaps organizations do not really care about the viability of their own 
plans.  Rather, they may care more about the successful communication of the fact that a plan 
exists.  In some ways changing the plans further reinforces the logic of the plan in the first place; 
 
 
170 
like some kind of surreal sequel, it gives these organizations a chance to elaborate and expand on 
their fantasy.  This also slows any chance for negation in the public, as newer plans carry even 
less expectations for a reality check, and through their very existence, they communicate that 
officials still maintain control of the situation.  
 This research builds from this conceptualization of fantasy documents.  But I contend 
these organizations not only produce fantasy documents but also produce objects to amplify the 
same quiescent effect.  This process is evident in the case of the Anniston stockpile and 
incinerator.  Emergency officials produced and distributed fantasy objects to the community 
surrounding the Depot according to their distance and perceived risk.  As previously mentioned, 
these objects included gasmasks, air filters, scissors, and tape with plastic sheeting, but their use 
goes beyond their physical capabilities.  Although these materials could potentially save lives, 
there still exist serious doubts considering some of the difficulties with this population properly 
implementing these objects in a disaster scenario.  As the critics I interviewed pointed out, these 
areas contain people with varying abilities and condition of housing.  Additionally there may not 
be enough warning for those living and working close to the complex.  But these confounding 
variables aside, confidence in these objects demands an assumption that they will work as 
advertised—as thankfully, they remain untested.  But I contend these objects are not produced or 
consumed for their overt utility.  They are highly symbolic, and their desired effect is to calm the 
population and reintegrate the social order.  
 These objects worked to preserve this principle of reality.  Consuming symbolic safety 
affirmed, legitimized, and reified power.  Symbolic safety crystallized the impression that a 
disaster was nearly impossible, and that if it were to somehow occur, officials could and would 
effectively control the disaster situation.  The public felt prepared that everything would remain 
orderly and secure.  To this effect, these powerful organizations produced and distributed fantasy 
documents; they bolstered this with tangible objects to achieve a real sense of credibility.  Their 
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audiences varied in their opinions of these objects, and although more important with critics, their 
utility did not greatly influence opinions on the risky organizations one-way or the other.  Instead, 
these objects silenced critics and ensured continuity in the social order of the community.  This 
became apparent in the widespread apathy in the community and most evident in the frustrations 
of the opponents to incineration.   
Applied Implications 
 This research contains several implications for application away from academia.  In 
particular, emergency planners should become mindful of not only their mitigation efforts and 
what they produce, but they need to account for how the population actually makes sense of the 
materials and information they receive.  Audiences are not passive consumers of information; 
they have a degree of agency, and they ultimately decide the utility and value of these efforts.   
Key to this study’s applied implications is the previously described phenomenon of 
exceptional individualism.  This particular cognitive factor imposes substantial obstacles to 
emergency planning efforts.  In the case of Anniston, we can see how this mindset impaired 
citizens from planning adequately for a disaster.  Emergency planners need to somehow 
communicate the potential problems with this kind of thinking.  Individuals need to critically 
assess their prospects for surviving a real disaster, and they need to recognize and resolve the 
problematic, existential disconnect they maintain between themselves and the community at 
large.  Communicating this will be difficult, as the narrative of rugged individualism runs deep in 
the culture.  Perhaps emergency managers could instead emphasize community solidarity in their 
planning; they could call for neighborhoods and smaller communities to plan together for an 
emergency.  This coordination could also engender informal ties and set up organic avenues of 
communication for many possible disaster scenarios.  Individual persons need to see past 
themselves.  They need to become aware of how interdependent the community really is.  At any 
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level, it would be good if the community were more directly involved in disaster planning.  I 
think more information would create a certain amount of concern, and that attention could force 
individuals to recognize the significance problems with this exceptional view of the individual.       
Limitations 
 This research has some methodological limitations.  The primary concern is its limited 
generalizability.  The non-probability sampling method is not amenable to statistical analysis, and 
because the focus is so specific to the Anniston area, findings from this study may not be 
generalizable to other places and phenomena.  Nevertheless, the case is unique and deserving of 
this kind of exploratory analysis.  Moreover, given that there are other chemical weapons sites in 
the United States, some of the findings are surely transferable to the other communities.  Another 
limitation of the research involves the issue of timing.  By the time this research was conducted, 
incineration was already underway in Anniston.  Perhaps a longitudinal study that tracked citizen 
perceptions of risk and safety over a longer period of time, including before the incinerator was 
approved, would have generated other interesting insights.     
Future Research 
 This project has expanded research on risk and disaster, merging the vulnerability and 
social constructionist paradigms.  As a result, it has opened new, potentially fruitful areas of 
future investigation.  For example, although environmental justice was not a primary focus of the 
current study, future research could address the significant pollution in the Anniston area and its 
close relationship to historical and contemporary events concerning race and class.  There is a 
strong case for environmental racism in Anniston, and future research should address this 
important issue.   
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Additionally, another topic not fully explored in this study that should be pursued further 
is the issue of environmental illness in the areas surrounding the Anniston Depot.  Although it 
was not included in the analysis, the topic came up unsolicited in the interviews.  One participant 
revealed that every woman on her street but herself has breast cancer.   
Finally, future research should explore the possible link between the use of fantasy 
objects to manufacture “therapeutic communities.”  It may be that because of devices such as 
warning sirens and radio alerts, people have stopped differentiating between technological risks 
and the hazards imposed by nature.  Perhaps these devices help create new communities and 
geographies of risk, and these effectively promote social solidarity in the face of potential harm.         
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Interview Schedule 
 
1. Tell me about Anniston, Alabama. 
a. If you had to describe it to an outsider, for example—someone moving here and 
they want to know what it’s like… 
b. History?   
c. Important things to know? 
d. Phenomenological qualities… 
e. How did you get here? 
2. How would you describe the role of the military in the community? 
a. Depot 
b. Fort McClellan  
3. I’ve been gone for a while, can you tell me about the incinerator?  
a. What are your thoughts about the incinerator being built here? 
b. What do you know about incineration? 
i. Describe the process of incineration? 
4. How would you describe the community reaction to the incinerator being built here in 
Anniston? 
a. How has your family and friends reacted? 
b. Do you know of anyone opposed to incineration?   
i. Can you tell me about them? 
5. What kind of risk information have you received about incineration? 
a. Do you feel that it is adequate?  
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b. Have you taken any special steps or anything ‘just in case’? 
6. What do you think would happen if there were an accident at the Depot? 
a. How adequately do you think the community is prepared? 
b. Do you think government officials have done enough to inform the public on 
what to do? 
7. Thank you for your help.  Before we go, I need to ask you a few last questions: 
a. What year were you born? 
b. What is your ethnicity? 
c. What’s the highest level of education you’ve obtained? 
8. Do you have any questions for me? 
9. Is there anything important you would like to add that we didn’t discuss? 
10. Do you know anyone that might be interested in participating in this study?  Could you 
give me their information?
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